The Limits Of Scientific Inquiry & Research (1)

An unnerving item that appeared not long ago referenced that only a handful of people read nearly half of all scientific papers.  One estimate is that  1.8 million articles  are published each year, in about 28,000 journals. This elicits the question: who actually reads those papers?

According to one 2007 study, half of academic papers are read only by their authors and journal editors. This is nothing short of astounding but makes sense if one gets inside what research scientists actually do, which is to narrow their focus almost exclusively to their specific specialty areas  In addition, specialty areas themselves can be reduced to sub specialties, for example solar physics has a sub-discipline of solar flare magneto-hydrodynamics, another of solar flare predictions. Perhaps the former comprises 5 percent of solar physics and the latter 2 percent. Take the overlap between them and you may only find 50 solar physicists. Will they read beyond the 250 papers published annually in those two areas? Doubtful!  There simply isn't the time to do so, in addition to lecturing, attending conferences to present papers, etc.

Even more sobering, the authors found that 90 percent of papers published are never even cited by other researchers. Again, this isn't surprising. and let's also bear in mind that papers are of unequal quality - much of the lesser quality due to the "publish or perish" pressure. This mandate means professors will churn out papers merely to meet the quota mandates of their institutions, and may not have anything genuinely novel to report. Hence, the low quality.

This brings us to the other aspect: what methods are used by the researchers? Not only in astrophysics but physics as a whole, biology and chemistry.  If then academics are not clear on their methods, or what justifies them, then we are bound to see a wide array of quality. This is often because of the peer review process itself, see e.g.

https://newrepublic.com/article/135921/science-suffering-peer-reviews-big-problems

And the fact not all journals and peer-review processes are created equally. All of this evokes questions of how rigorous scientific methods are applied to any scientific discipline and whether a specific reliable method exists in the first place.

According to biologist Lewis Wolpert, writing in his book 'The Unnatural Nature Of Science' (1992):

"It is doubtful there is a scientific method except in very broad and general terms".

Some of the advice referenced by Wolpert distilled from practicing scientists includes: "never try to solve a problem unless you can guess the answer, seek simplicity, seek beauty".

All of which are fine aspirations, but let's face it, rarely achieved in doing real science - say in stochastic realms like climate science and solar flare physics.

He follows these examples by reinforcing his original claim (ibid.):

"No one method, no paradigm, will capture the process of science. There is no such thing as the scientific method".

Which is a statement very likely to shock most high school science students, who will swear their teachers have shown them exactly what the scientific method entails, viz.

- Define the problem in respect to the specific phenomenon being investigated

- Gather information, data related to the problem

- Observe the phenomenon related to the problem

- Formulate a hypothesis related to the phenomenon and problem

- From the hypothesis make predictions that can be tested

-  Observe and/or experiment to test the hypothesis

Of course, in real life there is no such set formulaic pattern. Indeed, one can point to discoveries in the history of science (e.g. black holes such as Cygnus X-1) and show that scientists are led by theory almost as often as they are led by the observations.  There are also many permutations which led Wolpert to make the claim that "there is no such thing as the scientific method."

The single template presentation  - such as presented in high school science teaching- is a myth, an artificial scheme, rarely followed. It is only used for pedagogic purposes and convenience.. The fact is, when one reads most scientific papers - including in physics and astrophysics - there are large assumptions made and no particular method has been followed other than perhaps to gather the data as methodically as one can, usually by painstaking observations or experiments, and subject it to critical statistical or mathematical analysis. The latter usually entails the development of a consistent mathematical model.

However, and here is the kicker - depending on one's overarching choice of underlying philosophy, there may be no connection of the model to physical reality. Among the philosophies of science most powerful right now are positivism and reductionism. In the first case, one does not expect coincidence with physical reality but rather that the model "works" mathematically. To quote Stephen Hawking from his hypothesis for quantum coherence ('The Nature of Space and Time', p.3-4):

"I take the positivist viewpoint that a physical theory is just a mathematical model and that it is meaningless to ask whether it corresponds to reality. All one can ask is that its predictions should be in agreement with observation."

The original positivist emphasis in physics perhaps appeared in the quantum theory first, with its Copenhagen Interpretation. In this interpretation, the wave function Y  is purely statistical in nature, following the original proposal of Max Born. We cannot use it to effect specific computation concerning individual particles of a quantum system but are constrained to work only with collective properties.

In Born's view, the presence of i (the imaginary number i = Ö(-1)) in the quantum wave function divested it of any real, physical significance. A wave with an imaginary number is an abstraction - nothing more. In Born's statistical interpretation, it was useful for describing the changing probability of finding a micro-system in a particular quantum state. However, one was sensible enough not to take it literally, as a physically real entity.  Thus, the positivist interpretation or CI which still holds sway for most physicists.

Quantum theory accurately predicts the wavelengths of spectral lines, e.g. for hydrogen and other  spectra:









so whether it "really"  embodies physical reality is less important than that its observational predictions can be verified.

Reductionism is also a recurring and mesmerizing motif in most physics approaches, though it has also now diffused to other scientific disciplines. The pinnacle of reductionism, not surprisingly, was achieved in classical physics, based on Newton’s laws of motion. Its quintessential form, Mechanics, ultimately became the model for all of science by virtue of its sophisticated and elegant mathematics. Its power, particularly to make predictions, was so beguiling that it led to an entire mechanical paradigm for the universe. 

An illustration can help to clarify why mechanical reductionism became so beguiling to later scientific minds. One of the more interesting systems is the Attwood machine in which we have two masses suspended at opposite ends of a string on a single pulley, but with one mass exceeding the other, e.g.  m2 > m1. Then, when set up, the masses will accelerate in the direction of the greater mass, since an unbalanced force is now acting, e.g.

 A typical  problem for this simple pulley system is to find the acceleration resulting. Since m2 > m1 the acceleration is in the direction of  m2, and using two free body force diagrams (right side of graphic)  we may write (since T1 = T2 = T) 2 separate equations of motion:

m2 a = m2g – T

m1a = – m1 g + T

Adding the two equations:    a(m1 + m2) = (m2 – m1)g

Hence:  a =    (m2 – m1)g / ( m1 + m2)

Thus, if we take m1 = 0.5 kg, m1 = 1.0 kg and g = 10 N/kg  then:

a = (1.0 - 0.5)kg (10 N/kg)/  (1.0 kg + 0.5 kg) =  5 N/kg / (1.5) = 3.33 N/kg

Perhaps the single comment that embodies both positivism and ardent reductionism comes via Victor Stenger’s  attempt  to dash the validity of real quantum nonlocality (cf. God and the Folly of Faith, 155) :

It does not matter whether you are trying to measure a particle property or a wave property. You always measure particles. Here is the point that most people fail to understand: Quantum mechanics is just a statistical theory like statistical mechanics, fundamentally reducible to particle behavior

The biggest contradiction to Stenger’s interpretation comes by way of.  J.S Bell ( Foundations of Physics, (12, 989 ):

Although Y is a real field it does not show up immediately in the results of a ‘single measurement’, but only in the statistics of many such results. It is the de Broglie –Bohm variable X that shows up immediately each time.

These examples are meant to show why there is so much disagreement among physicists to account for differing observed phenomena.  For example, this is manifested to an extreme degree in the recent controversy over quantum "qbism", e.g.

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2014/05/qbism-remains-quantum-stepchild.html

This underscores a point made by Julian Baggini in his book, The Edge of Reason ('Chapter Two, 'Science for Humans',):

"The quirks and deviations from the official version of pure experiment and deduction are deeply embedded in the way science works".

Something that can be easily gleaned just by referring to the link above. Or, one can get hold of any number of different scientific papers, say from different journals. Is there one method of approach? No there is not.   If I had one major gripe about discussing scientific methods, approaches it is in ignoring that ultimately scientific advance is predicated on successive approximations. If high school (or even university) students learn anything, it is to master this subtle principle.

You have data, and accessory information which leads to some initial result (observation, experimental outcome)  which tests a particular hypothesis- call it 'x'. You then acquire better data (perhaps because of refined instruments, techniques ) and are led to a modified (improved) result such that:

x (n+1) = x + P(x) where x(n +1)

denotes an improvement via iteration, with P(x) the process (acting on x) that allows it.

Later, more refined data become available, such that:

x(n + 2) = x(n + 1) + P'(x + 1) and so on, and so on and so forth.

Each x, x(n+1), x(n+2) etc. being a successive approximation to what the objective, genuine value should be.

Beyond this, one must grasp different approaches are dictated depending on the discipline or sub-discipline and their respective empirical limits. Take the cases of the solar physicist and the lab plasma physicist. The solar physicist - with few exceptions, e.g.

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2016/12/coronal-mass-ejections-successfully.html

 

is perforce afforded a more passive role than his lab plasma physicists counterpart. And while the solar physicist can apply plasma physics principles to his object of inquiry, say solar flare plasma of differing polarity deduced from  vector magnetograms.

he cannot extract that flare plasma and subject it to experimental or diagnostic tests - say to check the Debye length of the plasma.  In effect, solar physics differs from lab plasma physics in the respective degrees of control which can be exerted on the lab and solar plasma. This then must be understood from the outset in order to fully appreciate the methodology applied in each discipline.

Even so, there are huge assumptions often made before the investigator in either discipline can proceed. That also often means skating over "outliers" in data, and ignoring minor discrepancies in order to arrive at a larger, overarching picture more amenable to publication. We will get into some of these in the next part.

What Prof. Keith De Rose Gets Wrong About God Claims (Part 1)

In this blog post I consider a recent interview given by Keith De Rose, professor of philosophy at Yale University and the author of “The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.” .   DeRose sought to assure Gary Gutting that God claims are valid and atheists have no case in rejecting them.  I will be giving my own responses after each of DeRose's, showing why he is wrong.

Gutting noted that De Rose made the following statement: “Since atheists’ only real hope of knowing that God doesn’t exist would be through some kind of philosophical argument (perhaps some argument from evil), their knowing that God doesn’t exist doesn’t seem to me a very serious possibility.”

To his credit, Gutting went on to observe:

"I think many atheists would object that it’s wrong to require them to have an argument showing that God doesn’t exist. They’d claim their atheism is justified simply because there are no good arguments in favor of theism. After all, it’s theists who are making an extraordinary claim. Isn’t the lack of evidence for the claim that God exists sufficient grounds for denying it?"

This is the key point and crux of the matter, and in any initiation of debate or exchange it is always critical to tag whoever is making the extraordinary claim. Here, again, I note that the definition of 'GOD' is also relevant. If we are only talking about a non-literal or figurative deity - such as Einstein meant in reference to the "God of Spinoza" - then it is case closed because he didn't mean a supernatural, all powerful, all knowing Being but rather a regulative ideal predicated on the mathematical description of the universe. Ditto with the 'God' of Deists, who is claimed to have set everything in motion but then walked away from it. Even hard core atheists like Victor Stenger have no problem with this god as he noted in his book 'God and the Folly of Faith'.

Despite this,  De Rose's reply is as follows:

" I think you can sometimes rightly claim to know that something doesn’t exist even if you don’t have a good argument for your claim. This is the situation with the currently infamous Flying Spaghetti Monster: We all find it bizarre and literally unbelievable and so reject its existence without any argument."

I, in fact, think some of our most important and interesting knowledge comes not through anything like arguments, but from just rightly rejecting as bizarre things that so strike us."

Fair enough, but note how he's dodged the central issue. That is, how can Christians (or Muslims, or Jews or anyone for that matter) make a claim for deity without factual, evidentiary basis? But after further pressing by Gutting (a Notre Dame professor of philosophy), De Rose launches into the "God as distinct entity" argument:

"In any case, the situation is very different with God. The thought that God exists does strike many atheists as bizarre. But, in contrast to the Flying Spaghetti Monster, there are all of these theists and agnostics who do not find the thought of God’s existence bizarre, and I really think they ruin our atheist friends’ hopes for easy knowledge here. The basic point is that, when there are many other apparently sensible people who disagree with you, you need a good argument to claim that you know they’re wrong

But again, this is a dodge. First, because he is arguing without having delivered a formal definition of the God he's making reference to. Second, no agnostic I know withholds belief in the generic form of "creative" deity peculiar to Deism but  rather in the more specific personal deity claimed by many  Christians .  Thus, for these agnostics, profound doubt prevents them from simply accepting a deity who knows every hair count for every person in the world (and all to come)  and what each is thinking every moment. It's a stretch too far! Third, Christians themselves differ widely on the concept of God they align with. And here again, it is well to note it is God concepts we are all about here and not the actual God-GOD of reality - assuming such exists.

Again, unless one has specified the nature of the 'God' one believes in,  the discussion is sterile and without point. Since the meaning of 'God' is vague then any claim can be made, and any expeditious rhetoric delivered with its applicability never called into question. This is what's so wrong with DeRose's claim of "many sensible people who disagree with you". Uh, not so - not when you press these "many people" to sit down and specify the nature of the 'God' they are claiming to accept. Is it a personal God that involves itself in every decision and breath a human takes? Is it an impersonal God like Brahman of the Hindus? Is it a detached God like that of the Deists? Unless we know what these "many people" are really claiming or believing in then it can't be said that they disagree with atheists in large numbers - since the lack of a coherent definition accepted by all trashes the "many people" argument - which, let's admit- assumes uniformity of belief in the SAME deity.


Prof. Gutting challenges De Rose once more:

"Are you saying that the mere fact that many disagree shows that we don’t have knowledge? Most of us deny without argument the existence of the gods of many religions (the gods of the ancient Greeks and of contemporary voodoo, the pantheon of popular Hinduism). Don’t we rightly claim to know these gods don’t exist, although many have and do disagree?"

And De Rose retorts:

"When your basis is not evidence or argument, but just how the matter strikes you, yes, the fact that the matter strikes others differently can undermine your claim to know. So, in particular, I am very skeptical about claims to know that the beliefs of major religions are false just because they strike us as bizarre."

Again, the point eludes him: at the core of religions' belief systems lie the definition of 'God' that they accept. Unless one parses the definition and explores its deficiencies one cannot be said to have discovered anything about the religions' validity. As for sounding the note of 'striking others differently'  this merely returns us to the subjective nature of God concepts, which as I noted in my recent book ('Beyond Atheism, Beyond God')  means all such concepts are relative and no one can be held up as exclusively true in respect of the others. But DeRose doesn't deal with any of this, preferring to talk in comforting generalities. 

Again, whether a religion or its God strikes anyone as 'bizarre' is irrelevant to the point of the evidentiary basis. Indeed, as I pointed out in previous posts, atheists need not even disprove a religion's God basis only show that whatever the basis is, it has no bearing on how we conduct experiments in science, for example. Or how we engineer safety factors into airlines, or how we build rockets to reach Mars or Pluto. In other words, the particular God concept or belief in God is actually redundant to how business is conducted in the real world - especially for the hard sciences like physics, as well as engineering.

Unphased, DeRose continues his answer to Prof. Gutting:

"If we knew that adherents to other religions came to hold their beliefs in some way that discredits them (say, through brainwashing), we might still know those beliefs are wrong on the basis of how bizarre they seem to us. Of course there are probably some individual believers who have come to hold their beliefs in a way that discredits them. But we don’t know enough about many believers to discredit their beliefs. So I don’t think we can know they’re wrong just because their beliefs strike us as bizarre."

Again, the central issue isn't believers' adopting "discredited" or bizarre beliefs, but rather whether  the beliefs and the 'God' behind them reflect a consistent reality that is in any way observable in the physical world. People in insane asylums also hold bizarre beliefs and many even claim to be 'God' - but rational people discount them because tests have disclosed neural defects or brain dysfunctions, such as schizophrenia.  Hence the source of their information or beliefs cannot be trusted. All of which bodes caution in accepting claims, irrespective of whether we know "all about" who is making them. It is for this reason atheists constantly harp on independent, objective tests in the real world.

Prof. Gutting then at last cuts to the chase:

"O.K., maybe atheists can’t rightly claim to know that theism is false just because they find it a bizarre claim. But atheists also point out that theists don’t put forward any evidence for the existence of God that stands up to rational scrutiny. Isn’t a total lack of evidence for a claim sufficient reason for denying it?"

As usual, DeRose dodges the question and uses obfuscation:

"No. When there’s a genuine dispute, a lack of evidence on the other side does not give you knowledge if you don’t have evidence for your claim."

But the issue is first, what is being claimed and second, the comparative QA for evidence on either side.   In general it isn't a question of whether knowledge exists despite lack of evidence, but whether the side that claims belief based on knowledge possesses a consistent and valid epistemology - or method of obtaining knowledge. For example, most atheists embrace science when they adopt the "extraordinary claims" argument. Science selectively excludes problems for which no practical method of inquiry exists. The supernatural, on which most religious claims are based, is neither measurable or verifiable, so falls into this rejected category and that includes ‘God’. More to the point, we tend to regard such entities held by virtue of belief alone – as opposed to evidence - as evocative of superstition.  The latter encompasses such beliefs, especially when the supernatural realm is populated by invisible beings which can supposedly affect and interact with our world. To the empirical scientist this is the very epitome of superstition.

 

In addition, most physical sciences, still operate on the principle of materialist reductionism. Thus, our job and duty is to remorselessly cull all dross or irrelevant issues that clutter as opposed to expose, what our objects of inquiry are about. This means all invisible, unapproachable entities must go into the epistemological dumpster.

Prof. Gutting again tries to steer DeRose into a sensible response:

 

"Of course, many atheists insist that they don’t claim to know that there is no God. They at most maintain that God’s existence is highly improbable, but don’t claim absolute certainty that God doesn’t exist. So, for example, if theists came up with good evidence for God, they might change their minds."

And what does DeRose say?

"My suggestion is that neither theists nor atheists know whether God exists. And here I don’t just mean that they don’t know for certain, but that they don’t know at all."

This is true, but as a long time atheist would aver: It doesn't matter! Whether God exists has no bearing whatsoever, none, on the quality of our scientific research, its testable hypotheses, or how the tests are conducted. Apart from which, one can't say "atheists don't know whether God exists" unless the definition of God is first given - which DeRose clearly avoids in each of his responses.

For example, if "God" is taken to be identifiable with the universe itself (pantheism), there is good reason not to accept it. After all, it was Buddhist philosopher Alan Watts who first alluded to the danger of pantheism when he asked the question (in his book, 'Does It Matter?'):

"If the universe is identified with God, and the universe is destroyed in a 'Big Crunch' or superheated explosion, does that mean God is destroyed too?"

By the same token, if "God" is taken to be defined as the ultra-Being of ancient theology: i.e. as omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, etc. there is also excellent basis to reject it since the "Omni" attributes end up making the Being contradictory as I pointed out in the penultimate chapter of my own book.

 None of this DeRose appears to grasp - or if he does, he prefers to let it slide or cover in obfuscations. As when he continues:

"I don’t think the arguments for either theism or atheism lead to knowledge of their conclusions. But there are arguments on both sides from premises that someone might reasonably judge to be plausible. If you find it quite probable that God does not exist, I think it’s perfectly possible that you are reasonable to think as you do. But this doesn’t mean that someone who thinks it is likely that God does exist can’t likewise be reasonable in holding that position."

True, in terms of the latter, but only again IF his God is defined. As we see already from these responses in Part 1, DeRose can get away with a lot because all the way through he adopts an elastic definition within which he can contain a baby asteroid, or more to the point -  mold his responses any way he wants to fend off Gutting's probes while making it appear ALL theists are as rational as your basic, garden variety, scientifically informed atheist.

More to come in Part 2.

 

Michio Kaku's "Model of Mind" is Too Simplistic, Reductionist

I suppose it was too much to expect that the author of Quantum Field Theory (Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) would be able in any way to discern that 'mind' can't simply be reduced to deterministic parameters, but there it is. In Michio Kaku's new book, The Future of Mind, he makes the same mistake I did with my first book, 'The Atheist's Handbook to Modern Materialism'.  by predicating distinct levels of self-awareness (consciousness) on the numerical number of discrete 'feedback loops'.   The ideal sort of component, to add to those for the basic Turing machine, would be something including internal and external feedback. That is, combine sensory (external) information, with various data and internal information and then process it to provide appropriate responses.

From my own book, I show one such possible component to achieve this capacity- known as an ‘XOR’ or exclusive –OR gate. And, we’d need a lot of these in tandem, just as we would numerous switching components.  The key point is that each combined output, be it X1Y1 or X2Y2 is fed back as a novel input. (Note that Y2 is designated as the complementary value of whatever Y1 is). We assume here that one output, say X1, arises from internal data already stored while X2 arises from some mix of outside data and other internal data kept in hidden registers somewhere. (Which could be likened to a human’s ‘subconscious’). In each case, outputs are produced that are fed back into the system providing it with the capability of self-recursiveness and a degree of self-regulation.

With enough of these operating in concert with appropriate switches etc. one might obtain the most basic human consciousness or 'Zimbo.'  While not at the fully conscious human level, there’s an amazing amount the ‘zimbo’ would be capable of, so it shouldn’t be dismissed too hastily. For example, a complex zimbo features a number of programs or sub-modules running concurrently. Consider a chess-playing module [C]. We identify the following essential sub-modules as integral it: foresight F(C) or the ability to see ahead some number of moves, M(C) mathematical-spatial recognition. Thus, for chess-playing: [C] = F(C) + M(C) at minimum. By extension if [H] is the total ‘program’ for a human zimbo, a number of sub-modules: P1, P2, P3 etc. can be assigned such that:

[H] = P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 +.......

and which exhaust all possible forms of human behavior and cognitive manifestation. Thus, as a conglomerate of virtual programs the aggregate human is itself a ‘virtual machine’! By definition it is governed by one or more parallel processes (e.g. P1, P2) such that:

P1-> [1, 0, 0, 1.............N]
P2-> [0, 1, 1, 1.............M]

such that EFFECT [E] <=> P1(N), P2(M)

Here the processes P1 and P2 are hidden from scrutiny and represent transfers of data bits in the parallel architecture (between its ‘accumulators’ and ‘registers’, and manipulated by switching elements such as already described). These go up to some number of (N,M) parallel steps where N = M generally. The effect is recursive (feedback loop programmed in) so that the program has the capability to adjust to input parameters and alter the effect (output) accordingly.

Now, Kaku's basic claim is one can approach a practical model of 'mind' (taken as the software processing aspect of the "wetware" or brain) by simply adding more and more of these feedback loop components. At no stage does he remotely think this will only leave you with more sophisticate Zimbos, as opposed to actual self-aware humans.  No surprise this is the very sort of model a reductionist physicist would invoke and, incredibly, he finds it not at all ironic to posit a thermostat at one end of the 'scale of awareness' and humans at the highest. But, sadly - like me - he seized on a metaphor and took it for a model or mechanism of operation.

So where Kaku runs off the rails, as I did,   is in using this ridiculously simple reductionist metaphor to suggest human self-consciousness can result from an indefinitely large macro-assembly of logic elements.  But again, this is what a reductionist would do since he's trapped in a box of his own making, where his very dependence on component reality means he's unable to conceive of emergence.  It is actually emergence - contingent on the brain as a quantum mechanical entity - that leads to a full model of human consciousness.

As another reviewer of Kaku's book has pointed out: "Simulations are not a self, and information is not experience." (Sunday New York Times Book Review, 'Dreaming in Code')  . How is the breakthrough made, conceptually, to emergence? Physicist Henry Stapp has pointedly noted that uncertainty principle limitations applied to calcium ion capture near synapses shows they (calcium ions) must be represented by a probability function. (Stapp, Henry, P.: 1993, Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics, Springer-Verlag, p. 42.)

More specifically, the dimension of the associated calcium ion wavepacket scales many times larger than the calcium ion itself. This nullifies the use of classical trajectories or classical mechanics to trace the path of the ions.  It thereby opens the door to quantum mechanics.

My insight, elaborated fully in my new book, (Beyond Atheism, Beyond God)  is that if one replaces the mechanical logic gates  (for the simple feedback loop inputs-outputs)  with QM  "gates", i.e. based on Pauli spin operators, then the entry of novelty and emergence is enabled. For example, the NOT gate can be represented by what is called a unitary matrix, or Pauli spin matrix-operator σ_x = (0,1¦1,0) where the left pair is a matrix 'top' and each right pair a matrix 'bottom' - since they are usually written in a rectangular array form.

Similarly, the other Pauli gates would be defined by: σ_y = (0,-i¦i, 0)and  σ_z = (1, 0¦0, -1), where i denotes the square root of (-1).  Incorporation of such Pauli (quantum) gates meets a primary application requirement for feed forward networks, in describing synapse function. (See e.g. Yaneer Bar-Yam, 'Dynamics of Complex Systems', Addison-Wesley, pp. 298-99.)

What is the advantage of doing this? Well, as I pointed out in my recent book, consciousness is elevated out of the strict machine-like model of an ordinary computer to one that can explain more features of the human experience, including the so-called "'qualia problem".  The qualia problem is often also called the Mary problem since it presents a hypothetical character (“Mary”) who inhabits a black and white world, but knows everything about colors in physics terms, i.e. 'yellow' corresponds to a wavelength of 5500 Angstroms, and 'red' to 7500 Angstroms etc.. Still, though she knows what color signifies, i.e. a particular wavelength in the electromagnetic spectrum – she has never experienced it.  The qualia problem helps to distinguish between what many call monistic physicalism and what I refer to as quantum physicalism. Monistic physicalism in its most rudimentary form can be summarized by Victor Stenger’s comment (cf. God and the Folly of Faith, 155) :

It does not matter whether you are trying to measure a particle property or a wave property. You always measure particles. Here is the point that most people fail to understand: Quantum mechanics is just a statistical theory like statistical mechanics, fundamentally reducible to particle behavior

 

And the biggest contradiction to Stenger’s interpretation is (cf.  J.S Bell,: Foundations of Physics, (12,) .989 )

Although Y is a real field it does not show up immediately in the results of a ‘single measurement’, but only in the statistics of many such results. It is the de Broglie –Bohm variable X that shows up immediately each time.

From this one can deduce that Kaku - from his model of mind - is a monistic Materialist like Stenger. In this way he can blithely dismiss telepathy (Ch. 3 p. 63),  telekinesis Ch. 4 (p.80) and of course, quantum consciousness (p. 329) . One wonders, therefore, if he's read the work of Dr. Robert G. Jahn who showed how student participants in his lab at Princeton Univ. could (telekinetically) disturb random number generators on computers, as published in The Journal of Scientific Exploration. (Vol. 1, No. 1).

 As NY Times' reviewer Adam Frank points out (ibid.): "he assumes that scientific accounts of consciousness must reduce to discussions of circuitry and programming alone. But there are other options. For those pursuing ideas of emergence, descriptions of lower level structures like neurons don't exhaust nature's creative potential."

But by applying QM the path to that creative potential is enabled and opened not foreclosed. (And bear in mind, Kaku's model devoid of QM is no more beyond the realm of conjecture than mine, or Henry Stapp's or David Bohm's!)  Thus as disclosed in the diagram (Fig. 2) one can illustrate the two types of concept to be interwoven: biological networks (left side) and an associated quantum vector superposition in terms of wavefunctions (right).

A neuron in sub-complex 'A' either fires or not. The 'firing' and 'not firing' can be designated as two different quantum states identified by the numbers 1 and 2. When we combine them together in a vector sum diagram, we obtain the superposition.

 Y  (n ( A] =  Y  (n1 ( A1] +  Y (n1 ( A2)]

where the wave function (left side) applies to the collective of neurons in 'A', and takes into account all the calcium wavepackets that factored into the process. What if one has 1,000 neurons, each to be described by the states 1 and 2? In principle, one can obtain the vector sum as shown in the above equation for all of the neuronal sub-complex A, and combine it with all the other vector sums for the sub-complexes B, C, D and E in an optimized path. The resulting aggregate vector sum represents the superposition of all subsidiary wave states and possibilities in a single probability density function. Configure the action of Pauli spin gates as well, and radical emergence is allowed, of the type that could even account for the effects reported by Robert Jahn (from his students) on computer random number generators.

In the end, what is on offer from Kaku - like Stenger- is another form of Scientism.  Another physicist ahead of his time, Bernard d'Espagnat advises caution for all those who'd willy -nilly hitch their wheels of reality to it: (In Search of Reality, p. 56):

If scientism were correct, or more precisely, if the view of the world it proposes so forcefully, that of a world ultimately consisting of myriads of small localized objects merely endowed with quasi-local properties were correct, then such an evolution of our mentality would admittedly be excellent. It is always good for man to know the truth! But on the other hand, if the ultimate vision of the world which scientism proposes is false, if its conceptual bases are mistaken, then this development is – on the contrary –quite unfortunate.

He continues, matter of factly, noting that the presumptions of “common scientism” are false in his estimation, and he bases this not on subjective opinion but on specific scientific facts, e.g. the nonlocality disclosed in the (1983) Aspect experiment, and the existence of de Broglie waves as revealed by the Davisson -Germer experiment.. This is a conclusion with which I must concur. It is also a world view that offers a picture of humans beyond being "computers encased in meat".

To quote Adam Frank again:

"If we treat minds like meat computers, we may end up in a world where that's the only aspect of our nature we perceive or value"

Something to consider!

Christian Pest Tries to Brain Fart His Way to Explaining Reepos' Loss - To BAJANS!

It's no secret that a certain contingent of Americans inhabits Barbados, and they continually attempt to brainwash the island nation's citizens - mainly concerning things political and religious in the US of A. (Especially the basis or cause of electoral outcomes) One of these gadflies - or pests, as I call them -  is a "Paul Kokoski" who also had a letter featured in today's Barbados Sunday Advocate trying to explain the Republicans' loss last Tuesday.

Kokoski's letter is also instructive because, like many other Reepos, it discloses the level of disinformation that they will resort to in order to twist susceptible minds - especially those not as au fait with American politics. Let's then consider some of Kokoski's claims in his letter, starting with his first paragraph:

"The Republicans did not lose the US election because of constituencies or demographics. Neither is Barack Obama the problem. We are! Abortion is. Public schools are. A rotting pop culture is. Modernism in the Catholic Church is. Divorce and homosexual “marriage” are. Obama has been re-elected simply because America, like any nation, will always only get the leaders she deserves. We told God to go to hell a long time ago, and God is now allowing us to see what life is like without Him."

Now, notice he makes no connection whatsoever to the fact that 99% of Reeps are against abortion, and indeed wish Roe v. Wade to be overturned! In other words, to say the Reeps "did not lose the election because of constituencies or demographics"  is to be too blind by half (see, e.g. the previous blog).  The claim that "Americans get the leaders they deserve" is also a snide implication that Mitt Romney would have been  superior to the one (Obama) we "deserved", although, given Kokoski is Roman Catholic, he may well have preferred Rick Santorum, since in later paragraphs he disses Romney as being as "liberal as JFK". But I get ahead of myself.  Btw, the Vatican's assholes are reportedly moaning and groaning about the results of our election. As reported in today's Denver Post, the Vatican hack "newspaper" L'Osservatore Romano "sought to frame itself as the lone voice of courage in opposing the initiatives" voted on in the U.S. Hey you holier-than-thou fuckers, where was your vaunted courage when children were being raped by your pedophile priests?

The claim that Americans or anyone can "tell God to go to Hell" is simply daft and insane, if one assumes: a) a functional God does exist, and b) is a transcendent entity and immaterial. In fact, in such a case, one can't "tell" God anything! The real question Kokoski avoids, as do so many pseudo-Xtian numbnuts, is why God as they postulate him (or It) fails to act when most called upon. This absence of action is the most devastating evidence for arguing (along Victor Stenger's lines) that either a) this God does not exist, or b) it doesn't exist in the fashion Xtians claim.

Case in point: the 6-month old infant (Julian Adams Lacas) whose short life was detailed in today's Denver Post (p. 1A) covering the deaths of more than 72 foster and other children in Colorado over the past several years. In the case of this particular infant, he was born with a cleft palate and severe brain problems and left one day in the care of his father by mom, Krista - who went out looking for work. When she returned she found the infant barely conscious and only able to make squeaking sounds - as its windpipe had been partially crushed and his head turned into a punctured melon after his father flew into a rage and kicked him like a soccer ball. WHERE was the great all powerful God when this was going on? If people like Kokoski are going to insist he was there, but "looking on" then he's useless! But in the same vein, this uselessness also translates into the colossal stupidity of statements such as those made by Kokoski - to wit, we "told God to go to Hell" a long time ago. How can we if he's not paying attention to anything? 

Do these dopes even comprehend any of this? Doubtful! Meanwhile, the innocents, like little Justin or those two unfortunate Connecticut girls (Hayley and Michaela Petit) raped by intruders in their own home several years ago, then set on fire while tied to their beds - are left without anything to help them in greatest time of need. So, why get "saved" if there's nothing there anyway? Any idiot can make pseudo- threats about unseen bogeys, but if you have no evidence to back it up you really belong on a funny farm, fastened into a straightjacket and on a diet of thorazine. Oh, and interspersed with steady amperes of ECT!

However, as Stenger does note, and all atheists need to take note: not all god concepts are excluded. To quote Stenger :

"Certainly the deist god who does not interfere in the world is difficult to rule out. However, the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God, whom I identify with an uppercase G, is believed to play such an active role in the universe that his actions should have been detected, thus confirming his existence.”

Here, Stenger is conceding that some God-concepts can’t be ruled out as possible transcendent realties. He names the Deist concept, but one surely can also include any pantheistic, or impersonal variant, say like Bohm’s  “Holomovement” (elevated to God –concept status).

The Deist deity is important, however, because THAT is exactly the one the Founders (Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, etc.) accepted. To remind people: this deity is responsible for creating the universe, but then it effectively "walks away" - leaving creation to itself. It doesn't personally involve itself in anything. Hence, Kokoski's next claim:

"America is a Christian nation, and our help is in the name of the Lord – not electoral politics."

is total rubbish! Because Deists are NOT Christians! They don't accept a personal God or a personal "savior" a la Jesus Christ.  Hence, Kokoski is trying to feed his readers non-historical BS. To make sure people understand this, and emphasize the distinction, I refer readers to the key passage in the Treaty Of Tripoli, e.g. http://www.nobeliefs.com/document.htm

""As the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquillity, of Musselmen; and as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries."


Now, there will be those who assert this isn't evidence, but we must categorize them as imbeciles and move on. They aren't worth wasting time on.

Kokoski's next bit of insane hyperbole reads as follows:

"Out of fear and sheer desperation, most Americans threw their hats in the ring for a Mormon, big government-backing, sometimes pro-life, moderately pro-gay rights candidate. Even by John F. Kennedy’s standards, Mitt Romney is a rabid liberal who would not have altered the course for America."

This shows the man has no clue, not one, concerning who John F. Kennedy was, and certainly not Mitt Romney either! In fact, by John F. Kennedy's standards Romney would be the next thing to Attila the Hun! Bear in mind that unlike Romney's promised $5 trillion tax cuts for the wealthiest, JFK actually sought to severely limit ANY tax breaks for the rich. This is why he was widely castigated by the financial press of the time! (E.g. WSJ, 8/6/62 'No Cause for Celebration'; p. 6;  WSJ, 3/26/63 'Too Much Money, Too Little Thought', p. 18; WSJ, 8/15/63 'When Friends Become Foes', p. 8 )

If Kennedy were really a Romney double (or vice versa), why the hell would the Wall Street Journal attack him so often (the preceding was just a sampling) while praising Romney for his tax cut plan? Clearly Kokoski doesn't know jack shit or diddly.  Meanwhile, Henry Hazlitt, contributing editor at Newsweek (The Washington Post's then sister publication, now defunct as a print publication) was airing many of the same complaints against JFK. These polemics, appearing regularly in Hazlitt's 'Business Tides', included taking JFK to task for his tax policies - including the proposed tax on U.S. business earnings abroad. Romney meanwhile has taken advantage of tax loopholes to parlay assets into hundreds of billion of bucks from tax avoidance, stashed in the Caymans and Swiss banks.

As for "big government backing" - well, any halfway intelligent person who ever took a real American History course would know Kennedy followed a genuinely liberal tack, but NOT Mitt Romney. For example, JFK established and promoted the "Alliance for Progress' to enable low-interest loans for Latin American American nations, thereby outraging the 'Street" and the other capitalist bastions of thought. He also (in June, 1963) issued Executive Order 11,110  to challenge Fed control of the money supply. (Which under the Constitution authorizes only Congress to create paper money not a private entity) This EO authorized the creation of some $4.2 billion in U.S. Notes - to replace Federal Reserve Notes. These U.S. Notes were issued by Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, and bore his signature.

Beyond that, JFK was into deficit spending for the public good, see, e.g. http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2012/07/thats-right-now-blame-60s-jfk-for.html  while the Mittster wanted to rein in deficit spending for any public benefit but expand it exponentially for tax cuts and the military ($2 trillion without any offsets).

Also, in regard to the latter, Romney not only wanted to plow another $2 trillion into the Pentagon's already overflowing coffers, but he hired on warmonger advisors like Gen. Tommy Franks and John Bolton - former Bushies with hard ons for a war with Iran. Meanwhile, JFK actually issued a National Security Action Memorandum (263) to PULL OUT of Vietnam by calendar year 1965. (When LBJ ascended to power, he issued NSAM 273 to cancel out JFK's NSAM).

Again, Kokoski plays the role of either an ignorant stooge, or maybe a disinformationist. Who knows? In either case he's a pest, like another rabid bible puncher I know who shall remain nameless, but whose rants can perhaps better be explained by appeal to mental illness.

Fortunately, most clever Bajans appear to be on to those like Paul Kokoski, but we have to expect the Kokoskis of the world will never quit trying to push bollocks and baloney down the throats of those who may not know as much about American history as the rest of us! It is up to those of us who know better to expose them and their game!