Can We Help A Supernaturally- Obsessed WSJ Letter Writer Overcome His Fear Of Materialism?

Americans have more than enough to occupy their worry hours lately, what with the spread of white nationalism, mass shooting threats and Trumpist insanity and lies. The latter was on display last week with Trump's dog and pony show with the Ukrainian Prez.  Then there is the constant financial turbulence (again no thanks to Dotard) , diseases such as EEE and vaping pneumonia,  preternaturally strong hurricanes like Doria.  So why add  supernatural phantasmagorias to that existential load?

Well, one WSJ letter writer named Paul Malocha appears to want to, writing in a letter four days ago:

"Neurons provide the material for human consciousness but cannot create it. A rational soul is necessary. Without the latter you have a bunch of data and processes only...Of course, the materialist philosophy behind this quest (for thinking machines) rejects that there is such a thing as a soul, rather holding that consciousness is simply an emergent property of electric meat."

But it is vastly more than "electric meat! And that's where Mr. Malocha goes astray and so allows supernatural babble like "souls" to enter the picture.  In fact, the departure from the crude materialism that Malocha invokes is made possible by the introduction of quantum mechanics into neural processing and brain dynamics.   We have to thank physicist Henry Stapp (Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics, Springer-Verlag, p. 42)  who  first posited that that uncertainty principle limitations applied to calcium ion capture near synapses shows they (calcium ions) must be represented by a probability function.  The latter is described by quantum mechanics, so entails a wave form (de Broglie waves) - not just matter- and we move beyond "electric meat".

More specifically, the dimension of the associated calcium ion wavepacket scales many times larger than the calcium ion itself. This nullifies the use of classical trajectories or classical mechanics to trace the path of the ions.  It thereby opens the door fully to quantum mechanics.  Ultimately (using additional work by physicist David Bohm) one can arrive at a "quantum potential", defined:

V_Q=   {-ħ²/ 2m} [Ñ R]² / R

for a wave function, U = R exp(iS/ħ)

where R,S are real.

But let's back up a bit to units we call neuronal assemblies, and super assemblies. These are amenable to a particular type of neural network processing that relies on "clustering algorithms" and for which quantum dots can be located at critical junctures in the network to minimize input variations and assure specific outputs. To fix ideas, I direct readers to parts A, B and C of Fig. 1.

 Part (A) shows a neuronal super-assembly, part (B) a biological and quantum analog to one center of neuronal action, and part (C) the workable neural network known as the radial basis function.  Part (A) shows a neuronal super-assembly, part (B) a biological and quantum analog to one center of neuronal action, and part (C) the workable neural network known as the radial basis function.

A neuronal assembly can also be described by connections to some N-synapses (where N> 100,000). This is shown simplified in the left side of the same diagram(B), where the neuron A now has 4 rays: AB, AC, AD, AE representing four connections of the same neuron to four different synapses. Bear in mind the neuron A has any number of quantum wave state possibilities associated with it: firing or not firing, action-potential or no action potential and perhaps one million others. In a higher-order neuronal assembly one might have 1,000 neurons each connected to 100,000 synapses for which an extremely complicated figure would result!

Consider now the the quantum aspect. A neuron 'A' either fires or not. The 'firing' and 'not firing' can be designated as two different quantum states identified by the numbers 1 and 2. When we combine them together in a vector sum diagram, we obtain the superposition. where the wave function (left side) applies to the neuron 'A'. What if one has 1,000 neurons, each to be described by the states 1 and 2? In principle, one can obtain the vector sum as shown in the above equation for neuron A and combine it with all the other vector sums (using the quantum superposition principle) for each of the 999 other neurons. The resulting vector sum represents the superposition of all subsidiary wave states and possibilities - at least those for the 'firing-not firing' states! The end product of this is a neuronal 'assembly' or aggregate of neurons (and associated synapses, axons, dendrites, etc.) which performs some function or acts like a circuit (for example a simple reflex arc, as when one burns a finger and automatically removes it from the source).

At a higher level of the hierarchy, one refers to the neuronal super-assembly(A) or 'super-circuit’ within which considerations such as networks, and optimization of paths as well as 'adjacency and order' take precedence. Each solid black circle denotes a neuronal assembly such as described above. These are intimately connected, each to the other, to perform some specific function. (For example in the brain region known as the limbic system, there is a structure called the hippocampus, within which an agglomerate of neuronal assemblies is dedicated to maximizing retention of events as memory.)

We then ask: What form or type of operational network can best exploit these properties to attain the desired function we want? That is, to be able to shut down or minimize negative inputs that contain information that amplifies unwarranted fears? The diagram (C) gives the clue: it will be a network for which a clustering algorithm is optimized, since this same clustering emulates the neuronal assemblies.

In the clustering algorithm view(C), the center for action (the m's) are going to be neurons, as occur in neuronal assemblies. As each cluster center m(i) is moved closer to the x(n) because the relevant equation minimizes the error vector, [x(n) - m(i)]. The relevant equation here is:

m(i)' = m(i) + a{x - m(i)} 

where a is the "learning rate" or in this case, the information processing (flow and refresh) rate in the network. The iterative aspect of the equation, emphasizes the fact that the algorithm is applicable for clustering the input vectors in real-time as they are acquired sequentially. Thus, the quantum gates will have an ongoing active role and continually update inputs as well as outputs.

What about the RBF network itself? This is shown in Fig. 2. 

Cursory inspection shows some similarities to the previous considered (numerically vetted) MLP network but also key differences. For example: the hidden layer j = 0, 1, 2 ....p has no bias inputs such as X(0) for the MLP. Both hidden layer operators transit to Y(k) and Y(m) which in turn feed into one bias point per cluster at Phi(0).

The output of a neuron in the output layer is then defined according to: y(k=j) = f(jth output of j = 0, 1, 2.....p neuron of hidden layer) which can be controlled by placing a quantum gate (likely NOT gate using the function for the Pauli spin matrix σ(z) = (1, 0¦0, -1), where as before, the left pair is a matrix 'top' and the right pair a matrix 'bottom' )

In effect, with correct placement of quantum dot NOT gates in the hidden layer, it will be possible to alter an input (0, 1) to an output (0,-1) say at the bias point Phi(0). That switching effect will then transfer to the output layer, inverting the outputs for the k = 1, 2,.....m neurons principally for the points y(1), y(k=j) and y(m). The key advantage of the RBF over an MLP network is that the RBF leads to better decision boundaries and improved classification of the information from the hidden layer. (Which might be very critical since not all information going to the amygdala is negative. Some is available evolutionarily, for example, to arouse an alert for a real threat!)

A remaining question or issue, is whether or not one quantum NOT gate is required for each neuron in the hidden layer. I am going to argue 'no', given the fact that quantum superposition superposition of data elements can apply such that: U = U(1) + U(0), where 1 and 0 denotes bits entrained to move along as information to the outputs y(1), y(k=j) and y(m). In principle, then, it is feasible that each quantum gate can - according to its qubit (not bit) capacity, match up to many more neuron bits in transit within the hidden layer.

For example, an ordinary (computer) register only holds one of eight possible 3-bit combinations at a time, say: 001, or 010, or 011. By contrast, a qubit register (or quantum gate acting as one) could accommodate all eight possible 3-bit combinations: 000, 001, 010, 100, 110, 101, 011, and 111. In general, for any given n-bit combination, with n a whole number, a qubit register could accommodate 2 to the nth power total combinations at one time. Thus, 16 combinations could be held in memory for 4-bits, 32 for 5-bits, and so on. This change marks an exponential (two to the 'n') increase over any classical counterpart.

The task now will be to check the workabilty of the RBF network by using a simulation code that can encode qubit capacity and be integral with the key network equations for the RBF network. What might be one way we know we're on the right track? Well, apart from getting the outputs we want at (1), y(k=j) and y(m), we also would like to see or ensure that the error function remains Gaussian, and doesn't suddenly change. For example, it can be shown that the relevant error function for a given neuron designated for the output bias is:

Phi(n) = exp {[x(n) - m(i)] ²/ 2s(n) ² where [x(n) - m(i)] is the Euclidean distance between x(n) and m(i) and which should not exceed the distance for which the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is applicable, e.g. ~ 300 nm, and s(n) is the standard deviation applicable to all neurons in the hidden layer subject to quantum gate effects. (It is also sometimes taken as the width of the Gaussian associated with the cluster algorithm prototype.).

All of the preceding is consistent with the "holarchy" cited by Mensan Christina Anne Knight (see my July 12 post)  in her 'Systems Approach to the Afterlife'  and first used by Arthur Koestler in The Ghost in the Machine .   As she points out and Koestler notes, this embodies  the "interdependence, interrelations and interaction of subsystems which results in a form of self-organization from which a larger system is an emergent product".  

In other words, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon of the brain but an "emergent product".    This is  assured by the novel role of QM and especially the uncertainty principle which allows the sort of creative behavior and thought we associated with a highly functioning consciousness. Hence, no "soul" is needed for consciousness to operate. Moreover, it has the capacity to be fully rational in its capacity and operation, Donald Trump being the exception, obviously. And the consequences at death, again, Ms. Knight's words:

"If the conscious mind is located at the apex of this holarchic system , then the collapse of the substructure beneath it has terminal consequences."

Thus,

"The conscious mind becomes just another impermanent system subject to physical laws.  It does not survive death because it cannot exist outside the holarchic structure from which it emerged"

It would appear then that the WSJ letter writer underestimates the power of Materialism (in its quantum based form - called Monistic physicalism) to account for consciousness, as well as rendering any "soul" redundant.

How Does An Atheist -Materialist Deal With The "Camus Conundrum"?

In his review of John Gray's book, 'Seven Types of Atheism' (WSJ, Dec. 18,  p. A17), Tim Crane writes: "If Atheism is simply the denial of God's existence then why should it be more of a worldview than the denial of anything else?  After all, the denial of extraterrestrial life, or fairies or Santa Claus, does not constitute a world view"

But as I pointed out in my recent letter published in Physics Today,  e.g.

Readers' thoughts on science and religion: Physics Today: Vol 71, No 6

"Because a supernatural domain cannot be approached in any scientific or objective way, then by my reckoning it doesn't exist. One need not even deny its existence because to all intents the supernatural entity becomes logically unnecessary or redundant. It doesn't help us make scientific predictions or explain natural phenomena—say, coronal mass ejections or auroral substorms"

In other words, the basis of the Atheist-Materialist worldview is not denial but rather the essential redundancy of invoking supernatural artifacts and constructs.  This is important to grasp if one is going to debate or discuss Atheism in any kind of intelligent context.  In a way, this comports with John Gray's definition (in his cited book) that Atheism "has no use for a creator god."  

Well, again, basically true because belief in the entity doesn't help me make any predictions. I can't predict the next class 4 x-ray or optical flare, or when the next supernova will be explode in terrestrial skies.  So in that sense science has no use for it - and since Atheism- Materialism is mainly predicated on naturalist science, it doesn't either.

Besides that, as I have noted in multiple previous posts,  the invocation of  the generic deity is laden with peril.  This is because even if we did agree some ultimate power started at all  there’d still be no agreement on the entity’s specific  attributes, nature or powers.  The late Carl Sagan, for his part, equated 'God' to the physical principles and laws that govern the universe, which let's be clear, is more a physical God.  Albert Einstein himself invoked "Spinoza's God" - which comes to the same thing. The point here is that it makes more sense not to interject the issue of 'God' at all, because no two people can even agree on what the noun means.

However, there exist problems - or perhaps conundrums- where Atheism -Materialism can be put to severe test.  Then  the different types of Materialism, in particular,  can be exposed as useful or not.   One such problem I introduced in my book, 'Beyond Atheism- Beyond God' and called "the Camus Conundrum" -    after author Albert Camus, as expressed by a character in  The Plague[1]. 

The essence is embodied in a question Camus’ character Jean Tarrou asks his friend, Rieux[2]:

Why do you show such devotion considering you don’t believe in God?

Author Greg  Epstein puts this in a contemporary setting, referencing a 2006 book tour by Richard Dawkins for his God Delusion. According to Epstein[3], Dawkins was somewhat startled when a young man approached him and asked directly: "Dr. Dawkins, I am thinking of committing suicide, what do you have to say?:

 Epstein relates that initially Dawkins was so nonplussed he could think of nothing to say then suggested the young man (a student at Harvard) could go to the humanist chaplain or – if he’d been at Oxford, he could go to the Anglican chaplain.

            In understandable astonishment, Epstein observed[4]:

Is that the best we can do? Rage, rage against the dying of the Enlightenment then shoo our troubled youth back to religion because we’re too distracted or cerebral or both to spend a few minutes of our deep thoughts on being more loving and more helpful?

Indeed. But let’s be clear the Camus conundrum highlighted in modern form by Epstein isn’t just a problem for Dawkins! I am certain that in a similar situation, all the current hard core crop of "New Atheists" would be at a loss for words, but perhaps more out of diplomacy. If they were truly honest and forthright they’d likely answer along the lines of:

"Well, you are just an assembly of molecules and atoms when all’s said and done. Killing yourself is therefore nothing to worry over.  You don’t have to fear Hell since when you’re dead, that’s it! You are in the end a complex machine, but only a machine nonetheless, so killing yourself is no different from pulling your own plug."

  What else could the reductionists say or do, if they have cast their lot with a remorseless meme that sees each human as merely an assemblage of trillions of inert component molecules? More to the point, they allocate no quantum mechanical dimension to any of those constituents, especially for the human brain.

 As an emergent Materialist, on the other hand, I would have told Dawkins’ questioner that emergence of a unified energy whole is more foundational than matter or apparent separation, as the professed realist-reductionists claim. I would have encouraged him to learn and become part of that emergent energy substrate or Being of which his consciousness was part.  I’d then have added that this transcending consciousness conferred meaning and also abhorred extinction via its individual conscious units. In other words, killing oneself amounted to killing an expression of Being within oneself. It meant killing a unique expression of Being manifest in the cosmos, and hence extinguishing a light that might be there for others.

But let me clear here, lest too many misinterpret my meaning: The Being to which I refer is  basically the same physical, nonlocal entity described and discussed by physicist Bernard d 'Espagnat in his book, 'In Search Of Reality'. It is not supernatural nor does it work "miracles'.  If I were pressed to pinpoint the nature in more specific terms it would be analogous to David Bohm's holomovement, described in detail in his book, 'Wholeness and the Implicate Order'.  See e.g.

[PDF]

Wholeness and the Implicate Order

In the implicate order proposed by Bohm, the separateness of the universe is ultimately submerged within its higher dimensional implicate aspect. All seemingly separate entities are ultimately unified into one, much like the apparently separate ‘waves’ seen on the ocean ultimately dissolve and submerge into the vastly greater background sea that spawned them.  This illustration helps to understand the relation:

INDIVIDUAL FORMS (EXPLICATE ORDER)

___Ç___Ç___Ç___Ç___Ç___

DIRAC ENERGY SEA (IMPLICATE ORDER)

In human terms, this implies that at a higher dimensional level all matter, especially as embodied in human forms, along with human minds, becomes interfused into one reality, one whole without division. As Bohm describes it[5]:

In the implicate order we have to say the mind enfolds matter in general and therefore the body in particular. Similarly, the body enfolds not only the mind but also in some sense, the entire material universe.

If it is true that not all Materialist philosophies are created the same, and there is a subset that must be false, then it is incumbent on us to expose the latter.  Contrary to a physicalist model that incorporates quantum mechanics and mind, we have the hyper-reductionists real locality models which  Graham Smetham dismisses as false. These embody a false Materialism because they attempt to explain something as complex as thought and consciousness using simple bio-chemical interactions. As Smetham puts it [6]:

In the most up-to date understanding of quantum theory, it is quite clear that all apparently material structures and processes, including the brain, are emergent from quantum insubstantial ‘dream’ stuff, to use a description by Wojciech Zurek.

  In other words, in the valid theories of Materialism, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon of material hardware but rather the author of the brain’s running software. In other words: the material of the brain is ultimately immaterial.  (De Broglie waves) 

Central to discriminating opposing Materialist models of mind are qualia. The term refers to subjective properties perceived in the material world, including colors, shapes and sounds (music). Arguably, none of these have objective existence but are tied to our neural processing and mode of consciousness. The qualia problem is often also called the Mary problem since it presents a hypothetical character (“Mary”) who inhabits a black and white world, but knows everything about colors in physics terms. Still, though she knows what color signifies – e.6. a particular wavelength  (say 660 nm)  in the electromagnetic spectrum – she has never experienced it.  The qualia problem helps to distinguish between what many call monistic physicalism and what I refer to as quantum or nonlocal physicalism.

In monistic physicalism, reality is structured around locality (predicated on particles), and quantum wave mechanics and its inherent potentiality never enters the field Y  to the extent of overturning particle dominance. In this way, emergence and holism are kept at bay. Conversely, J.S. Bell’s awareness of the hidden variable X [7]:

Although Y is a real field it does not show up immediately in the results of a ‘single measurement’, but only in the statistics of many such results. It is the de Broglie –Bohm variable X that shows up immediately each time.

And what of Man? According to physicist Henry Stapp [8]:

Classical physics portrayed man as a puppet controlled by the iron hand of destiny ordained at the beginning of time. Man was thereby removed of all  responsibility for his acts.

But this is in contradiction to quantum facts, i.e. (ibid.):

Brain processes involve chemical processes which must, in principle, be treated quantum mechanically. In particular, the transmission process occurring at a synaptic junction is triggered by the capture of a small number of calcium ions at an appropriate release site.
 

 In a quantum mechanical treatment, the locations of the calcium ions must be treated quantum mechanically: a quantum mechanical component must be added to the other uncertainties such as those generated by thermal noise, that enter into the decision as to whether the synapse will fire.

Which means (op. cit.):

Reinstatement of human freedom by appeal to quantum theory resurrects human

responsibility...this approach to the mind-body problem creates a quantum

mechanical conception of man and his role in nature.  

He is no longer a passive observer of a cataclysmic initial act of creation, but rather an active participant in the  process of creation

Evidently then, we can gather that the choice isn't between "God" or "no God" but between whether we humans invoke a perspective based on monistic physicalism or nonlocal physicalism.  In the first we remain as mere assemblies of atoms and molecules, or "puppets controlled by the iron hand of destiny" in Stapp's parlance.  In the latter we have the potential for a nonlocal emergence and enhanced freedom as cosmic participants- though not as "souls"-   but rather as explicated centers of energy grounded in a higher dimensional implicate order.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Albert Camus: The Plague, 126.

[2]  Camus: Ibid.

[3] Greg Epstein, op. cit., 64.

[4] Ibid.

[5] David Bohm,  p. 209
[6] Graham Smetham,  Philosophy Now, No. 93, 28.(Nov./Dec.               2012), p. 30
[7]J.S. Bell,: Foundations of Physics, (12,) .989

[8] Henry Stapp: Foundations of Physics, (15), 35

Bishop Richard Barron Misfires On God & Metaphysics

Auxiliary Bishop Robert Barron, of the LA Archdiocese, is adamant that opponents don't grasp his position on science and religion as spelled out recently. In a current response (Nov. 19) he writes:

 "Many respondents display what I call “scientism,” the philosophical assumption that the real is reducible to what the empirical sciences can verify or describe. In reaction to my attempts to demonstrate that God must exist as the necessary precursor to the radically contingent universe, respondent after respondent says some version of this: Energy, or matter, or the Big Bang, is the ultimate cause of all things."

The problem first, is that Bishop Barron offers only a simplistic definition of scientism. It doesn't mean reducible to what the empirical sciences can verify or describe  but rather a blind commitment to a rigid, locality-based, non-emergent mechanical reductionism.  This is in radical distinction to the nonlocality manifested by the quantum domain. Physicist Bernard d'Espagnat put it thusly in his 'In Search of Reality':

"If scientism were correct, or more precisely, if the view of the world it proposes so forcefully, that of a world ultimately consisting of myriads of small localized objects merely endowed with quasi-local properties were correct then we'd be little more than automatons"

Thus, by rejecting scientism - which a real scientist should - one is led to a deeper reality of emergence, such as I discussed in my recent book, 'Beyond Atheism, Beyond God'.  Thus, the cartoon version of physical reality of which Barron writes is obviated by embracing a nonlocal physical universe. This, incidentally, still doesn't allow for any supernatural entity.

In this nonlocal setting, there is no separation vis-a-vis energy so "God" is already immanent in the system as an unexpressed regulative ideal - but which physicists refer to as negative (vacuum) energy. It is this which gave rise to the big bang, this would be via a collision of M-branes, e.g.

The origin of our universe from nothing, then,  occurs as a result of the contact of two hyperdimensional branes, not from a single particle, atom, or even a bubble of dark energy. The M-brane pairs occur as a result of vacuum energy fluctuations in conformal space-time.

Thus, Barron's respondents would have been more correct to say that negative or vacuum energy is the ultimate cause of all things.

Beyond this, Barron, like most religionists, doesn't define what he means by "God". And what is the "radically contingent universe"? Unless terms are defined it is not possible to have a coherent argument or compelling discussion.

Take aseity or non-contingency. Philosopher Mortimer Adler  first identified the attribute of “aseity” as the most fundamental for any putative divine being. Adler translated his coined term as synonymous with non-contingence, i.e. depending on nothing else for existence. In many respects, aseity trumps all other properties when it comes to identifying a divinity or trying to assign properties whereby a God can be defined consistently.

Can aseity be assigned such that an entity called “God” can truly be imaged or encapsulated? Perhaps, but more likely not very likely! The reason, as philosopher Alan Watts has observed, is because to envisage such deity requires a perfect balancing act between fixity and fluidity. In fixity one seeks to possess or fix an isolated definition or image, but this borders on idolatry. In fluidity one admits to the constant motion and ephemeral nature of reality around him but in this case no imaging is possible because all the images flowing are also fleeting. The problem for Barron and others is in identifying the latter with a "radically contingent universe" and the former with aseity or a non-contingent deity. But if the actual deity is "fluid", i.e. based on Dirac sub-quantal energy, what then?

This has led Watts to finally conclude (‘The Wisdom of Insecurity’, p.27):

“The incredible truth that what religion calls the vision of God is found by giving up any belief in the idea of God. By the same law of reversed effort, we find the infinite and the absolute, not by straining to escape from the finite and relative world, but by the most complete acceptance of its limitations."

This is a radical idea to be sure, but one which is worth considering if one is really invested in resolving or eliminating any conflict between modern science and religion - as it 0ught to be.  After all, is there really that huge a sacrifice in giving up belief in the "idea of God"?  Which again, is not the same as any essential Being that may be tied to it. (A point made in my book in terms of "God concepts")

Barron  also doesn't seem to grasp here that science DOES take a position or view (naturalistic or materialistic) which undergirds its naturalistic approach to inquiry - in order to take an impartial approach to the natural world. If it allowed subjective beliefs to hold sway, or adopt any openness to supernaturalism, the impartial search for natural truth would be destroyed.

Barron also seems not to grasp that the invocation of God in any domain is fraught with  metaphysical peril because even if we did agree some ultimate power started at all (as I pointed out in my 1990 Astronomy article, August, p. 11, God and Astronomy) there’d still be no agreement on the entity’s attributes, nature or powers. 

Some, like Bishop Barron, would see a ‘creator’ that stands apart from the universe, while others see an underlying intelligence in nature.( Carl Sagan, for his part, equated 'God' to the physical principles and laws that govern the universe, which let's be clear, is more a physical God.)  The point here is that it makes more sense not to interject the issue of 'God' at all, because no two people can even agree on what the noun means.

He also writes:

 "When I counter that the Big Bang itself demonstrates that the universe in its totality is contingent and hence in need of a cause extraneous to itself, they think I'm just talking nonsense."

But referring to a cause "extraneous to itself" shows how he confuses the whole matter.  Robert Baum’s textbook, LOGIC, pp. 469-70, clearly shows that explicating necessary and sufficient conditions constitutes a practical replacement for causes. In other words, instead of saying or asserting x caused y, one stipulates that a, b are necessary conditions for x to exist at all, and c, d are sufficient conditions for y to have been the sole effect of cause x.

Baum’s reasoning is clear (ibid.): because “cause” (generic) can be interpreted as proximate or remote, or even as the “goal or aim of an action”  it is therefore too open-ended, ambiguous and construed in too many different ways. Thus, “cause” is too embedded in most people’s minds with only one of several meanings, leaving most causality discussions unproductive and confused. If my “cause” and your “cause” in a given argument diverge, then we will not get very far.

Because of this one uses the more neutral term “condition” and specifies necessary and sufficient ones. The latter terms are specifically meaningful in the context of determining causal conditions, and hence, causes. If one eschews them, then one concedes he is incapable of logical argument.

Much of this can be addressed via Bayesian probabilities. To fix ideas here: let p[S] be the unconditional probability there is a supernatural agent responsible for the creation of the universe. Let p(S-[BB]) be the conditional probability of the existence of a supernatural agent if the Big Bang has indeed occurred. Let p[B,B] be the unconditional probability the Big Bang occurred and p(BB-[S]) the conditional probability that the Big Bang occurred – provided a supernatural agent is responsible for the creation of the cosmos.

According to the principles of Bayesian probability theory (e.g. by Bayes’ theorem) we can write:

p(S-[BB])/ p[S] = p(BB-[S])/ p[B,B]

In terms of strict adherence to Bayes’ theorem, one can only have:

p(S-[BB]) >> p[S]

E.g. IF the Big Bang occurred, there is an enhanced probability of the Big Bang being its source.

However, this is not what they proffer, but instead arrive at:

p(BB-[S]) >> p{BB]

which inverts the prior Bayesian statement by asserting:

“the existence of a supernatural being enhances the probability of the Big Bang”

The fallacy of the approach inheres in the inequality given by:

p(BB-[S]) >> p{BB]

But this is an arbitrary assumption since we have no knowledge of how a supernatural agent might act and none of its proponents have given the necessary and sufficient conditions for such action, including Barron.

The end result? If necessary and sufficient conditions were at least provided, we might have a better way of setting up the Bayesian probabilities to conform to what they should be and not include any arbitrary assumptions.

In the meantime, we can conclude the universe is not in need of a cause 'extraneous" to itself since p(S-[BB]) >> p[S]

Barron goes on:

"The obvious success of the physical sciences, evident in the technology that surrounds us and facilitates our lives in so many ways, has convinced many of our young people (the vast majority of those who watch YouTube are young) that anything outside the range of the empirical and measurable is simply a fantasy, the stuff of superstition. That there might be a dimension of reality knowable in a nonscientific but still rational manner never occurs to them. In their scientism, they are blind to literature, philosophy, metaphysics, mysticism and religion."

The problem for Barron here is that he does not indicate in any way how an "extra-physical" reality might be established. Yes, there well might be such but how can it be accessed rationally? How can it be validated in a nonscientific way? Again, the major difficulty for Barron is that he confuses scientism with Monistic physicalism.  In its most rudimentary form the latter can be summarized by reference to the late Victor Stenger’s comment (cf. God and the Folly of Faith, 155)

It does not matter whether you are trying to measure a particle property or a wave property. You always measure particles. Here is the point that most people fail to understand: Quantum mechanics is just a statistical theory like statistical mechanics, fundamentally reducible to particle behavior.

By contrast, David Bohm's nonlocal physics as explicated in his wonderful book 'Wholeness and the Implicate Order' shows that all the reductionist snafus are eliminated when one integrates the results of fundamental physics or quantum mechanics. By the use of such a full integration Bohm provided a putative basis for a holistic consciousness which he referred to as the holomovement. To enable a unified field within this higher dimensionality he appealed to hidden variables obeying Heisenberg uncertainty relations such that:

(d p)( d q) > h/ 2π

Where p, q denote hidden variables underlying a sub-quantal scale indeterminacy relation. From this he was then able to derive an equation for what he called "the quantum potential":

V_Q=   {-ħ²/ 2m} [Ñ R]² / R

If one then fully applies Bohm's nonlocal system to physical reality it becomes possible to show the relation of individual forms to the universal aggregate, i.e.g

INDIVIDUAL FORMS (EXPLICATE ORDER)

___Ç___Ç___Ç___Ç___Ç___

DIRAC ENERGY SEA (IMPLICATE ORDER)

The relation is holographic in the sense that each of the individual forms contains the information of the whole holographic field. Given this holistic system, none of Barron's issues provides an impediment. Thus, the young person familiar with a Bohmian system of physical reality will not be  "blind to literature, philosophy, metaphysics, mysticism and religion".   Bohm's implicate order perspective, indeed, absolutely forbids metaphysical (or physical) isolationism.

Barron again:

Another recurring theme on my YouTube forums is the disturbing assumption that science and Christianity are, by their natures, implacable enemies.

He then goes on to cite examples of Georges Lemaitre, Galileo and others but omits many key details. While it is true  Lemaitre can be considered the "father" of the Big Bang theory (he did conceive a crude version, without inflation) no mention is made by Barron that he refused Pope Pius XII claim that Lemaître's theory provided a scientific validation for Catholicism. In fact, as the Wikipedia article on him observes: "While a devout Roman Catholic, he was against mixing science with religion" - though he did allow there need not be conflict.  Regarding Galileo, Barron omits the fact he was actually persecuted by the Inquisition for backing Copernicus' heliocentric theory. He also conveniently omits mention of Giordano Bruno - who was burned at the stake just for his speculations, and the Alexandrian scientist Hypatia, slaughtered by Christian zealots, e.g.

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2011/03/hypatia-victim-of-christian-zealots_27.html

The true fact to take away is that, as George Santayana put it ('Reason in Religion', p. 157):

"It does not require much shrewdness to see that supernatural beings and events are without the efficacy attributed to them".

Inferring that those who uphold such (presumably like Barron) are in fact advocating a "false physics". Thus it isn't true science and religion that are necessarily opposed to each other, but mock religion which pretends to have creations that can't be proven (e.g. false physics) and real physics - which underlies all of science.  They will always be opposed to each other because there is no support basis for agents or events without efficacy in science.

Barron's penultimate statements are especially enlightening in view of the preceding:

"If the world or nature were considered divine (as it is in many philosophies and mysticisms), then one would never allow oneself to analyze it, dissect it or perform experiments on it. But a created world, by definition, is other than God and, in that very otherness, open to inquiry.

Similarly, if the world were considered unintelligible, no science would get off the ground, because all science is based on the presumption that nature can be known. But the world, Christians agree, is thoroughly intelligible, and hence scientists have the confidence to seek, explore and experiment."

But considering the world or nature "divine" begs the question of what exactly we mean by "divine"? If we mean some supernatural order or being - which lacks efficacy - to use Santayana's term, then we are admitting a false physics and false religion. (Santayana links the two as a tandem). If on the other hand, we mean something along the lines of Bohm's holomovement, we may be getting somewhere.

But let's be clear again that a universe a la Bohm is not a "created" one, for all the reasons given above.

As for his claim that "if the world were considered unintelligible, no science would get off the ground", no argument. But when we say "intelligible" in science we mean the artifact or object of inquiry must be susceptible to scientific methods and I don't believe this is what Barron means.  As I noted in my ASTRONOMY magazine article:  ‘The God Factor’ (Astronomy Forum, March, 1990), science selectively excludes problems for which no practical method of inquiry exists. The supernatural, which is neither measurable or verifiable, falls into this category and that includes ‘God’ - if depicted as "causeless" and "supernatural". More to the point, we tend to regard such entities held by virtue of belief alone – as opposed to evidence - as evocative of superstition.  The latter encompasses such beliefs, especially when the supernatural realm is populated by invisible beings which can supposedly affect and interact with our world. To the empirical scientist this is the very epitome of superstition.

This is reinforced by the fact that astronomy, like most physical sciences, still operates on the primacy of observation and testing,  as well as subsequent confirmation. Thus, our job and duty is to remorselessly cull all dross or irrelevant issues that clutter as opposed to highlight, what our objects of inquiry are about. This means all invisible, unapproachable entities must go into the dumpster.

Thus, we have the confidence to "explore and experiment' precisely because we need not worry about entities for which there is no support: ghosts, poltergeists, demons, angels.....or God - unless this is identified with a regularized ideal or something like the holomovement.

Lastly, Barron writes:

"This is why thoughtful people — Christians and atheists alike — must battle the myth of the eternal warfare of science and religion. We must continually preach, as St. John Paul II did, that faith and reason are complementary and compatible paths toward the knowledge of truth."

Again, we do battle if it is in the context of  the pseudo-warfare between real emergence allowing) science and standard religious metaphysics which disallows it. Thus, the former allows no supernatural events or beings which lack efficacy (false physics) that the latter insists on. The battle Barron actually refers to is between reductionist physics -science and false religion (predicated on locality, separation)

Interestingly, Barron's arguments dovetail in many ways with those of Gary Gutting in his recent salon.com piece, e.g.

http://www.salon.com/2015/11/29/can_we_prove_that_god_exists_richard_dawkins_and_the_limits_of_faith_and_atheism/

Sadly, Gutting also doesn't appreciate the fact that cosmological arguments, non-contingent (non-causal) ones and others simple don't work - based on what I already discussed above, e.g. in terms of separating monistic physicalism and its required reductionist cosmos from an emergent, nonlocal cosmos.