Showing posts with label John S. Bell. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John S. Bell. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 7, 2020

A Look At Quantum Acausal Determinism - Its Roots, And Support

Quantum acausal determinism differs from quantum acausal indeterminism in respect that the former is based on Louis deBroglie's concept of a physically real "pilot" wave which is associated with the wave function. Thus, a physically real wave solution satisfies Schrodinger's equation:


H op y  =  Eop  y


Where:  
p op  =  -i h (/ x)  And

Eop  =  i h  ( /t)

So, the full wave equation in one dimension (x) becomes:

- h / 2m ( 2/ x2) y  +   V(x) y  =   i h  ( /t) y

 Meanwhile, in the Bohmian acausal deterministic setting[1]: "it is supposed that each experimental result is determined completely by a set of hidden variables, φ. Thus, the result A of measurement of spin in the direction â depends only on φ, while the result C, of measurement of spin in direction ĉ depends only on φ and ĉ"
This was a brilliant tour-de -force which can be summarized:

A = A (â, φ)

C = C(ĉ, φ)

where measuring entanglements such as: A = A(â, ĉ, φ) and C = C(â, ĉ, φ) are specifically excluded.

Thus, as the authors note[2]:

"In other words, while nothing is said about the general dynamical laws of the hidden variables, φ, which may be as nonlocally connected as we please, we are requiring that the response of each particular observing instrument to the set φ, depends only on it own state and not the state of any other piece of apparatus that is far away".


This is a critical distinction, because it eliminates the pure objection Einstein had to unlimited nonlocality. Thus, Bohmian quantum physics introduces a measure of locality by tying the action of hidden variables to the particular observing device.

To fix ideas and show differences, in the Aspect experiment four different analyzer orientation 'sets' were obtained. These might be denoted:

 (A1,A2)I, (A1,A2)II, (A1,A2,)III, and (A1,A2)IV

Each result is expressed as a mathematical (statistical) quantity known as a 'correlation coefficient'. Aspect's final result (sum) yielded:

S = (A1,A2)I + (A1,A2)II + (A1,A2,)III + (A1,A2)IV = 2.70 ± 0.05

            What is the significance? In a landmark theoretical achievement in 1964, mathematician John S. Bell formulated a thought experiment based on a design similar to that shown. He made the basic assumption of locality (i.e. that no communication could occur between A1 and A2 at any rate faster than light speed). In what is now widely recognized as a seminal work of mathematical physics, he set out to show that a theory which upheld locality could reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics. His result predicted that the above sum, S, had to be less than or equal to 2 (S less than or equal 2). This is known as the 'Bell Inequality'.

In the case of  David Bohm's hidden variables, and its deterministic model, the above sum came to less than 2.

The key insight for Bohm was in terms of the evolution (time change) of the probability density:

dP/dt + Sn  (Ñ n)  (P Ñn S)/m = 0

From the preceding, and a modified Hamilton -Jacobi equation,  Bohm deduced that each particle would be acted upon not only by a classical potential but also an added quantum potential Q.

 I now examine this in the context of an experimental underpinning. Since Bohm's deterministic theory includes what he calls "hidden variables" - which effectively drive the determinism toward a relative locality- then these must be incorporated. The problem is to invoke an experimental basis which can allow the determinism to be checked.

            The original proposal[3] by Rietdjik and Selleri was to show that if a photon is successively transmitted by 2 polarizers (using appropriate settings or orientations) then the very first transmission must influence a hidden variable which co-determines the second one. "Malus law" was first formulated by Etienne Louis Malus in 1809 and asserts that the intensity of light transiting an analyzer and polarizer is proportional to cos2(q) where q is the angle through which the analyzer is rotated with respect to the polarizer.

One can proceed by first considering a set-up with 2 orthogonally polarized correlated photons (designated 'g 1' and 'g 2' in the diagram shown below) and these interact with three polarizers denoted A, B and C.


















If 'E' is the causal event (e.g. photon departure from location), then by causal determinism one must find:

AE <  CE  <  BE

In other words, the interaction event denoted 'AE' (whereupon the designated photon for  g 1 interacts with polarizer A) occurs before CE and CE before BE.

By appropriate computations one is led to a theorem:

"A deterministic theory with hidden variable φ reproduces Malus' law for a photon (g2) transmitted by two polarizers C and B, with arbitrarily chosen settings of their axes, only if the hidden variable φ undergoes some change (a redistribution) when g 2 crosses the first polarizer.

To refine the experiment, one removes the polarizer C from the top panel set up shown  and defines p1,2(x - p /2, y) to be the probability that, in the new setup g 1 is transmitted by A, and g2 by B.

For the new (lower panel, Fig. B) setup, the predictions of quantum mechanics allow us to write:

P1,2 (x –
p/2, y) = ½ sin2(x – p /2, y) = ½ cos2(x – y) = p2(x,y)


 So long as polarizers A and B of the original setup are orthogonal (e.g. perpendicular to one another) photon
g 2 is transmitted by C if  g 1 is transmitted by A. Thus, in the case of A and C orthogonality, then for each micro-condition of the system (g1, g2) for which g1 is transmitted so also is g2. This must meant the relevant sets of hidden variables φ i,j are identical, viz.:

φ i (x –
p /2) = φ j(x)

and

φ*i(x –
p /2) = φ*j(x)


  Therefore, one can deduce that if the hidden variable φ, (implicit in the lower arrangement) experiences no change from the previous interaction (of
g1 and A, via transmission or absorption) then we have:

P1,2(x –p /2, y) = m (φ i(x – p /2) Ç   φ j(x))

Where /x\ denotes set intersection

        As Rietdjik and Selleri note[4] the preceding expresseda mutual physical independence of the transmission events at A and B, respectively, in the sense  that one of the events does not change the hidden variable φ as it is relevant to the other.” This is precisely what confers a relative locality since the action of φ is constrained.

It is also what paves the way toward validating Bohm's acausal determinism.  How so?

Either one of two propositions must be valid, supporting or refuting a deterministic effect:

1) Transmission across C generates a change in φ and thereby allows transmission through B, or

2) No change transpires with the crossing at C, so none occurs at B (no influence, so null hypothesis)

Let’s look at each in terms of the hidden variable sets: φi(x), φj(y). Then in order for
g2 to transit C we need: φ (- φ i(x); and to transit B, we need φ (- φj(y). Then to transit both:
φ   (- φi(x)
Ç   φj(y))

Using this one can estimate the probability condition by way of summing all orientations, as applicable to the null hypothesis:

p2(a,b) + p2(b,c) + p2(c,a) > ½

Which, of course, violates Malus’ law which predicts:

p2(x,y) = ½ cos2(x – y)


Using partial derivatives we can move further on this.

Let S = p2(a,b) + p2(b,c) + p2(c,a)

And apply the Malus’ law requirement, viz. based on the orientations for axes x, y:

S = ½ [cos2(a – b) + cos2(b – c) + cos2(c – a)]


Take the partial:

S/ a = - ½ [sin 2(a – b) – sin 2(c – a)]


  At this point, we briefly review the concepts of max-min theory to do with partial derivatives of functions of several independent variables (say a, b, c etc.)

Consider a function of x alone such that: F(x) = f(x, a, b, c…)

which has an extreme value (extremum) at x = a. Then if f has a partial derivative with respect to x at x = a, that partial derivative must be zero by virtue of the theory for max-min functions F(x) of a single independent variable., viz.

f/ x = 0 at x = a

Similar reasoning allows us to arrive at the necessary conditions for minima say, when one has a function of several independent variables.

The number of simultaneous equations f/ x = 0 etc. thus obtained is equal to the number of independent variables. In the case of S, we have three independent variables a, b and c representing the different polarizer positions. For minimization we need:

S/ a = 0, S  /b = 0 and S /c = 0

We see that since:
S/a = - ½ [sin 2(a – b) – sin2(c – a)]

S/ a = 0 implies: (a – b) = (c – a)

E.g. let (a – b) = (c – a) = 
p /2

Then: - ½ [sin2(
p/2) – sin2(p/2)] = - ½ [sin(p) – sin(p)] = 0

Of course, since we’ve three polarizer orientations, a, b and c the minima must hold for all, then also we have:

S/b = 0 implies: (a – b) = (b – c)

And:

S/c = 0 implies: (b – c) = (c – a)

Further computations disclose that we need:

(a – b) = (b – c) = (c – a) = 120 deg


Then:

Smin = ½ [cos2(120) + cos2(120) + cos2(120)]

Since cos (120) = ½

Smin  = ½ [(½)2 + (½)2 + (½)2] = ¼


Or: Smin = ½ [(¼) + (¼) + (¼)] = ½ [(3/4)] = 3/8

Since 3/8 is less than ½ this violates the null hypothesis of no influence, and hence proves that a deterministic hidden variables effect is present. 




[1] Bohm, D. and Hiley, B.J.: 1981, Foundations of Physics, No. 11,  No. 7/8, p. 529.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Rietjik, C.W. and Selleri, F.,   Foundations of Physics, 3/85, p. 303.

[4] Rietjik, C.W. and Selleri, F.,  Ibid.

Monday, February 10, 2014

Why the Concept of "Natural Afterlife" Is Nonsense (2)

If you ask a serious, decently informed person if s/he believes a perpetual motion machine is feasible, the person will likely respond: "Of course not! It's nonsense!" This shows the person may at least have had some basic exposure (maybe in high school physics) to the 2nd law of thermodynamics.  In a more advanced course, i.e. Calculus Physics taken in first year university, two statements express the 2nd law. They are:

(I) The Kelvin -Planck statement:

It is impossible to construct a heat engine, operating in a cycle, which produces no other effect than absorption of thermal energy from a hot reservoir and the performance of an equal amount of work.


II): The Clausius statement:

It is impossible to construct a cyclical machine that produces no other effect than to transfer heat continuously from one body to another at higher temperature.

These are often generalized in another form to read:

The entropy (degree of disorder of a system) increases in all natural processes


Thus, for example, gasoline once burnt in your car engine cannot be captured from the exhaust gases and used over again.. Also, any energy process will also have a large part of any energy produced coming off as unusable waste energy. There is no way, or any process that can deliver 100% usable energy.

In terms of biological -organic systems it means that death is the highest entropy state. This means that once one is dead he remains dead.  There are no "Lazarus-type" resurrections.  Once one's life is extinguished it remains so. In other words, if one adheres to the laws of the natural world there can be no personal afterlives, i.e. peculiar to the individual which are contingent on a lower entropic state (e.g. dream ideation or experience) that pre-existed the person's demise.

However, the supernaturalist doesn't adhere to physical- natural laws, so of course, he is at liberty to invent "afterlives" - even eternal, or "timeless ones".  No biggie. He can even invent "heaven" and "hell" plus "purgatory" - if he happens to be Catholic.

The point is, that unless one is a supernaturalist, he cannot invoke a timeless state contingent on a "dream state" condition that had to involve a particular energy regime associated with synapses in the brain. In other words, a "natural afterlife" which demands indefinite preservation of a synaptic state pre-brain death,  must be as much nonsense as perpetual motion machines.

Let's delve into this further.

According to Bryon Ehlmann,  a proponent of this "theory":

The natural afterlife is timeless. Again, it is the final moment of your NDE. It is like a paused movie scene and the feelings and memories you have at the exact point at which the movie was unknowingly paused. Since it is timeless, no further events happen within the dream. You, however, are never aware of this and that your dream was not just “paused,” but actually stopped since you too were “stopped.”


Now consider: He at once invokes the presumption this "natural afterlife" is timeless. But what must happen in terms of the 2nd law, i.e. to be "timeless"? The answer is that the entropy of the dream- sustained system - whatever it is-  must be zero. However, the natural afterlife proponents decline and indeed reject nonlocal consciousness (e.g. of the Stuart Hameroff or Bohmian type), which means they are hoist on their own petards.  This means they are left with explaining a "dream state" system they invented that has arrived from a higher entropy state to a lower one, something completely disallowed for closed systems. (Wherein the entropy must always increase, unless it can avail itself of external energy, i.e.  green plants in terms of sunlight).

Consider that in the instants preceding actual death, and possibly with an NDE in train, successive brain states evolve leading to one final state:


{s1, s2, s3, s4……………sn}   ®  Ã


Entanglement and increased entropy of neuronal states is dictated by:

 
ENT (Ã) = -Tr à ln Ã

Where Tr denotes the trace  (of diagonal elements)  of the  corresponding density matrix.

This means, using our model from the previous blog post, that synaptic function must begin to slow, i.e. as neural transmission and efficiency begins to recede. The person is headed toward a maximum entropic state as are the specific portions of the brain which create the ideations, dreams, thoughts a person has.

The entropy then will be the total aggregate of accessible states:

ENT(Ã) = ln Ã

Conservation of probability requires:

P/ t = / t (Tr(Ã)) = 0

In other words, the process must be one for which any change in the defined state  Ã   tends to zero , given there can be NO further entropy change. However, the natural afterlife bunch are asserting there is a change from what would be maximum entropy (at death) to a defined zero entropy ("timeless") state, post death, i.e. in their NED (never ending dream scenario). Hence, they are postulating a major contradiction of the 2nd law of thermodynamics.

If one agrees that the synaptic cleft dimension (see last post) is scaled to allow application of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (as Physicist Henry Stapp has shown, i.e. in his 'Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics') then it is feasible to obtain a rough estimate of the final energy state potential just before death. I.e. let us imagine the last workable synapse firing to generate an ideation. For this estimate we will allow a   time indeterminacy or:

2 τ = 2 x (10-34) s

Then using:
ΔE Δ t ³  h/2π

the calculated energy change (‘indeterminacy in energy’) is:

ΔE » (h/2π)/  Δ t

Or:

ΔE »  1.05 x 10-34 J-s/ (2 x (10-34) s) » 0.5 J


So one half joule is available - which means for the end state to be sustained this energy must also be sustained, e.g. in the alleged "timeless" state. This is roughly equal to the energy given off by a half-watt bulb (say in a small flashlight) for one second..

 
It is also useful to estimate how much information - as bits-  this amount of energy corresponds to. We already know that one bit has 0.693 kT of energy (in joules) where k is the Boltzmann constant and T is the ambient temperature. Then the number of bits would be:


N(bits) = (0.5 J) / (0.693kT)

 
Taking k = 1.38 x 10-23 J/K and T = 300 K (about typical room temperature), one obtains:


N(bits) = (0.5J) /  [(0.693 x 1.38 x 10-23 J/K) ( 300 K)]


N(bits) = 1.74 x 1020

This would be the total number of bits in the final ideation (dream state)  that would need to be sustained in the timeless state. (The only assumption made is that any given 'frozen'  dream image contains information, it cannot be content or information free, or it doesn't exist - especially to the person allegedly experiencing it.) Thus persistence of the dream image/content  cannot be done without energy, any more than a paused TV image can be sustained without electrical energy. But where is it coming from? The natural afterlifers reject non-local consciousness as even remotely possible, indeed they dismiss consciousness entirely! This leads one to believe they are making the error first identified by Prof. Daniel N. Robinson (op. cit., p. 6):

 
"The claim 'I am conscious of the rabbit in the garden' is different from the claim 'I know there is a rabbit in the garden'.  There is a difference between being conscious of and being conscious. The former is always subject to error. Being conscious or aware is to be the possible subject of an experience, the self."


He also expands on the  notion of self-reference, and takes to task those who believe it to be merely an epiphenomenon of the brain, by way of the 'Mary' problem. 

A bit of digression here: Central to discriminating opposing Materialist models of mind are qualia. The term refers to subjective properties perceived in the material world, including colors, shapes and sounds (music). Arguably, none of these have objective existence but are tied to our neural processing and mode of consciousness. The qualia problem is often also called the Mary problem since it presents a hypothetical character (“Mary”) who inhabits a black and white world, but knows everything about colors in physics terms. Still, though she knows what color signifies – a particular wavelength in the electromagnetic spectrum – she has never experienced it.  The qualia problem helps to distinguish between what many call monistic physicalism and what I refer to as quantum physicalism. Monistic physicalism in its most rudimentary form can be summarized by Victor Stenger’s comment[1]:
 
It does not matter whether you are trying to measure a particle property or a wave property. You always measure particles. Here is the point that most people fail to understand: Quantum mechanics is just a statistical theory like statistical mechanics, fundamentally reducible to particle behavior
 
And the biggest contradiction to Stenger’s interpretation is[2]:
 
Although Y is a real field it does not show up immediately in the results of a ‘single measurement’, but only in the statistics of many such results. It is the de Broglie –Bohm variable X that shows up immediately each time.
 
In Stenger’s monistic physicalism, reality is structured around locality (predicated on particles), and quantum wave mechanics and its inherent potentiality never enters the field Y  to the extent of overturning particle dominance. In this way, emergence and holism are kept at bay. Conversely, J.S. Bell’s awareness of the hidden variable X enables quantum waves to supersede particles and in turn, demands the brain is treated as a quantum mechanical device.
 
 
On account of the latter position, physicist Henry Stapp has correctly noted[3]:
 
Brain processes involve chemical processes which must, in principle, be treated quantum mechanically. In particular, the transmission process occurring at a synaptic junction is apparently triggered by the capture of a small number of calcium ions at an appropriate release site. In a quantum mechanical treatment, the locations of these calcium ions must be treated quantum mechanically
 
 All of this means, again, that the only "natural afterlife" plausibly (albeit improbably) on offer or even remotely feasible based on physical laws, is the one described in the previous post to do with de Broglie waves.
 
Bryon Ehlmann writes:
 
  The natural afterlife is relative. Others know that you are dead and that your brain is no longer functioning and that your last dream—what would have been an NDE had you recovered—has ended, but you do not. For you, the NDE becomes an NED.
 
But this really says nothing, not anything a physicist can hang his hat on, i.e. in terms of energies available, entropy, neural thresholds etc. So whether the 'natural afterlife is relative" is roughly like whether one million angels can dance on the end of a pin, or one thousand.  Others "know you are dead" - ok, fine, but if they have sense they will have an EEG attached at the last instant to see if any mercurial action potential causes wave spikes that might indicate a final dream state. (Better yet, keep the EEG attached over time to see if any tiny wave forms re-appear  - after all a 0.5 J end state in stasis ought to be detectable electrically!)
 
Bottom line: a dream state or dream, final or not, must have energy to support it as I showed. It can't persist indefinitely in a metaphysical vacuum, following death,  no matter how many words (or clever analogies)  the natural afterlife crew churns out.  (See A.J. Ayers'  Language, Truth and Logic).  Those interested in seeing Ehlmann's detailed responses to an earlier blog post of mine on the after life can go to this link.
 
 
 
Then make your own decision!
--------------------------------------
Addendum:
 
 Ehlmann's comment in his link response,  that:

"The deBroglie wave afterlife is described using phrases such as “de Broglie waves,” “essential energy associated with the microtubules disperses out from the brain and becomes ‘entangled’ in a larger, undifferentiated whole,” “quantum coherence,” and “quantum wave states are stored in a multitude of microtubules” as well as by numerous mathematical equations. The complexity is enough to make one’s head spin!"


Is really irrelevant. He mixes up the use of precise language (which any serious person ought to strive to employ to avoid ambiguity), with constructs that others have invoked. Thus, the terms "de Broglie waves", "quantum coherence" and "entanglement" are all well known within the context (QM) in which they apply. Their use doesn't make for 'complexity' but rather exactitude in referencing and distinguishing elements of a hypothesis related to the underpinning physical theory - something Elhmann would do well to attend to more.

"Undifferentiated whole",  likewise, is merely another term (synonym) for quantum nonlocality - which again is basic to discussing anything to do with quantum mechanics. Since de Broglie waves encompass quantum mechanics, it is natural for this term to appear. That doesn't mean the basis is "complex", only that the person approaching it from a more generic (anecdotal) perspective hasn't adequately done his homework.

Where the complexity actually arises is in the use of "micro-tubules" (an added structure of the brain inside neurons) but which is really due to Hameroff and Penrose, not me. Technically, the de Broglie wave hypothesis requires no special additional structures since these decay anyway at the time of death - the only thing really left are wave forms, i.e. the  de Broglie  waves themselves.  NO unheard of violations of natural law are required here, unlike the violations of the entropy law by the NED team.

Ehlmann maintains he is a "skeptic" and he:  "will wait until (my)  theory of de Broglie waves is published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal".  Of course,  this is ridiculous. I make no claim to having a "theory" that is in any way significant enough to qualify to be published in a journal. I only offer the de Broglie wave hypothesis as a scientifically plausible, albeit improbable, explanation for a possible afterlife scenario.  I offered it as part of two blog posts-   because I maintain the 'natural afterlife' proposition of Ehlmann et al isn't plausible at all.

Let me also again clarify that my own POV is that death means the end of whatever had previously existed, including ALL formerly conscious states, ideations and any residual derivatives of them.  That means I implicitly accept the scientific world view of entropy as defining the "arrow of time" (at least in the classical realm) and that death means one has reached a maximum entropy condition. This maximum entropy automatically rules out any "timeless state" embodying any kind of ideation, or "dream" - since such state would have entropy zero.  Others can go along with the natural afterlife if it makes them feel better, but I believe they will only be fooling themselves.
 


[1] Stenger, God and the Folly of Faith, 155
[2] Bell,: Foundations of Physics, (12,) .989
[3] Stapp, H. op. cit., p. 152