The problem of the self, and particularly the "Real self" has been debated for as long as there've been philosophers (as well as neuro-scientists). For example, Neuroscientist Robert Ornstein associated specific modes of behavior with particular neuronal sub-assemblies to assign relatively distinct units of dominant behavior. He calls these sub-units "simpletons".
For example, every human {H} will be a composite of a number of simpletons, say:
{H} = [A] + [P] + [L] + [R] + ........
where [A] = Altruistic, [P] = Playfulness,[L] = lustful, [R] = reflective and so on.
A dozen or more such "simpletons" may "inhabit" each human brain - and come to the fore if the correct stimulus appears. As each one comes to the fore it represents one side of the Self. Note: this is not the same as saying "multiple selves" as in schizoid splitting or split personality. Each 'self' is legit and valid, since it arises from the person's own neuronal sub-assemblies.
Thus, a "hostile-aggressive" simpleton may appear if one is cut off in a lane of traffic, or is chewed out by one's boss. A "lust" simpleton may appear for any number of stimuli-images which I won't bother to detail, but which anyone can imagine! A "caring-loving" simpleton may appear in response to words of endearment, or an affectionate hug from one's spouse, or child. A "comic" simpleton may appear spontaneously - and proceed to play a practical joke, or take a humorous perspective on everything for the time it is "in control".
Ornstein points out that many humans "require time to get their simpletons in place" for particular situations. A father of two young children may need a half hour or more after he arrives home from work to "chill out" to allow his "hostile-aggressive" simpleton to depart, to make way for the "loving-caring" simpleton that can address his children's needs - without yelling at them, criticizing them or swatting them. Far better, as Ornstein indicates - to allow separation time for a simpleton change, than to invite disaster. Ornstein argues that if a person makes any kind of effort - he or she can identify most of the simpletons at work in their personality, and learn to recognize them - and bring a desired one on when the situation calls for it. (As in the case of the father above).
Now, a new contribution arrives in terms of author Julian Baggini's The Ego Trick. Moreover, he argues that these questions about the Self aren't merely philosophical ones. They span the spectrum from psychology, neurology and gender issues, to what is dementia, the social construction of personae, and even religion.
In regard to the last, Baggini starts off the bat with negative answers, beginning with the fact we can simplify what the Self is right away, by dropping the concept of "soul". It is ultimately, a vacuous Macguffin and non-entity existing only in human brain neurons as synaptic excitations. Thus, there is no immaterial soul on which most religions rely. As he writes:
"Whatever stuff you are made from is the same kind of stuff that everything else is also made of"
Which is exactly what honest physicists (like Victor Stenger, who isn't afraid to offend the peanut gallery) have always said. We have one single physical world which is comprised of both material (e.g. atomic) and immaterial (e.g. invisible physical forces such as magnetism, electricity) parts. No one has yet been able to prove any non-physical immaterial entity exists.
Beyond this, Baggini argues that there is no single thing or part of a person that is "essentially" him, or which can be uniquely pinpointed. One's brain, body and memories all play a part in constructing the Self but there is no particular strcuture, say in the brain, which confers identity. All of which means the concept of Self is totally fluid, and we ought not treat it as if it's fixed. The Self I am today, for example, is not the Self that I was twenty or thirty years ago, and this goes far beyond mere physical changes. As a results of my collection of unique experiences I am a different self.
This is also important to bear in mind in terms of the fragility of the self. For example, a brain tumor or Alzheimer's can destroy the self, by virtue of eliminating vast memory troves as well as cognitive ability. But certain emotions, such as grief, might still be recognizable in the same person, irrespective of brain deformity or damage. Since each 'draft' is capable of recalling the previous ones, this capacity is what confers an essential unity of self and stability.
How is the Self constructed? Philosopher Daniel Dennett, in his Consciousness Explained uses a "multiple drafts" model, a kind of phenomenological theory - by which the brain creates different scripts or 'drafts' for its behaviors, then puts these into action. At any time a specific script may be revised, showing that the next behavior may not be exactly the same to the same response.
Baggini, meanwhile, follows the model of philosopher Derek Parfit in describing the unity of the Self as being achieved by a trick called "the ego trick". That is, constructing such a strong sense of connectedness and continuity out of disparate memories and experiences in a brain with no single command center. The trick, as he notes, works so well that many are fooled into believing some little controller actually sits behind the eyes and pulls the strings for action!
Baggini then breaks with Dennett by arguing that while we as walking brains are matter, we are not "just" matter. In other words, we can't describe ourselves fully with only the vocabulary of physics. One needs to invoke psychological concepts too, because of the immaterial nature of consciousness. Therefore, we need to accept that thoughts and feelings emerge from the matter of which our brains are constructed. In other words, he is an "emergent materialist". Thus, your mind is not your brain, but rather it's what your brain does. If your brain doesn't do anything then your mind can't exist, at least for that time.
In the end, Baggini succeeds in showing there are three interactive and mutually compatible modes for selfhood, dependent on: 1) the physical body as a self, 2) our assorted memory collections which recall the evolution and tendencies of a Self, and 3) a more traditional selfhood criterion. Each captures part of the truth and each in its way helps to constitute the whole truth.
Since, of course, the self can change so readily, we can see it is somewhat ridiculous to hold it to some firm account for what it may have said or thought earlier. Was that a "lie" because some contradiction appeared to have occurred in what was said or done (assuming a non-malicious intent)? Only if the complainant can show that a self is a fixed entity and not subject to the changes, morphings I cited above!
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