Federal Aviation Advisory Panel's Report On Boeing's 737 MAX Is More Cover Up And Nonsense

Boeing's new CEO (David Calhoun) is convinced the public will be 'all in' and get back on the MAX when pilots do, and regulators approve it.

It is often said while watching certain movies, mainly science fiction (e.g. 'The Matrix'), that you have to strongly apply the suspension of disbelief. Else, within minutes you are likely to cease conscious viewing and simply erupt into peals of unconstrained laughter at the nonsense coming at you. Well, I had pretty well that identical reaction on reading the recent account (WSJ, 'Panel Backs How FAA Gave Safety Approval For 737 MAX', January 17, p. A4).   This was after reading the following codswallop:

"A federal advisory panel evaluating the safety approval process for Boeing's 737 MAX concluded regulators adhered to policies in certifying the plane and determined it wouldn't have been safer if it had received the scrutiny of an all new aircraft."

Of course, that is tommyrot and balderdash.  First, the approval process and certification - mainly letting Boeing itself have at it - was full of holes and misfires,  apart from which you have a 'fox guarding the henhouse' scenario.See e.g.:

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

In addition it is a bold-faced lie to claim the jet would not have been safer in the mode of an all new aircraft.  As I pointed out in my Nov. 14 post, "A proper redesign of Boeing's MAX 8  would require extending the fuselage height, and thereby not getting a simple recertification. "  

More mind-boggling in the case of the piece is when one reads (ibid.)

"Lee Moak, co-chairman of the independent committee set up last year declined to identify the mistakes made during certification of the now -grounded jets,  instead describing current procedures as 'appropriate and effective'."

Which is more horse pockey, especially given that within a day of that report's exposure in the WSJ we learned a new software problem had emerged.  This one involves the software preventing the jet's  flight control computers  from powering up and also verifying they are ready for flight- according to industry and government officials (WSJ, 'Boeing Finds Another Software Problem', January 18, p. A1)

The new issue was uncovered  (ibid.) when:  "engineers were loading the updated software - including an array of changes painstakingly developed over roughly a year- into the flight control computers of a test aircraft". 

Pardon me, but this shows me Moak is out to lunch, and the whole "let Boeing certify the thing" was nutso  - plus unsafe (including the whole MCAS system as well). Also, contrary to Moak's twaddle  all the "current procedures" are nowhere near adequate or safe if this software- developed over a year- wasn't even found  defective until being loaded into an actual aircraft.   Let's also note this revised software was "intended to fix the automated MCAS system" - to prevent the plane from crashing again.

Again, another reminder why I never want to see the inside of this flying boondoggle.  Even for a short trip to Vegas.

As if this new software glitch wasn't enough, barely a week earlier Boeing was forced to admit (finally) that Ipad training wasn't sufficient and flight simulators were needed for training. (Following which we learned Boeing had insufficient simulators to proceed with pilot training when - and IF - the MAX is ever re-certified. ) 

The latest  'MAX' fiasco intruded a day ago when Boeing announced it doesn't expect federal regulators to approve its changes to the grounded plane until this summer.  Which means, of course, it won't be flying this summer - but more likely months later- if ever.  Even if approved this summer all 'MAX' -using airlines - e.g. Southwest, United, American - will need additional time to train their pilots on flight simulators.  Already, Boeing has had to set aside $9 billion to cover customer compensation - for loss of parts of their fleets- as well as  working through the backlog of orders (4,500 jets).

Personally, as I wrote before, this monstrosity ought not be airborne, period, because of its severe design flaws.  As I noted, no software "fix" should be used to correct what is in essence an aerodynamic design flaw.

Moak's clownish "federal advisory panel" report received the best brush off from Rep. Peter DeFazio of Oregon, Chairman of the House Transportation Committee who said (WSJ earlier item):

"It would be the height of irresponsibility to leave the (certification) delegation system as is and just hope for the best."

Indeed, and this move - daft as it is - certainly wouldn't impress or coax the flying public into getting inside one of these glorified tin can "self -hijacking"  contraptions anytime soon. In the most recent surveys, more than 50 percent of flyers would choose another aircraft - or not fly at all.

Never mind. Boeing's new CEO -David Calhoun-   is totally convinced the flying public will be there lining up to get on the MAX once regulatory approval passes. ("And pilots get on that airplane and support that airplane" (WSJ,  'Boeing CEO Puts Faith In MAX', today, p. B1, Business & Finance).

Well, maybe. Until the next crash - then all bets are off. 

See also:

'New Republic' Expose Shows How Wall St. Cost- Cut...

Boeing's History Shows Nothing It Says Can Be Trusted - So Don't Trust The MAX 737 Being "Ready" Next Month

Artist's sketch from Wall Street Journal ('Why The 737 MAX Failed',  Aug. 17-18, p. A10)  shows the fundamental problem with MCAS, which was only installed because the MAX 737 was aerodynamically unstable.


As we learned Tuesday that Boeing is ready to commence redelivery of the grounded MAX 737, don't hold your breath.  One of the issues dogging the 60-year old company is a lack of trust or faith in its MAX 8, which is understandable. The primary manifestation is a reduction in new orders, i.e. Denver Post, 'Boeing Orders And Deliveries Continue To Sag',  Nov. 13, p. 16A).  As we learned from the article:

"Boeing said it took 10 new orders in October, down from 24 the same month last year... Boeing's European rival Airbus said Tuesday that it took 415 orders in October.  Airbus said it delivered 77 orders last month."

In other words, Airbus is now beating the pants off Boeing, and why not?   There are many quality tests that remain to be done before the MAX gets airborne again. A lot will also depend on the company  agreeing to training MAX pilots on actual flight simulators as opposed to Ipads.  It is also clear we can't trust anything this bunch asserts especially as they've been going downhill since taking over a failing plane company, McDonnell-Douglas, see e.g.

'New Republic' Expose Shows How Wall St. Cost- Cut...

As per a Sunday Denver Post Business piece two weeks earlier we learned:

"The company has earned a reputation in the aviation community for withholding information, favoring theories of pilot errors over product flaws and being slow to make engineering changes to planes that could  prevent future crashes."

A perfect case is the MAX 8 - source of two major crashes within 5 months.  which as I noted in my Oct. 30 post is aerodynamically flawed,

"The aerodynamics were negatively impacted because the LEAP engines were too large to just tuck into their original positions underneath the wings so Boeing's engineers decided to mount them slightly forward - just in front of the wings.  The problem was that this change caused the plane's center of gravity to also move forward given the engines' mass.

The alteration using a MAX replica the size of an eagle - with tests in a wind tunnel - disclosed even 4 years before certification that the plane was a mess.  The aerodynamic profile caused the tail to keep pitching down while the nose pitched up.  There was no normal way to alter the aerodynamics to get it to fly so the engineers devised the MCAS software fix  to do the job.   The problem was the software pushed the nose down in the event of rare set of circumstances in conjunction with the "speed trim system"

I concluded:

"The bottom line is that this plane is an aerodynamic disaster - and was from the instant the massive LEAP engines were mounted so far forward so that no natural re-design (that cost less than projected) was possible, or recertification without complications.  It is a menace to fly for any passengers, and Sen. John Tester was correct to express misgivings. ..

Nobody in his or her right mind ought to be cheering for this aerodynamic monstrosity to take to the skies again, if ever. Not unless and until the entire plane is redesigned without the need for an MCAS "fix"  to hide in the background ready to 'self hijack' ."

In other words, there's a good chance that putting this thing in the sky again, rushing it into service without a full engineering redesign, could result in yet another major crash.  Boeing insists this can be prevented by having "two separate sensors" - and only when the two agree  there's a stall will the MCAS be activated.

But the problem is the plane is still aerodynamically unstable so that very MCAS activation could still bring the plane crashing down.  The only difference is that the single point of failure will now require two sensors to show a stall, but the unbalanced design in tandem with the activation still has the potential for a crash - if the pilots are unable to control it.

As the more recent Denver Post piece also reminds us (in terms of the Boeing history in which there have been a total of 240 fatal incidents):

"After another crash of a Boeing commercial jet in Thailand in 1991, the company was slow to admit that  a flaw in the plane's design had caused the crash, according to an essay in The Guardian written by Niki Lauda - the owner of the airline that operated the downed airline. "

What was the design flaw?  

An anomaly that caused the plane's thrust reverser to suddenly deploy in midfight.

The untimely activation of the braking mechanism resulted   in the  deaths of all 223 people on board.  Lauda, a former Formula One driver, wanted an acknowledgment but got nada, despite it being clear why the plane crashed. According to Lauda (ibid.)

"The legal department at Boeing said they could not issue a statement."

Why not? 

Well, because the unspoken intent was to "limit its legal liability and to maintain the confidence of customers, employees and investors in the integrity of its airplanes."   

The goal then, with the earlier crashes as well as the MAX 8, has been to carefully shape and manipulate public opinion.  To at least get the flying public to question the aptitude and training of the pilots first, before blaming Boeing for aerodynamically unsound planes.

Take the case of the poorly designed rudder system in Boeing's 757 which led to two fatal crashes and the loss of 152 lives, as reported in the Post piece. We also read (ibid.):

"Boeing declined to follow an NTSB recommendation to modify the rudder system after the first crash in 1991, and repeatedly argued that a pilot was to blame for a second crash in 1994 despite strong similarities between the two incidents."

While Boeing - wasting time-  tried to build a specious case that the USAir pilots in the second crash were at fault,  the NTSB determined that a defect "with the rudder's hydraulic valve was the most likely cause".

After dragging its behind for over a decade  - and finally obeying an FAA directive to upgrade the rudder system - Boeing  "completed the complex and costly task in 2008."

There is no sign at all, not one, that Boeing will do a proper redesign of its MAX 8 which would require extending the fuselage height, and thereby not getting a simple recertification.   

So the commercially flying public is left with the proverbial roll of the dice if these 737 MAX 8 jets ever do get back in the skies.  Take the chance all will be ok and the MCAS won't suddenly seize the controls?  Or walk, like Sen. John Tester vowed. Or, stick to taking the Airbus when you can - which is vastly more comfortable - and spacious - than the MAX 8 anyway.  The choice is yours, my friends. 

  Let us hope you make the right one.

'New Republic' Expose Shows How Wall St. Cost- Cutting Model Turned Boeing's 737 MAX Into A Disaster

The Ethiopian MAX 8 of the sort that crashed earlier this year. No one in his or her right mind should be pining for this monstrosity to get back in the air anytime soon.

"I'd walk before I'd get on a 737 Max."  -  Sen. John Tester  in Senate hearing  yesterday on Boeing's 737 Max

"In the now infamous debacle of the Boeing 737 MAX, the company produced a plane outfitted with a half-assed bit of software programmed to override all pilot input, and nosedive when a little vane on the side of the fuselage told it the nose was pitching up." - Maureen Tkacik, 'How Boeing's Managerial Revolution Created The 737 Max Disaster',  The New Republic, October, p. 12.

The interrogation of Boeing CEO  Dennis Mullenburg yesterday was notable for one thing: the consistency of weasel words and lack of transparency as to the basis for Boeing's two 737 MAX -8 crashes.  In effect, no one watching would gain any deep insights. Not like they would if they took the time to read the 12-page article in The New Republic by Maureen Tkacik.   Given most readers might not have ready access, I provide the link to this must read article here:

https://newrepublic.com/article/154944/boeing-737-max-investigation-indonesia-lion-air-ethiopian-airlines-managerial-revolution


Given the length of the piece, I summarize below what I believe are the key takeaways:

-  Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas in 1997 foreshadowed its downward spiral in terms of the quality of decision making, and becoming hostage to Wall Street shareholder imperatives.  Thereby Boeing adopted the "Hollywood model" for dealing with engineers: Hire them for a few months with project deadlines approaching then fire them "when you need to make numbers"

In other words eliminate engineers' input to expedite a product goal, given it likely means cutting corners to appease Wall Street leading to "endless wars" with assorted unions, including mechanics.

Examples:

Much of the software on  the MAX had been engineered by recent grads of Indian coding schools, who earned barely $9 an hour. Boeing didn't want to pay any more.

In a number of cases quality control documents were regularly forged

Employees who tried to enforce standards were sabotaged

Planes were regularly delivered to airlines with loose screws, scratched windows and random debris everywhere. 

-  The 737 Max's design was so far out of whack with aerodynamic principles that even test models in wind tunnels "botched certain extreme maneuvers."

At the core of the issues were the use of two, massive "LEAP" engines manufactured  by CFM (a joint 50-50 venture of GE and the French firm, Safran).  The massive  engines' fans were over 40 percent larger in diameter than the original 737 Pratt & Whitneys - and weighed in at twice the weight of those original engines.  The correction for the increased weight was translated into a longer and heavier fuselage and also a wider wingspan.  But the key bugbear in altered design was the inability to increase the plane's height. (Which would have meant redesigning the landing gear and risking an easier FAA certification.)

The aerodynamics were negatively impacted because the LEAP engines were too large to just tuck into their original positions underneath the wings so Boeing's engineers decided to mount them slightly forward - just in front of the wings.  The problem was that this change caused the plane's center of gravity to also move forward given the engines' mass.

The alteration using a MAX replica the size of an eagle - with tests in a wind tunnel - disclosed even 4 years before certification that the plane was a mess.  The aerodynamic profile caused the tail to keep pitching down while the nose pitched up.  There was no normal way to alter the aerodynamics to get it to fly so the engineers devised the MCAS software fix  to do the job.   The problem was the software pushed the nose down in the event of rare set of circumstances in conjunction with the "speed trim system".  (Devised in the 1980s to smooth takeoffs).

Once the MAX "materialized" in actual scale 4 years later test pilots discovered how it was even more stall prone than its predecessors. This led Boeing to modify the MCAS to force down the nose of the plane whenever the angle of attack (AOA) sensor detected a stall - and regardless of the speed.   The trouble was Boeing created an additional problem to solve the original problem of  unstable aerodynamic design.

In this case, Boeing had to give the MCAS system more power while it removed a safeguard - but not in a formal, specifically documented way that might have given the FAA pause in any certification.  The issue is traced to the fact that while the MAX has two AOA sensors only one was programmed to trigger the MCAS.  One Boeing whistleblower quoted in the NR article gave a simple explanation: if a program required data from BOTH sensors it would have had to account for any divergence.  Also the possibility that any sensor disagreement would trigger a cockpit alert.  That in turn would require additional and more complex training (D level)  and no Boeing hotshot - least of all Mullenberg - wanted to risk that in a race to beat Airbus in gaining market share.

Therefore, Boeing's machinations spawned the single point of failure; the MCAS system was programmed to turn the nose down based on the feedback from a single sensor.  In other words, they'd created the "world's first self -hijacking plane."

Worse, the single system programming was such that it enabled the plane to nose dive again 5 seconds later, and "again five seconds after that ad infinitum".

- The worst travesty is that Boeing kept the details of the MCAS software fix and actions hidden including from test pilots.

Thus,

Pilots were particularly stunned (e.g. at the Lion Air Crash last year) and the tracing to the MCAS given MCAS  "had been a big secret, largely kept from Boeing's own test pilots, mentioned only once in the glossary of the plane's 1,600 page manual and left entirely out of the 56 minute Ipad refresher course that some 737 pilots took for MAX certification."

And to top it off, "most pilots only heard of the MCAS from their unions which had gotten wind of the software from a supplementary Bulletin Boeing put out."

Outraged, many pilots took to message boards and others contacted the press including  Dominic Gates of The Seattle Times, Sean Broderick of Aviation Week and the WSJ's  Andy Pasztor.  Subsequent investigation has uncovered Boeing lobbied (FAA) regulators successfully to keep any explanation of the system from pilot manuals and training - then after the 2 crashes tried to blame the foreign pilots for improper or inadequate training.  We now know this was a ruse and depraved way to shift blame when Boeing alone bears responsibility for designing an unstable plane and a god-awful attempt at a software fix which they were ashamed to even admit existed..

Other pilots went to their corporate management to try to get additional resources "to train people on the scary new planes."

In the end not enough was done and neither the Lion Air or Ethiopian Airlines pilots had a chance,  see e.g.

BOEING 737 MAX 8 May Not Fly Until 2022 - If Then ...

The bottom line is that this plane is an aerodynamic disaster - and was from the instant the massive LEAP engines were mounted so far forward so that no natural re-design (that cost less than projected) was possible, or recertification without complications.  It is a menace to fly, for any passengers and Sen. John Tester was correct to express misgivings. I would not go so far as to "walk" instead of flying, but I would take a train.

Nobody in his or her right mind ought to be cheering for this aerodynamic monstrosity to take to the skies again, if ever. Not unless and until the entire plane is redesigned without the need for an MCAS "fix"  to hide in the background ready to "self hijack".