How Does An Atheist -Materialist Deal With The "Camus Conundrum"?

In his review of John Gray's book, 'Seven Types of Atheism' (WSJ, Dec. 18,  p. A17), Tim Crane writes: "If Atheism is simply the denial of God's existence then why should it be more of a worldview than the denial of anything else?  After all, the denial of extraterrestrial life, or fairies or Santa Claus, does not constitute a world view"

But as I pointed out in my recent letter published in Physics Today,  e.g.

Readers' thoughts on science and religion: Physics Today: Vol 71, No 6

"Because a supernatural domain cannot be approached in any scientific or objective way, then by my reckoning it doesn't exist. One need not even deny its existence because to all intents the supernatural entity becomes logically unnecessary or redundant. It doesn't help us make scientific predictions or explain natural phenomena—say, coronal mass ejections or auroral substorms"

In other words, the basis of the Atheist-Materialist worldview is not denial but rather the essential redundancy of invoking supernatural artifacts and constructs.  This is important to grasp if one is going to debate or discuss Atheism in any kind of intelligent context.  In a way, this comports with John Gray's definition (in his cited book) that Atheism "has no use for a creator god."  

Well, again, basically true because belief in the entity doesn't help me make any predictions. I can't predict the next class 4 x-ray or optical flare, or when the next supernova will be explode in terrestrial skies.  So in that sense science has no use for it - and since Atheism- Materialism is mainly predicated on naturalist science, it doesn't either.

Besides that, as I have noted in multiple previous posts,  the invocation of  the generic deity is laden with peril.  This is because even if we did agree some ultimate power started at all  there’d still be no agreement on the entity’s specific  attributes, nature or powers.  The late Carl Sagan, for his part, equated 'God' to the physical principles and laws that govern the universe, which let's be clear, is more a physical God.  Albert Einstein himself invoked "Spinoza's God" - which comes to the same thing. The point here is that it makes more sense not to interject the issue of 'God' at all, because no two people can even agree on what the noun means.

However, there exist problems - or perhaps conundrums- where Atheism -Materialism can be put to severe test.  Then  the different types of Materialism, in particular,  can be exposed as useful or not.   One such problem I introduced in my book, 'Beyond Atheism- Beyond God' and called "the Camus Conundrum" -    after author Albert Camus, as expressed by a character in  The Plague[1]. 

The essence is embodied in a question Camus’ character Jean Tarrou asks his friend, Rieux[2]:

Why do you show such devotion considering you don’t believe in God?

Author Greg  Epstein puts this in a contemporary setting, referencing a 2006 book tour by Richard Dawkins for his God Delusion. According to Epstein[3], Dawkins was somewhat startled when a young man approached him and asked directly: "Dr. Dawkins, I am thinking of committing suicide, what do you have to say?:

 Epstein relates that initially Dawkins was so nonplussed he could think of nothing to say then suggested the young man (a student at Harvard) could go to the humanist chaplain or – if he’d been at Oxford, he could go to the Anglican chaplain.

            In understandable astonishment, Epstein observed[4]:

Is that the best we can do? Rage, rage against the dying of the Enlightenment then shoo our troubled youth back to religion because we’re too distracted or cerebral or both to spend a few minutes of our deep thoughts on being more loving and more helpful?

Indeed. But let’s be clear the Camus conundrum highlighted in modern form by Epstein isn’t just a problem for Dawkins! I am certain that in a similar situation, all the current hard core crop of "New Atheists" would be at a loss for words, but perhaps more out of diplomacy. If they were truly honest and forthright they’d likely answer along the lines of:

"Well, you are just an assembly of molecules and atoms when all’s said and done. Killing yourself is therefore nothing to worry over.  You don’t have to fear Hell since when you’re dead, that’s it! You are in the end a complex machine, but only a machine nonetheless, so killing yourself is no different from pulling your own plug."

  What else could the reductionists say or do, if they have cast their lot with a remorseless meme that sees each human as merely an assemblage of trillions of inert component molecules? More to the point, they allocate no quantum mechanical dimension to any of those constituents, especially for the human brain.

 As an emergent Materialist, on the other hand, I would have told Dawkins’ questioner that emergence of a unified energy whole is more foundational than matter or apparent separation, as the professed realist-reductionists claim. I would have encouraged him to learn and become part of that emergent energy substrate or Being of which his consciousness was part.  I’d then have added that this transcending consciousness conferred meaning and also abhorred extinction via its individual conscious units. In other words, killing oneself amounted to killing an expression of Being within oneself. It meant killing a unique expression of Being manifest in the cosmos, and hence extinguishing a light that might be there for others.

But let me clear here, lest too many misinterpret my meaning: The Being to which I refer is  basically the same physical, nonlocal entity described and discussed by physicist Bernard d 'Espagnat in his book, 'In Search Of Reality'. It is not supernatural nor does it work "miracles'.  If I were pressed to pinpoint the nature in more specific terms it would be analogous to David Bohm's holomovement, described in detail in his book, 'Wholeness and the Implicate Order'.  See e.g.

[PDF]

Wholeness and the Implicate Order

In the implicate order proposed by Bohm, the separateness of the universe is ultimately submerged within its higher dimensional implicate aspect. All seemingly separate entities are ultimately unified into one, much like the apparently separate ‘waves’ seen on the ocean ultimately dissolve and submerge into the vastly greater background sea that spawned them.  This illustration helps to understand the relation:

INDIVIDUAL FORMS (EXPLICATE ORDER)

___Ç___Ç___Ç___Ç___Ç___

DIRAC ENERGY SEA (IMPLICATE ORDER)

In human terms, this implies that at a higher dimensional level all matter, especially as embodied in human forms, along with human minds, becomes interfused into one reality, one whole without division. As Bohm describes it[5]:

In the implicate order we have to say the mind enfolds matter in general and therefore the body in particular. Similarly, the body enfolds not only the mind but also in some sense, the entire material universe.

If it is true that not all Materialist philosophies are created the same, and there is a subset that must be false, then it is incumbent on us to expose the latter.  Contrary to a physicalist model that incorporates quantum mechanics and mind, we have the hyper-reductionists real locality models which  Graham Smetham dismisses as false. These embody a false Materialism because they attempt to explain something as complex as thought and consciousness using simple bio-chemical interactions. As Smetham puts it [6]:

In the most up-to date understanding of quantum theory, it is quite clear that all apparently material structures and processes, including the brain, are emergent from quantum insubstantial ‘dream’ stuff, to use a description by Wojciech Zurek.

  In other words, in the valid theories of Materialism, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon of material hardware but rather the author of the brain’s running software. In other words: the material of the brain is ultimately immaterial.  (De Broglie waves) 

Central to discriminating opposing Materialist models of mind are qualia. The term refers to subjective properties perceived in the material world, including colors, shapes and sounds (music). Arguably, none of these have objective existence but are tied to our neural processing and mode of consciousness. The qualia problem is often also called the Mary problem since it presents a hypothetical character (“Mary”) who inhabits a black and white world, but knows everything about colors in physics terms. Still, though she knows what color signifies – e.6. a particular wavelength  (say 660 nm)  in the electromagnetic spectrum – she has never experienced it.  The qualia problem helps to distinguish between what many call monistic physicalism and what I refer to as quantum or nonlocal physicalism.

In monistic physicalism, reality is structured around locality (predicated on particles), and quantum wave mechanics and its inherent potentiality never enters the field Y  to the extent of overturning particle dominance. In this way, emergence and holism are kept at bay. Conversely, J.S. Bell’s awareness of the hidden variable X [7]:

Although Y is a real field it does not show up immediately in the results of a ‘single measurement’, but only in the statistics of many such results. It is the de Broglie –Bohm variable X that shows up immediately each time.

And what of Man? According to physicist Henry Stapp [8]:

Classical physics portrayed man as a puppet controlled by the iron hand of destiny ordained at the beginning of time. Man was thereby removed of all  responsibility for his acts.

But this is in contradiction to quantum facts, i.e. (ibid.):

Brain processes involve chemical processes which must, in principle, be treated quantum mechanically. In particular, the transmission process occurring at a synaptic junction is triggered by the capture of a small number of calcium ions at an appropriate release site.
 

 In a quantum mechanical treatment, the locations of the calcium ions must be treated quantum mechanically: a quantum mechanical component must be added to the other uncertainties such as those generated by thermal noise, that enter into the decision as to whether the synapse will fire.

Which means (op. cit.):

Reinstatement of human freedom by appeal to quantum theory resurrects human

responsibility...this approach to the mind-body problem creates a quantum

mechanical conception of man and his role in nature.  

He is no longer a passive observer of a cataclysmic initial act of creation, but rather an active participant in the  process of creation

Evidently then, we can gather that the choice isn't between "God" or "no God" but between whether we humans invoke a perspective based on monistic physicalism or nonlocal physicalism.  In the first we remain as mere assemblies of atoms and molecules, or "puppets controlled by the iron hand of destiny" in Stapp's parlance.  In the latter we have the potential for a nonlocal emergence and enhanced freedom as cosmic participants- though not as "souls"-   but rather as explicated centers of energy grounded in a higher dimensional implicate order.

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[1] Albert Camus: The Plague, 126.

[2]  Camus: Ibid.

[3] Greg Epstein, op. cit., 64.

[4] Ibid.

[5] David Bohm,  p. 209
[6] Graham Smetham,  Philosophy Now, No. 93, 28.(Nov./Dec.               2012), p. 30
[7]J.S. Bell,: Foundations of Physics, (12,) .989

[8] Henry Stapp: Foundations of Physics, (15), 35