Mensa's Theists Still Don't Understand Atheists

Recent letters appearing in The Mensa Bulletin have garnered attention under the header: 'Atheists Come In Many Flavors'.   Indeed, and in one response I noted:

"Reading Scott Bowden’s letter  (‘Brainwaves’, September, p. 12), reminded me of  James Byrne’s arguments in his book, ‘GOD’ to do with the limits of humans' grasp of  such an entity. Byrne argued that all statements made by humans to do with God must be either incomplete or more often contradictory. Byrne thereby endorsed French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion’s ploy of  only writing  GOD. Thereby to indicate no one has the capacity to define, describe, prove, or  imagine  the underlying entity.

In effect, as Byrne observed (p.151)  “to think GOD as unthinkable is to reject the idolatry of the God of onto-theology.   Byrne’s thesis also introduced a problem for atheists. For if  this entity is de-conceptualized, then it can’t be debated, even by the most ardent, aggressive atheist. The latter ends up tilting at a windmill of the mind, like a modern Don Quixote.  I suspect the takeaway message is we need to look beyond facile word symbols and stop jousting at them if we’re to get a reasonable resolution.  The alternative is that debate will invariably prove futile since incomplete definitions and contradictions inevitably emerge, even in atheist claims and arguments."

This is actually a synthesis of arguments I also made in my book, Beyond Atheism,  Beyond God,  and in the relevant chapter I took pains to point out the "beyond" in the title  is a different thing from being “beyond knowledge” as the classic agnostic would define it. It is rather, beyond any capacity for human thought at all!  Thus, while the avowed agnostic may insist his position embraces impossibility of knowledge of God, this new category prohibits even naming the subject when expressing limitations of knowledge. It is more productive and practical, as Byrne avers, to regard God as a “regulative ideal”. Such an ideal for human use doesn’t necessarily preclude a transcendent Being, but it doesn’t require it either.

These observations became more relevant as the next blowback arrived in the October issue of the Bulletin with more theists putting in their 2 cents, including a padre. (Father John Oliver). For some reason Fr. Oliver wasn't limited to a mere 250 word letter but allocated an entire article headed: 'We Theists Come With Four Suggestions' directed at atheists and specified under what Oliver presumed to be four atheist categories.

His first broadside was directed at the "reluctant atheist" and he admonished:

"We theists encourage a reconsideration of agnosticism. Compared to atheism it is the more intellectually defensible position"

But is it really? And more to the point, does Fr. Oliver really know what agnosticism means? On parsing the context of Oliver's query it is clear to me he has no idea of agnosticism. I refer here to George Smith ('The Case Against God', p. 9):

Properly considered, agnosticism is not a third alternative to theism and atheism because it is concerned with a different aspect of religious belief. Theism and atheism  refer to the presence or absence of belief in a god; agnosticism refers to the impossibility of knowledge with regard to a god or supernatural being.

Note that this is a critical difference.  From a scientific and objective standpoint there is simply no way that any purported "supernatural" entity can be demonstrated or proven.  There are no existing scientific methodologies for such, nor any credible instruments, measuring techniques. The rejoinder that these things "can't be measured" merely reinforces the argument that they are unfit for scientific inquiry any more than the astrologer's claim of Mars' "malefic" influences on a birth. These more refined definitions are crucial, especially in honing people’s mental perspectives which in turn help to forge a coherent mental outlook. After all, if one cannot truly know anything supernatural, then how can one arrive at a supernaturally –based all powerful entity? One can't.

Because there is no way to approach a supernatural domain in any scientific or objective way, then by any reckonings it doesn't exist.  In this case, one need not even "deny" its existence because to all intents the supernatural entity becomes logically unnecessary, or redundant.  It doesn't  help us to make scientific predictions or explain natural phenomena. The point is, if any doubt is to be expressed in terms of the impossibility of knowledge then it must vastly multiplied for supernatural agents. 

As I noted in my ASTRONOMY magazine article:  ‘The God Factor’ (Astronomy Forum, March, 1990), science selectively excludes problems for which no practical method of inquiry exists. The supernatural, which is neither measurable or verifiable, falls into this category and that includes ‘God’ - if depicted as "causeless" and "supernatural". More to the point, we tend to regard such entities held by virtue of belief alone – as opposed to evidence - as evocative of superstition.  The latter encompasses such beliefs, especially when the supernatural realm is populated by invisible beings which can supposedly affect and interact with our world. To the empirical scientist this is the very epitome of superstition.

Fr. Oliver goes on to insist, quoting Thomas Edison: "We don't know one millionth of one percent of anything". Which is true, but this pertains to the realm of natural phenomena. It can't pertain to the supernatural because that is by definition unknowable, so it's preposterous to assert we don't know "one millionth" of that. We don't know any! .  Present me with what you claim is a supernatural event or entity, and I will provide a natural explanation for it.  But whatever you do you cannot appeal to the argument from ignorance.

Some religionists claim, for example, that consciousness is impossible to understand apart from a supernatural concept or formulation. But this is the classical argument from ignorance.  It commits the fallacy of  ignotum per ignotius : postulating an unknown agent or cause to account for a not well understood process, e.g. consciousness or rational thought within it.

The same goes for "miracles" used as examples of such. The Fatima "miracle" is a case in point. The supernaturalists had actually claimed the Sun to have gyrated and moved back and forth before 70,000 devout observers.  This indeed would have been the most fantastic event in history, of science too. But alas, no telescopes anywhere in the world detected such motions.   The only conclusion? Rather than all the observatories around the world being "blind" or their solar telescopes defective,   the entire crowd experienced a mass hallucination.  From a strictly rationalist viewpoint, the former has to be deemed more miraculous, so that the latter – no matter how much one’s temperament may rebel – has to be accepted as closer to the explanation!

This is what we call applying the Hume test, so according to David Hume:

"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish. "

By the Hume test one always selects the more probable natural option from two or more choices.

Fr. Oliver then makes this facile argument:

"Consider an attack on theism by an atheist to be a bit like an attack on swimming by someone who has never leapt into the pool. God is not an abstraction but an experience and therefore understandably unfamiliar to any who have not had the experience."

But this is a false analogy. For one thing, swimming is a real, wholly physical exercise not just an "experience". After all, one must know the correct moves, muscles to use to get from point A to B in a pool. Is Oliver saying God is a physical experience? Then it is a false analogy because there is no such thing as a supernatural experience for the reasons already given.  Hence, Fr. Oliver ends up begging the question of God's existence by invoking a specious example with no bearing on any rational approach to ascertain it.

Fr. Oliver demands the atheist to "pursue honest debate" - but at this stage we must demand it more of the sophist theist. An excellent way out of the morass is to consider necessary and sufficient conditions.  Robert Baum, in his textbook, LOGIC, p. 469-70, correctly observes that n-s conditions are practical replacements (in logic) for causes. In other words, instead of saying or asserting "x caused y", one stipulates that a, b are necessary conditions for x to exist at all, and c, d are sufficient conditions for y to have been the sole effect of cause x.

A necessary condition is one which, if absent, the entity cannot exist. A sufficient condition is one which, if present, the entity must exist. For example, a sufficient condition for the existence of a hydrogen emission nebula in space would be proximity of the nebula to a radiating star. The necessary condition is the nebula exists in the first place.

 Baum’s reasoning is clear (ibid.): because “cause” (generic) can be interpreted as proximate or remote, or even as the “goal or aim of an action” and is therefore too open-ended, ambiguous and construed in too many different ways. Thus, “cause” is too embedded in most people’s minds with only one of several meanings, leaving most causality discussions unproductive and confused. If my “cause” and your ‘cause” in a given argument diverge, then we will not get very far. Also, if we confront a disjunctive plurality of causes, we may be at moot dead ends using a naïve causal paradigm.

Thus, if you are going to make an argument on how or why the universe came to be, you can’t just say “God did it” or “Because God is the uncaused cause” – you must deliver the necessary and sufficient conditions for God to exist first. We can THEN examine these conditions in terms of how the universe actually looks, behaves and determine if the conditions are consistent.

Fr. Oliver's "swimming" example, then, is merely a red herring which doesn't really get to the core of either the pro-theist argument, or even advancing an honest one. He is correct in saying one can search via "experiential depths". This is, indeed, something I have been doing the past 40 odd years, which formed the basis of my last book, Beyond Atheism, Beyond God. But my conclusion - though I agreed modern physics offered a basis for a transcendent Being - is that one simply could not also identify it as being supernatural. It had to be a wholly physical-energy entity more in line with David Bohm's "Holomovement".

In Fr. Oliver's next paragraph, directed at the "activist atheist"  he insists:

"Surely you know more of classical theism than to accuse it of rejecting logic. Logos is of vital relevance to the theist, chiefly for its embodiment as a Person ("In the beginning was the logos and logos was with God") but also for its usefulness as a dialectic tool."

Several points to make here: First, if classical theism does indeed embrace logic, it ought to have done with specious false analogies like the swimming -experience one offered by Oliver earlier. Second, if theism doesn't reject logic it ought to have no problem applying Robert Baum's necessary and sufficient conditions to use to support existence of a deity. Third, while Fr. Oliver identifies "logos" with God it is more accepted by philosophers and biblical exegesis as referencing the dawning of consciousness in the brain.

When did this arise?   In his controversial 1976 book, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Julian Jaynes (a Princeton psychologist) argued that the brain activity of ancient people - those living roughly 3,500 years ago, prior to early evidence of consciousness  - would have resembled that of modern schizophrenics.  Jaynes maintained that, like schizophrenics, they'd have initiated conversations with unseen deities as well as inanimate objects and even been the beneficiaries of conversations from them! Only later, with the emergence of language, logic and quantitative empirical testing would actual human consciousness emerge. One can argue at this stage "logos" finally appeared.

In perhaps his most forthright appeal, Fr. Oliver directs attention at "militant atheists" imploring them thusly:

"When you attack theism, especially publicly, please deal with its non-caricatured expressions. Snake handlers and preachy politicians make easy targets but the hospitals, food banks and charity centers traceable to the conviction that God hides in the hungry, the poor, the suffering....are not easily refutable."

He is correct here that, too often,  the explicit atheists (which he calls "militant") go for the extremes, but is honest enough to acknowledge theists do likewise, invoking bloodthirsty totalitarian megalomaniacs like Stalin and Mao - who just happened to adopt atheism.

Alas, where he is dishonest is in conflating all branches of theism with Christianity. Hence, as much as he'd like us to invest incontrovertible power to his invocation of charitable works, these simply do not apply to all theisms. Below, for reference is a diagram that we can use to fix ideas on the breadth and scope of theism - which Fr. Oliver avoids:

So what he is referencing with his "hospitals, food banks" etc. is really a tiny domain with the small box on the left labeled  "monotheism".  It doesn't necessarily apply at all to the other boxes which feature other variants of  theism (e.g Hindu, Jain, Shinto, Buddhist etc.) that vastly outnumber the Christians  My point is that one cannot legitimately use the charity invocation if it doesn't apply to all parts of what you are defending which is THEISM, not Christianity alone.

Let's briefly cover some of the distinctions:

Polytheism refers to a belief in multiple deities each of which is worshipped or propitiated in turn. There is no formal injunction in any of these to be charitable.

Pantheism holds that nature and deity are bound up as one indistinguishable entity, most often as a single oneness or in terms of the regularities of natural laws. Thus, when one worships nature one is cognizant that an all encompassing power resides within it. While this form may lead to more compassion for other humans (as part of nature) it does not necessarily mandate any charitable works on their behalf.   A more subtle form is "natural law pantheism" which received attention after Einstein referred to it as "Spinoza's God". When pressed to explain himself, Einstein insisted he meant no personal God but rather "Spinoza's God, the order and harmony of all that exists."

Deism: Strictly speaking, deism treated in its orthodox and traditional manner is only one step removed from implicit atheism. In the Deist view an innominate, impersonal Intelligence created the cosmos - but then detached from it - so there's no further involvement.

The Deist God is analogous to an intelligent child who makes a toy with a gear wheel, and the toy has the ability to move after being wound up and released. Thus, the child makes the toy, winds it up, releases it down the sidewalk, then walks away never to glance at it or its final outcome, destination.

We know nearly all the Founders, the actual authors of the Constitution were hard core Deists, not  Christians.

 Fr. Oliver gets a gentleman's 'C' for his Bulletin effort, which at least doesn't go over the top in its portrayal of atheism like a letter writer (Dr. Barry Lamont) in the same issue. At least Oliver tries to keep his reasoning on an even keel though as I showed there are  number of places where it is full of holes.  Lamont, meanwhile, argued in his letter (p. 16):

"Atheists believe, with no possibility of proof, that God does not exist, nor can this basic premise of atheism be refuted by logic."

But, of course, this is not a "basic premise" at all, it is Lamont's mental permutation of what he believes is a basic premise of atheism. This is the cartoon version of atheism.   What we atheists actually say is that the whole idea of God is redundant – logically unnecessary – because it doesn’t help us to model any physical systems or make verifiable, empirical predictions that pertain to the natural world.

In addition, Lamont poses the "premise" as if atheists initiate a rejection or preemptive denial. In fact, it is the theist who usually proposes whatever deity claim (given atheists can't know in advance what his definition of "God" is)  to which the atheist simply withholds intellectual investment. Since the atheist is only the recipient of the claim (not the originator) it behooves the god claimant to provide the evidence for it. This is the same as if I claimed that an invisible Gnome lurks around all Trump rallies causing the crowds to go batshit nuts.  This may play well in the anti-Trump enclaves but doesn't pass muster with the rationalist.

Not surprisingly, Lamont - like Fr. Oliver- also errs in his take on agnosticism, calling theism and atheism "two diametrically opposed views". Hence, one is entitled to doubt each.  But this is oversimplified, failing to grasp the root of how there are actually different agnosticisms, as pointed out by George Smith (op. cit.) . Thus, agnosticism predicated on the "impossibility of knowledge" can be either theistic or atheistic in manifestation. The agnostic theist believes in the existence of a god but maintains the nature of god is unknowable. The agnostic atheist maintains any supernatural realm is inherently unknowable by the human mind. And further - not only is the nature of any supernatural realm, (e.g. "Hell") unknowable, but the existence of any supernatural being is unknowable as well.

To summarize:

1) The pure agnostic disdains any belief in a deity based on an absolute impossiblity of knowledge.

2) The agnostic theist BELIEVES in the existence of God, but argues it's useless to attempt to elaborate any divine nature (e.g. all-powerful, all loving, all knowing etc.) because the knowledge basis isn't there to permit such assumptions.

3) The agnostic atheist asserts all transcendents are unknowable and hence their existence is as well, so belief is impossible since it requires a leap of faith not warranted by reason alone.

Never mind, it is almost a certainty that in future debates between theists and atheists, the putative "agnostics" who fancy themselves above the fray will still get it wrong.

See also:

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/11/re-visiting-atheism-agnosticism.html

What Prof. Keith DeRose Gets Wrong About God Claims (Part 2)

I continue now with the commentary on Keith DeRose's interview with Gary Gutting:

De Rose:

"To know that God does (or doesn’t) exist, you have to show that there are no arguments for atheism (or for theism) that a reasonable person could find plausible. But to support that claim you would have to have better critiques of all those arguments than I’ve ever seen. In my view, it’s more likely those who claim to know whether God exists — whether theists or atheists — are just blowing smoke."

Again, DeRose regurgitates the "claim to know" nonsense which embodies the cartoon version of atheism.   What we atheists actually say is that the whole idea of God is redundant – logically unnecessary – because it doesn’t help us to model any physical systems or make verifiable, empirical predictions. The closest to what De Rose identifies as atheism here more relates to explicit atheism which maintains there can never be any evidence for a God because the natural sciences can have nothing to do with the supernatural. (I.e. "Supernatural evidence" is an oxymoron)

 

The gist of it is that the atheist maintains the probability is very high that there is no ultimate force out there, and we are on our own. (Which is precisely the point Carl Sagan made in the last segment shown of the final new COSMOS episode ('Unafraid of the Dark'), with the focus on the 'pale blue dot' of Earth.)

 

The issue then isn't one of "knowing" but instead efficacy in the real world. What benefit is there - apart from emotional security - of God belief if there is no active demonstration of the object of belief in the outside world? This is the core theme that DeRose won't touch because he knows he can't get anywhere with it.

 

Prof. Gutting then asks him:

"Without getting into details, could you mention a theistic and an atheistic argument that you think a reasonable person could find plausible?"

He responds:

"My favorite theistic example is the cosmological argument, particularly as William Rowe discusses it in his “Two Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument.” This is the argument that tries to show that we need to posit God as the reason the universe exists. Negatively, it’s clear to me that this argument does not really establish its conclusion. For it to work you have to accept a quite strong form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (roughly, the claim that everything must have a reason). This principle is just too questionable for an argument based on it to produce knowledge. And, like Rowe, I in fact don’t buy it."

Of course,  De Rose is correct that the cosmological argument does not really  "establish its conclusion".  Which would be near impossible in any case  since quantum mechanical  models (e.g. T. Padmanabhan,  ‘Universe Before Planck Time – A Quantum Gravity Model, in Physical Review D, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 756)  show the cosmos can come into existence on its own via quantum fluctuation.. Once physical models exist then one doesn't need supernatural explanations and should refrain from invoking them.  See also:

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/09/yes-universe-created-itself-from.html


DeRose is also wise not to buy into the 'sufficient reason' bollocks because numerous philosophers, e.g. Mario Bunge (cf. Causality and Modern Science, pp. 33-34, 1979) , have shown it is defunct. A much more fruitful path is to present necessary and sufficient conditions  for one's claims.  The criteria of necessary and sufficient conditions was actually invoked originally by Galileo to replace the concept of efficient cause (ibid., p. 33). In this regard, it was recognized from early on that "efficient causation" was often too limited or narrow a concept to be practical or workable.

Robert Baum, in his textbook, LOGIC, p. 469-70, correctly observes that n-s conditions are practical replacements (in logic) for causes. In other words, instead of saying or asserting "x caused y", one stipulates that a, b are necessary conditions for x to exist at all, and c, d are sufficient conditions for y to have been the sole effect of cause x.

Baum’s reasoning is clear (ibid.): because “cause” (generic) can be interpreted as proximate or remote, or even as the “goal or aim of an action” and is therefore too open-ended, ambiguous and construed in too many different ways. Thus, “cause” is too embedded in most people’s minds with only one of several meanings, leaving most causality discussions unproductive and confused. If my “cause” and your ‘cause” in a given argument diverge, then we will not get very far. Also, if we confront a disjunctive plurality of causes, we may be at moot dead ends using a naïve causal paradigm.

Anyway, DeRose Goes on:

"But positively, given the state of the philosophical discussion, which has produced good responses to the apparently knock-out objections, someone could certainly be reasonable in accepting the argument. This view has been cemented in place for me since I came to Yale, because my colleague Michael Della Rocca is a terrific, and very sensible, advocate of quite strong forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He has never convinced me to join him in his rationalist ways, but because of him I would be willfully blind to think that even someone who understood the issue extremely well could not reasonably think as he does."

But note that one would expect DeRose by this point to at least adopt some rationalist way! In effect, we'd like to see him present the necessary and sufficient conditions for God's existence but he hasn't. I believe the reason might be that, again, he has not been willing to define the God he refers to in his exchange. Without the definition it isn't possible to supply the n-s conditions which will depend on the entity's nature.

Gutting next asks him:

"How about an argument against God’s existence?"

He replies:

"I’m going to have to be conventional here and go with the usual suspect: the argument from evil. Without getting into any details, you can feel the force of the argument by choosing a suitably horrific example (the Holocaust, children dying of cancer) that leads you to say, “There’s no way a perfectly good God would have allowed that!” There is a huge, often fascinating, discussion that tries to refute such arguments. But I find this intuitively powerful case does stand up to scrutiny, at the very least to the extent that someone could reasonably accept it at the end of the day. I suspect that even God thinks there is something wrong with you if you are not at least tempted by such an argument from evil."

 Here, DeRose is quite wrong that the "argument can't stand up to scrutiny to the extent someone can reasonably accept it". In fact, examined from one definition of the deity (and bear in mind DeRose has carefully avoided defining the God to which he refers) it's abundantly evident how and why it fails. This definition is provided we allow the attribute of "design" along with one of the omni properties: omniscience.

Then we can treat first natural evil, then human evil and trace it back to the designer.  If the former is emphasized, such as the 2004 Indonesian tsunami that took out 240,000 people - or the Haiti 2010 earthquake, then it doesn't beg the question to ask whether in fact the world was not properly designed for humans ab initio. I mean, if it was then we'd not see such enormous disasters with vast loss of life. If the world wasn't properly designed then whose fault is that? It must be the designer's, the same as it's the automotive designer's fault for a GM car that won't brake properly or accelerates when one puts the keys in the wrong way.

But perhaps mass killer earthquakes, tsunamis, killer hurricanes  etc. are no one's fault since no designer exists that would or could have made a habitable planet without them. The same applies to human evil, which actually inheres in the structure of the human brain itself, e.g.

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2013/12/want-better-future-then-evil-brains.html

 In other words, if a designer God is responsible for fashioning the human brain then he must be ultimately responsible for human evil. But....it could be the brain is simply the product of evolutionary accident, in which case we'd expect the hodgepodge tossing together of ancient atavistic regions (e.g. R-complex)  with newer ones (neocortex).

This leads the rational skeptic to conclude that both forms of  evil (natural and human) mean  that either the world (and cosmos by extension) is not the product of a “designer” at all (in which case no God exists by one set of criteria) OR: the world and cosmos is the product of a putative, supra-physical agent that is likely incomplete and whose actions are constrained by being manifest in an incomplete, evolving universe. (This is the Socinian deity first advanced by Socinus, which posits a creative intelligence that can never know more than the most advanced of its created, conscious "wetware".)

In the former case, we’d more likely side with Leibniz, who opined that "natural disasters aren’t the result if any divine punishment for sin” but simply the foreseen (or better, foreseeable) consequences of a regulated and overall consistent system of natural laws.

In the latter case of the limited but supra-physical agent it was the philosopher N.M Wildiers who first observed:

“Evil is part and parcel of a world in evolution, an incomplete world.”

Meaning that in an imperfect world governed by evolution, we must expect evil as essential to an incomplete natural order.  We must therefore not expect divine intervention because the supra-physical agent version of God himself is “working things out” amidst a sea of polarities in the relative domain of physical reality. (This is also part of the "God Theory"  of Bernard Haisch).

All the above is meant to show how crucial definitions are when one discusses the possible existence of God. Even a tiny change in definition in terms of the attributes assigned can totally turn the discussion or debate in one or other direction. Yet DeRose steadfastly refuses to provide anything to work with, leading me to conclude his avoidance of defining "God" must be intentional. It allows him to be evasive and prevents Gutting from pinning him down. (Aside: some may aver here that "God cannot be defined" in any case, which in one philosophical context is true. BUT...if we are going to debate or discuss claims for God's existence that won't do. Since a logical treatment involving existence claims presumes the use or acceptance of propositions bearing defined objects, then we must provide the definitions. If we refuse to then we need to take the Buddhist way out and say: "No discussion  (or interview) is possible because the reality is beyond the use of words to limit or parse it".  This means all claims for it are as well.)

Prof. Gutting does his best to press DeRose further:

"So far, you’ve argued that both atheists and theists can have good reasons for their views, so that neither side can rightly claim that the other is just irrational. But you make an important distinction between reasonably believing something and knowing that it’s true, and you claim that neither atheists nor theists know whether God exists. Finally, what do you think of agnosticism, the view that, given the strong disagreement about theism, the most reasonable position is to remain undecided?

De Rose replies:

"In some ways, that view is right. One reading of “agnostic” is just someone who does not take herself to know. On that reading, I accept the view. After all, my suggestion is that those who are not agnostics in that sense are deluded! But “agnostic” often slides into meaning something more along the lines of someone who does not take a position on the issue, and is in that way “undecided,” as you put it. And while I certainly think someone could easily be, and many people are, reasonable in being an agnostic about God in that stronger way, there are important goals served by our taking stands on issues where we cannot be objectively certain, or even know that we are right."

Here, at least, DeRose comes closer to parsing the meaning of agnostic - but not completely. In fact, an agnostic atheist is exactly someone who withholds belief until there is evidence for a claim. A pure agnostic is one who asserts there is an impossibility of ever knowing enough to confer belief.  He subscribes to the tenet that our brains are simply not up to the capacity to ever be in such an ultimately knowing position.  Thus, the belief that an agnostic is simply someone who refuses to take a stand on an issue is wrong. De Rose is correct that there are "important goals in taking stands on issues" but this has nada to do with being an agnostic. One will "take a stand" if s/he is able to parse necessary and sufficient conditions for a claim (including a defined deity) and then see that the claim is inconsistent with the conditions set out. One would not simply "take a stand" out of an emotional or simply belief position.

At least Prof. Gutting asks him:

"Could you explain that more fully? If you don’t know you’re right, why take a stand?"

De Rose responds:

"In philosophy and other areas of controversy, like politics, we often come to adopt a view on a disputed matter. When this happens, then even if you recognize the reasonableness of contrary views, you can come to really feel that your view is right, to the point that it can feel as if you know that it’s true. And I think that taking such a strong stand on a disputed issue can be good. Those who take a strong stand may most effectively develop and defend their position. I don’t think it would aid philosophy or politics if we all quickly abandoned our positions whenever we hit significant resistance from well-informed opponents. Often, that’s just when things get interesting."

But DeRose again misses the point that the areas he references generally require the adoption of views based on logical analyses - and this almost always entails examining the necessary and sufficient conditions. If those aren't met, one rationally won't "take a stand". One doesn't take a position merely out of an emotional incentive or "feeling" or having watched "Fox and Friends".

For example, I take a position to reject unregulated market capitalism because I understand that the resources of the planet are inadequate to fuel and support the level of growth market capitalism demands. If one then runs the numbers, this becomes evident. It isn't a matter of simply "taking a stand" without any basis.

In politics, I take a position to reject money as "free speech" because it automatically puts voters in an inferior position and owners of capital  (and corporations) in control of our political process.

In philosophy, I take a position to reject Ayn Rand's Objectivism because it simply can't work. Taking 66  million seniors immediately off of Social Security and Medicare will not make the nation better, or make people better, only create an additional vast poverty class. This is apart from the fact that there simply don't exist the decent paying jobs to support such a move, nor will there ever be. (15 million citizens even now remain under-employed and the monthly jobs numbers, such as they are, barely reach population replacement level- estimated at 200,000 per month.)

Yes, one can "take a stand" but there must be a logical, rational basis to do so.

Prof. Gutting again:

"But is the existence of God just a philosophical question, like, say, the definition of knowledge or the existence of Plato’s forms?"

De Rose responds:

"The existence of God is not just any philosophical issue. It’s intimately tied up with what very many in our society feel gives meaning to their lives. As compared with other philosophical issues, many, including many professional philosophers, are especially protective of their position here. And on God’s existence, I think many are subject to often subtle, but also often powerful, pressure from their religious groups to feel and to act and even to try to be certain of their position.

This no doubt creates special dangers. But it also seems that a life of religious faith can lead us to special values we can’t find elsewhere. At any rate, this too is a philosophical issue. In light of all that, I would not want to make any blanket pronouncement, either about philosophers or people generally, that the most reasonable stance on the existence of God is to stay on the sidelines."

 DeRose does at least get it right that  discussions of philosophical issues such as God's existence are fraught with enormous emotional overtones and baggage - including a need for existential security.  No one denies here that a profound need to believe in a higher power exists, and for the majority of human brains the very idea of cosmic isolation - or a universe without higher purpose - is unthinkable. But this emotional driver alone is not sufficient to justify philosophical claims for existence.

I may feel, for example, more comfortable in the cosmos if intelligent extraterrestrials also existed within it. But I can't make a claim for their existence unless hard evidence is forthcoming - at least intercepted radio signals which bear a definite mathematical pattern such that they could only have been produced by intelligent aliens.

In the same way, though people may feel "God gives meaning to their lives" - they can't just make a claim for such without providing evidence, or at least proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for the Being they want to exist.  I am not saying here that the cosmos is not imbued with a higher consciousness or intelligence, it well might be (as I indicated in my book, 'Beyond Atheism, Beyond God'). What I am saying is that you cannot arrive at any objective truth for such an entity merely by invoking emotional appeal or needs.

It is a pity that DeRose himself didn't deliver more substance - as opposed to ambiguous rhetoric - in his interview with Prof. Gutting.

Can Faith and Science Co-Exist?

MIT physicist and avowed atheist Alan Lightman has an interesting essay today at salon.com, How Faith and Science Can Co-Exist:

http://life.salon.com/2011/10/02/how_science_and_faith_coexist/singleton/

Readers can peruse the piece and see how much of it they either accept or reject. For myself, I am skeptical of a lot of it, including the proposal there is some "Central Doctrine of Science". While it is true there are certain central natural laws or statements of science that have withstood well the tests of time, it is also true there are actual "impossibility statements" of what cannot occur - and in the end these may be equally trenchant and valid. For example, one impossibility statement is that a dead man can't actually come back to life from formerly being a rotting corpse. This would violate the 2nd law of thermodynamics, or entropy law which prohibits a system moving from a more disordered state to a more ordered one.

Another is that it is impossible to get more mass or energy out of system than what you put in. This would violate the conservation of mass-energy. And so on, including that it is impossible for any mass to travel faster than the speed of light.

Thus, these would not be described as parts of a "doctrine", central or other, but firm prohibitions on what sort of phenomena we expect to observe in this universe, with its particular physical constants (G, e/m, alpha, etc.)

Next, Lightman offers what he claims is a "working definition of God", viz:

"God is a being not restricted by the laws that govern matter and energy in the physical universe. In other words, God exists outside matter and energy"

But once more, this isn't very workable or operational. Saying God "exists outside of all matter and energy" is more a tautology. Or, saying what is obvious in terms of most orthodox definitions, if such are ever given. But what would be far more useful here, is to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for the entity articulated in the definition to exist. One must also ensure the specific conditions comport with the given definition, to be acceptable in a scientific or even logical sense.

For example, asserting "God is a first cause" is actually and technically unprovable within an axiomatic system based on cause! Of course, one may eschew such a system - but then s/he loses the ability to argue from or about "cause"!This is directly from application of Gödel's Incompleteness theorems.

In this case the set of causal elements in the axiomatic system, call the set:

Z ={C1, C2, C3,........Cn)

has ONE element which is uncaused. It matters not whether it is C1 or any other. The point is, the proof of its existence can't be rendered from within the axiomatic system that uses the set Z for a causal argument. Thus, one will inevitably find at least one contradiction, and this contradiction means the system is incomplete, so the set must be also. Look at it this way: say Z = C1 is equivalent to saying C1 is "the first cause of all Z".

But if: Z = C1 is provable-in-the-system, we have a contradiction: for if it were provable in-the-system, then it would not be unprovable-in-the-system, so that "Z= C1 is unprovable-in-the-system" would be false. Again, it can't be provable in the system since C1 is an element from a presumed CAUSAL set.

So, Z = C1 is unprovable-in-the-system is not provable-in-the-system (Z), but unprovable-in-the-system (Z). Technically, one would require a "meta-set" such that Z' = Z + k', the uncaused element- with Z purged of it. However, it can be shown that invoking such a meta-set leads to an infinite regression.This shows why - before one interjects false conditionality- he or she had first better be sure Kurt Gödel isn't looking over his shoulder! Next thing:

How would Lightman square the claim (say by a firm faith Christian evangelical) for an "objectively true" Christian God with the delimitations noted by Pascal Boyer (Ch. 2, `What Supernatural Concepts are like', p. 51, in `Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought', Basic Books)?

As he observes, when one seeks to reconcile any supernatural concept with what is deemed "objectively real" (and hence - by extension, the religion based on it):

"the information contained in key tags of the statement or concept must contradict information provided by the ontological category".

Therefore ALL terms used by supernatural extension, i.e. "force", "thought", "knowledge", "act" etc. must be set out so as to contradict the tag in a known (physical) ontological category. Thus, "supernatural force" must be shown to specifically contradict physical force (as given by Newton's 2nd law, F = ma) and be explained in depth to show its workability in a supernatural domain. This demand extends to "supernatual ethics" and why it (evidently) contradicts normative human ethical expectations. (For instance, why didn't the Xtian deity intervene to spare those who are actively out there, putatively extending its mission - like those 12 missionaries slain in Afghanistan some time ago).

Such outrageous inaction doesn't even meet the basic qualities of ethical morality displayed by a human parent, say in rescuing a beloved child from a burning room! (As noted by Kai Neilsson in his 'Ethics Without God', observing this must be the minimal defintion for what is "morally good").

In the end, all Lightman's fulminations against Richard Dawkins to the contrary, Dawkins was essentially correct in assessing religion's overall effect on human consciousness as negative. This will be so as long as religion remains a confected or artificial "contraption or creature of civilization" to use the words of one commentator on Salon's blog.

So is it possible for Faith and Science to co-exist? Possibly, but only if faith is diluted to the point that all those of faith acknowledge their respective gods, sacred books and dogmas are relative to all others, none being absolute or in any way "objective". Otherwise, all bets are off and we are merely left with glorified superstition, and worse ....a deleterious form if it is organized by a hierarchy in order to subvert the inquiring function of human minds.

An Invitation to God-template?

As religiosity heats up again approaching Christmas, a number of new "God" books - and some not so new- have come to my attention. One of these has been the book: ‘No One Sees God’ by Michael Novak, 1994 winner of the Templeton Prize.

Novak's is one of those books an atheist sometimes reaches for in the hope of seeing whether a Christian can forge a detailed apologia for his position. Also, whether an atheist can be greeted by something more than bombast, threats or venom for not kowtowing to the mainstream God-addiction.

For the first thirty or so pages, until the author veers into palpable atheist baiting (‘Not the Way to Invite a Conversation’, using the "New atheist" books of Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris as templates) it was a pretty good read. One sees a reasonable and rational mind at work, and one not afraid to admit that atheists may have something in their favor - for at least pushing lazy Christians to examine issues and aspects of their faith. (But, of course, to me - Christianity is not one monolithic faith, but a patchwork of about 70 different sects - from the largest, Roman Catholicism - to which Novak belongs, to the smallest Science of Mind enclaves)

Indeed, it reminded me of the sort of dialectic content that often permeates arguments with my longtime Christian friend, John Phillips. E.g. the author’s claim (p. 17) that he hypothesizes that:

“unbelievers, especially those who have never known religion in their personal lives, or who have had bad experiences with it, experience a revulsion against a reasoned knowledge of God”.

Of course, as my friend John noted and recalled, I have not had so nice experiences of religion either – going back to a nun teacher in first grade pressing a hot needle (she’d just heated using a match) into my right palm to remind me “of Hell”.

“Remember boy, the fires of Hell are a million times hotter than this and they burn you inside and out! Don’t ever forget it!”

Well, I didn’t, and thus began my journey to rational atheism as I note in my recent book, Atheism: A Beginner’s Handbook.

But to assert, as Novak does, that this might have elicited “a revulsion against reasoned knowledge of God” is to miss the interpretation, and by a country mile.

First, there can be no such thing as “reasoned knowledge” of anything until one has first provided the ontology. Ontology, the basis for primary existence, comes BEFORE knowledge (epistemology) and not after. Thus, all Novak’s later citations of the classics describing God and citing the likes of Aristotle and St. Augustine, do him no service. Rather, such diversionary passages merely show that Novak himself has no clue about who or what this “God” is, he can only say what It isn’t.

Thus, despite waxing long and hard (in reply to the three atheist authors, Dawkins, Harris and Dennett) in Chapter Three (‘Letter to an Atheist Friend’) he fails to make his case that his entity is anything more than a will-o-the-wisp centered in his fertile imagination, or his temporal lobes (as Michael Persinger’s work showed, see my review of his ‘The Neuropsychology of God Belief’) . He himself reinforces his own deficiencies when he admits (p. 274, Epilogue):

“The only knowledge of God we have through reason, all the ancient thinkers have taught us, is dark- and by the via negative- that is, by reasoning from what God cannot be”

True enough! But Novak is not afraid, despite this candid admission, to make all manner of positive statements about God’s nature. A few samples off-hand:


p.196:

“God must be more like human consciousness, insight, a sense of humor, good judgment…”

“God knows well the creatures He made…he has to beat us around the ears a bit”

“In the end it was important for God that his son (who is one with him) became human and dwelt on the Earth”


The Trinity: p. 197,

“to think of God as a Trinity is to think of Him as more like an intimate communion of persons than as a solitary being”.

p. 198:

“When everything is suffused with reason, that is the presence of God”

How exactly are any of these, metaphorical or not, statements via negativa- the dark way? They aren’t! Especially the egregious and misplaced reference to “God’s son” (p. 196) which assumes there is ample evidence that a possible 1st century charismatic Jewish rabbi was a genuine God-man. He wasn’t. He was a confabulation of Christians who felt compelled to copy and imitate the earlier pagan Mithraists’ god-man fables. (E.g. Mithras was born of a virgin, performed miracles, died on a cross...etc. then rose from the dead.)

The collection of Novak’s statements comprise an assortment of positive statements the author proffers about an entity he really doesn’t know because he hasn’t provided any ontology.

Now let’s get into some ontology here. First, following Bertrand Russell’s lead (‘The Problems of Philosophy’) we need to specify the practical and operative laws that apply to existents and entities, under the general rubric of “being”. (Thus, to be most accurate here, when an atheist agrees to debate a Christian, he is only agreeing to the presupposition of “being”. It remains to be worked out or proven, what the exact nature of this being is.)

By “existent” we mean to say that which has prior grounding in the mind, albeit not yet demonstrably shown in reality.

For example, the number ‘2’.

If the number 2 is mental, it is essentially a mental existent. (Do you see literal two lurking in the outside world, apart from what the human mind assigns, e.g. two apples, two oranges, two beetles etc.?)

Such existents are always particular.

If any particular exists in one mind at one time it cannot exist in another mind at any time or the same mind at a different time. The reason is that as time passes, the neural sequence and synapses that elicited the previous “existent” at that earlier time, no longer exists. My conceptual existent of “2” at 3.30 a.m. this morning is thus not the same as my conceptualization of it at 4 p.m. It may APPEAR so, but rigorous neural network tests will show it is not. (E.g. differing brain energies will be highlighted at each time)

Thus, ‘2’ must be minimally an entity that has “being’ regardless of whether it has existence.

Now, we jump into the realm of epistemology from here, with the next proposition:

Generalizing from the preceding example, ALL knowledge must be recognition, and must be of entities that are not purely mental but whose being is a PRECONDITION- and NOT a result- of being thought of.

Applying this to the ontology of “non-contingent creator”, it must be shown it exists independently of being thought of. (E.g. there must be a way to declare and isolate its independent existence from the constellation of human brains which might get tempted to confabulate it out of innate brain defect or emotional need)

Here’s another way to propose it: If one demands that this entity (G-O-D) is not susceptible to independent existence, and therefore the mere announcement or writing of the words incurs validity, then the supposed condition has nothing to do with reality. It is like averring we all live inside a 12-dimensonal flying spaghetti monster. I would be laughed into oblivion, especially as I incur no special benediction (as you do) by invoking the G-noun.

In effect, if the proposed “non-contingent creator” or its single word equivalent isn’t subject to independent existence, then its alleged “truth” is separated from verification. Truth then becomes what is communicated to us by proxy (or proxy vehicle, e.g. Pope Benedict, the Bible, Novak or any other Xtian apologist) with the existent (or a metaphor) in the mind of the communicator who deems himself qualified to make the “truth” exist.

But such a “truth” (or any associated invocation of “reason” in its service) is fraudulent and cannot be a valid expression of the condition. What it means is there is little assurance the communicated secondary artifact has all the elements and particulars needed to be an affirmed REAL entity. The truth is dispensed according to our needs (in this case the need to believe humans are seen after by a Cosmic Daddy) – all we need ignore is the constellation of evidence that refutes it.

Second: How to escape from this ontological problem?

Logicians have been aware for centuries of the pitfalls of appealing to pure causes, or to generic causality. We see this in multiple places in Novak’s book such as on page 217 where he takes Dan Dennett to task for what is claimed to be spurious invocation of causes and causality:

“Besides, Dennett interprets the cause of a cause as if both were the same, like one turtle on another”

This sort of causal approach is exactly what makes discussions sterile because it invites dead ends and ambiguity. By contrast, as Robert Baum notes in his text, Logic, 4th Edition, causal explanations are only of limited utility because of the intuitive, non-systematic nature of causal inference. Not only are we confronted with multiple types of cause but also proximate and remote causes. For example, a collision of a comet with a large meteoroid in space may be the proximate cause of the comet’s shifting orbit enough for its nucleus to collide with Earth. However, another collision – say of a large asteroid with Earth- may be engendered by the remote cause of the YORP effect.

For this reason, it is far more productive to instead reframe causes into necessary and sufficient conditions. As Baum notes (p. 469) this is advisable because the term ‘cause’ has been too closely associated in most people’s minds with a “proximate efficient” cause. Like one billiard hitting another and sending it into a side pocket. Or one small asteroid hitting another to send it into Earth- intersecting orbit.

In these terms, whatever “secondary causes” or other causes pertain to G-O-D are irrelevant and do not advance the arguments. We therefore put these causal references aside as Baum recommends, and substitute for them necessary and sufficient conditions for the claimed existent. If someone is unable to provide these, then either he doesn’t know what he is talking about, or has engendered a fantasy creation or phantasmagoria in his own brain which he now offers to us (non-believers) as reality.

Let’s now review what these n-s conditions are. A necessary condition is one, without which, the claimed entity cannot exist. A sufficient condition is one which, if present, the entity must exist.

For example, consider a hydrogen emission nebula. The necessary condition is the nebula or interstellar cloud of hydrogen exist in the first place. The sufficient condition for the existence of a hydrogen emission nebula in space would be proximity of the nebula to a radiating star. In this case, the star’s radiation causes the hydrogen atoms in the nebula to become excited – cause electrons to jump to higher energy levels- then go to lower with the emission of photons)

Leaving out all the fluff about “first causes” or “secondary causes” we therefore simply ask: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a “God” of the type Novak proposes to exist?

Note, that in having to explicate these, Novak also is compelled to show how his God varies from all the other God- concepts proposed. This also disallows the cavalier statement he makes in his Epilogue where he conflates the Judeo-Christian God with that of deists. E.g., page 274:

“If there is a God such as Jews, Christians and deists have held there to be…..”

But wait! The Deist’s God is NOT the same as that of Jews or Christians! Strictly speaking, Deism treated in its orthodox and traditional form is not Theism. Deism is, in fact, only one step removed from atheism. The only real difference is that in deism some kind of non-specific "first cause" is proposed, but after that all distinctions collapse. The atheist avers there is no one or nothing "minding the store" and so does the deist.

Deism, to give an analogy, is analogous to a child who makes a toy with a gear wheel, and the toy has the ability to move after being wound up and released. Thus, the child makes the toy (he's a clever kid) winds it up, releases it down the sidewalk, then walks away never to glance at it or its final outcome, destination. In this case, the child plays an analogous role to the ambiguous first cause of deism and the toy is analogous to the universe.

One of the most egregious arguments of Novak is when he avers (p. 267) that:

“The trouble is that atheism is a leap in the dark and not a rational alternative. No one can possibly prove a negative or know enough to be certain there is no God”

But none of the atheists I know, myself included, DO THAT! So what Novak has succeeded in doing is inventing his own straw man atheist or tackling dummy and nothing more. Let’s take his ‘shot in the dark’ tag. Not at all! What we (rational atheists) say is that in the absence of YOU proving your claim (or at least giving us the necessary and sufficient conditions for it) - we are maintaining a position of non-investment of our mental or emotional resources and energies into it. This is the conservative and natural position to adopt for a true rationalist.

In a similar vein, if a neighbor tells me he has alien ghosts inhabiting his attic, I would also withhold investment of any emotional or intellectual commitment to it. Until he could provide me with some empirical justification or evidence, I am fully entitled to ignore his claim as possessing any remote connection to reality. Likewise for Novak’s claim of a deity no matter how many descriptive metaphors he can dredge up for it. Minus those n-s conditions he is merely promoting phantasm as reality like the alien ghost believing neighbor. True, on a vaster perhaps more sublime scale, but in the end the same category of Macguffin.

As to ‘proving a negative” no atheist does that either. We simply maintain the conservative “show us, we’re from Missouri” outlook. Thus, we regard the improbability of a deity that is invisible and governs and designs the cosmos as about the same as one trillion alien ghosts from Tau Ceti inhabiting the DC Beltway.
The error of latter day Christian obscurantists like Novak is in placing the onus of proving a negative on us, when in fact the onus is on him to prove his existent is substantive and not his own mental confection. Failing any hard evidence, say like a video recording for an alien ghost or apparition, the next best thing is to give us those necessary and sufficient conditions signed, sealed and delivered. As it is, what we end up with (in Novak's book) is his own creation of deity as a mirror image of his mental self-representation.

There are so many other egregious assertions or claims that pervade the book, such as atheism allowing the meme that “everything is permitted”, or that purpose must be exposed via science, that it would require a whole other book to deal with them. So let me end this review with the case of Novak’s daughter, who we are told, p. 42: “decided atheism cannot be true because it is self-contradictory”.


He then goes on to expostulate that: “atheists want all the comforts of rationality that emanates from rational theism but without any personal indebtedness to any Creator, Governor, Judge.."


And so Novak’s daughter concludes it is more reasonable to believe there is a God, then withholding investment for any evidence demonstrating it is more than a munchkin of her mind. And let us recall hear the words of astrophysicist Carl von Weiszsacker: “It is impossible to understand rationally a God in whom one did not believe in already”.

First, Novak’s daughter is wrong to accept that we define everything as “chancy” or “absurd”. Indeed, there is within the cosmos a domain of natural law regularity within which our deterministic mechanics can work very well. It is only when one moves on to the quantum theory (quantum mechanics) that hard prediction becomes dicey. Our job, as rationalists and scientists, is not to succumb to metaphysics or overeager mystics, but to try to show how much of our cosmos CAN be understood in terms of known laws and how much cannot. Thus, on setting the limits for rational enquiry we set limits on our own penchant for mental eruptions and inventions. We use our empirical methods, whatever they are, to put curbs on our human penchant to inflate reality.

What we do know now, compliments of our most modern advances in infrared and microwave astronomy, is that the assay of the cosmos holds little room for what we recognize as “order”. The latest results from the Boomerang balloon survey and the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy project disclose that darkness pervades 93% of the cosmos, whether in the form of dark matter(23%) or dark energy (70%). We humans represent emergence of a rational brain to fathom these mysteries compliments of natural selection on one small planet, and the probable beneficial intervention of a large asteroid 65 million years ago which wiped out our prime competition.

Second, NONE of these rational modes or methods was earned via “comfort” or given to us compliments of the god-mongers or Christians. We had to earn our rational results (say those showing that dark energy behaves like a plasma that fits a spherical harmonic distribution) step by step through patience and many errors, and the final ability to reach our goals. Thus, we owe absolutely nothing to any “judges” or mystical “creators’ inhabiting the mind of Novak, or anyone else. To say so is to attempt to validate science’s service in the perpetuation of never-ending mumbo-jumbo, theological dogmas and superstitious phantasmagorias.

I am a rational atheist, proud of it, and beholding for it to no fictitious entity that inhabits the wayward neurons of someone’s brain.

The good news here is that this is one of the better “God books’ in circulation. The bad news, is that it’s not anywhere near as good as James Byrne’s “GOD”(Continuum, 2001). But then again, after reading Tipler’s fulsome ‘Physics of Christianity’ it was a relief of sorts!