What Prof. Keith De Rose Gets Wrong About God Claims (Part 1)

In this blog post I consider a recent interview given by Keith De Rose, professor of philosophy at Yale University and the author of “The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.” .   DeRose sought to assure Gary Gutting that God claims are valid and atheists have no case in rejecting them.  I will be giving my own responses after each of DeRose's, showing why he is wrong.

Gutting noted that De Rose made the following statement: “Since atheists’ only real hope of knowing that God doesn’t exist would be through some kind of philosophical argument (perhaps some argument from evil), their knowing that God doesn’t exist doesn’t seem to me a very serious possibility.”

To his credit, Gutting went on to observe:

"I think many atheists would object that it’s wrong to require them to have an argument showing that God doesn’t exist. They’d claim their atheism is justified simply because there are no good arguments in favor of theism. After all, it’s theists who are making an extraordinary claim. Isn’t the lack of evidence for the claim that God exists sufficient grounds for denying it?"

This is the key point and crux of the matter, and in any initiation of debate or exchange it is always critical to tag whoever is making the extraordinary claim. Here, again, I note that the definition of 'GOD' is also relevant. If we are only talking about a non-literal or figurative deity - such as Einstein meant in reference to the "God of Spinoza" - then it is case closed because he didn't mean a supernatural, all powerful, all knowing Being but rather a regulative ideal predicated on the mathematical description of the universe. Ditto with the 'God' of Deists, who is claimed to have set everything in motion but then walked away from it. Even hard core atheists like Victor Stenger have no problem with this god as he noted in his book 'God and the Folly of Faith'.

Despite this,  De Rose's reply is as follows:

" I think you can sometimes rightly claim to know that something doesn’t exist even if you don’t have a good argument for your claim. This is the situation with the currently infamous Flying Spaghetti Monster: We all find it bizarre and literally unbelievable and so reject its existence without any argument."

I, in fact, think some of our most important and interesting knowledge comes not through anything like arguments, but from just rightly rejecting as bizarre things that so strike us."

Fair enough, but note how he's dodged the central issue. That is, how can Christians (or Muslims, or Jews or anyone for that matter) make a claim for deity without factual, evidentiary basis? But after further pressing by Gutting (a Notre Dame professor of philosophy), De Rose launches into the "God as distinct entity" argument:

"In any case, the situation is very different with God. The thought that God exists does strike many atheists as bizarre. But, in contrast to the Flying Spaghetti Monster, there are all of these theists and agnostics who do not find the thought of God’s existence bizarre, and I really think they ruin our atheist friends’ hopes for easy knowledge here. The basic point is that, when there are many other apparently sensible people who disagree with you, you need a good argument to claim that you know they’re wrong

But again, this is a dodge. First, because he is arguing without having delivered a formal definition of the God he's making reference to. Second, no agnostic I know withholds belief in the generic form of "creative" deity peculiar to Deism but  rather in the more specific personal deity claimed by many  Christians .  Thus, for these agnostics, profound doubt prevents them from simply accepting a deity who knows every hair count for every person in the world (and all to come)  and what each is thinking every moment. It's a stretch too far! Third, Christians themselves differ widely on the concept of God they align with. And here again, it is well to note it is God concepts we are all about here and not the actual God-GOD of reality - assuming such exists.

Again, unless one has specified the nature of the 'God' one believes in,  the discussion is sterile and without point. Since the meaning of 'God' is vague then any claim can be made, and any expeditious rhetoric delivered with its applicability never called into question. This is what's so wrong with DeRose's claim of "many sensible people who disagree with you". Uh, not so - not when you press these "many people" to sit down and specify the nature of the 'God' they are claiming to accept. Is it a personal God that involves itself in every decision and breath a human takes? Is it an impersonal God like Brahman of the Hindus? Is it a detached God like that of the Deists? Unless we know what these "many people" are really claiming or believing in then it can't be said that they disagree with atheists in large numbers - since the lack of a coherent definition accepted by all trashes the "many people" argument - which, let's admit- assumes uniformity of belief in the SAME deity.


Prof. Gutting challenges De Rose once more:

"Are you saying that the mere fact that many disagree shows that we don’t have knowledge? Most of us deny without argument the existence of the gods of many religions (the gods of the ancient Greeks and of contemporary voodoo, the pantheon of popular Hinduism). Don’t we rightly claim to know these gods don’t exist, although many have and do disagree?"

And De Rose retorts:

"When your basis is not evidence or argument, but just how the matter strikes you, yes, the fact that the matter strikes others differently can undermine your claim to know. So, in particular, I am very skeptical about claims to know that the beliefs of major religions are false just because they strike us as bizarre."

Again, the point eludes him: at the core of religions' belief systems lie the definition of 'God' that they accept. Unless one parses the definition and explores its deficiencies one cannot be said to have discovered anything about the religions' validity. As for sounding the note of 'striking others differently'  this merely returns us to the subjective nature of God concepts, which as I noted in my recent book ('Beyond Atheism, Beyond God')  means all such concepts are relative and no one can be held up as exclusively true in respect of the others. But DeRose doesn't deal with any of this, preferring to talk in comforting generalities. 

Again, whether a religion or its God strikes anyone as 'bizarre' is irrelevant to the point of the evidentiary basis. Indeed, as I pointed out in previous posts, atheists need not even disprove a religion's God basis only show that whatever the basis is, it has no bearing on how we conduct experiments in science, for example. Or how we engineer safety factors into airlines, or how we build rockets to reach Mars or Pluto. In other words, the particular God concept or belief in God is actually redundant to how business is conducted in the real world - especially for the hard sciences like physics, as well as engineering.

Unphased, DeRose continues his answer to Prof. Gutting:

"If we knew that adherents to other religions came to hold their beliefs in some way that discredits them (say, through brainwashing), we might still know those beliefs are wrong on the basis of how bizarre they seem to us. Of course there are probably some individual believers who have come to hold their beliefs in a way that discredits them. But we don’t know enough about many believers to discredit their beliefs. So I don’t think we can know they’re wrong just because their beliefs strike us as bizarre."

Again, the central issue isn't believers' adopting "discredited" or bizarre beliefs, but rather whether  the beliefs and the 'God' behind them reflect a consistent reality that is in any way observable in the physical world. People in insane asylums also hold bizarre beliefs and many even claim to be 'God' - but rational people discount them because tests have disclosed neural defects or brain dysfunctions, such as schizophrenia.  Hence the source of their information or beliefs cannot be trusted. All of which bodes caution in accepting claims, irrespective of whether we know "all about" who is making them. It is for this reason atheists constantly harp on independent, objective tests in the real world.

Prof. Gutting then at last cuts to the chase:

"O.K., maybe atheists can’t rightly claim to know that theism is false just because they find it a bizarre claim. But atheists also point out that theists don’t put forward any evidence for the existence of God that stands up to rational scrutiny. Isn’t a total lack of evidence for a claim sufficient reason for denying it?"

As usual, DeRose dodges the question and uses obfuscation:

"No. When there’s a genuine dispute, a lack of evidence on the other side does not give you knowledge if you don’t have evidence for your claim."

But the issue is first, what is being claimed and second, the comparative QA for evidence on either side.   In general it isn't a question of whether knowledge exists despite lack of evidence, but whether the side that claims belief based on knowledge possesses a consistent and valid epistemology - or method of obtaining knowledge. For example, most atheists embrace science when they adopt the "extraordinary claims" argument. Science selectively excludes problems for which no practical method of inquiry exists. The supernatural, on which most religious claims are based, is neither measurable or verifiable, so falls into this rejected category and that includes ‘God’. More to the point, we tend to regard such entities held by virtue of belief alone – as opposed to evidence - as evocative of superstition.  The latter encompasses such beliefs, especially when the supernatural realm is populated by invisible beings which can supposedly affect and interact with our world. To the empirical scientist this is the very epitome of superstition.

 

In addition, most physical sciences, still operate on the principle of materialist reductionism. Thus, our job and duty is to remorselessly cull all dross or irrelevant issues that clutter as opposed to expose, what our objects of inquiry are about. This means all invisible, unapproachable entities must go into the epistemological dumpster.

Prof. Gutting again tries to steer DeRose into a sensible response:

 

"Of course, many atheists insist that they don’t claim to know that there is no God. They at most maintain that God’s existence is highly improbable, but don’t claim absolute certainty that God doesn’t exist. So, for example, if theists came up with good evidence for God, they might change their minds."

And what does DeRose say?

"My suggestion is that neither theists nor atheists know whether God exists. And here I don’t just mean that they don’t know for certain, but that they don’t know at all."

This is true, but as a long time atheist would aver: It doesn't matter! Whether God exists has no bearing whatsoever, none, on the quality of our scientific research, its testable hypotheses, or how the tests are conducted. Apart from which, one can't say "atheists don't know whether God exists" unless the definition of God is first given - which DeRose clearly avoids in each of his responses.

For example, if "God" is taken to be identifiable with the universe itself (pantheism), there is good reason not to accept it. After all, it was Buddhist philosopher Alan Watts who first alluded to the danger of pantheism when he asked the question (in his book, 'Does It Matter?'):

"If the universe is identified with God, and the universe is destroyed in a 'Big Crunch' or superheated explosion, does that mean God is destroyed too?"

By the same token, if "God" is taken to be defined as the ultra-Being of ancient theology: i.e. as omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, etc. there is also excellent basis to reject it since the "Omni" attributes end up making the Being contradictory as I pointed out in the penultimate chapter of my own book.

 None of this DeRose appears to grasp - or if he does, he prefers to let it slide or cover in obfuscations. As when he continues:

"I don’t think the arguments for either theism or atheism lead to knowledge of their conclusions. But there are arguments on both sides from premises that someone might reasonably judge to be plausible. If you find it quite probable that God does not exist, I think it’s perfectly possible that you are reasonable to think as you do. But this doesn’t mean that someone who thinks it is likely that God does exist can’t likewise be reasonable in holding that position."

True, in terms of the latter, but only again IF his God is defined. As we see already from these responses in Part 1, DeRose can get away with a lot because all the way through he adopts an elastic definition within which he can contain a baby asteroid, or more to the point -  mold his responses any way he wants to fend off Gutting's probes while making it appear ALL theists are as rational as your basic, garden variety, scientifically informed atheist.

More to come in Part 2.

 

And Rene thus spake: God is...God is....God is....

Yes, from Rene's recent comments here, he is convinced he knows all about God.

"God is incorruptible"

"God is immortal"


"God is invisible"

Hold on there. You haven't even provided an ontology for your God yet and you are going hog wild assigning (epistemological) attributes? Talking about placing the cart before the horse.

However, as Philosopher Joseph Campbell in his book, The Power of Myth (Anchor Books, p. 56) noted:

"'God' is an ambiguous word in our language because it appears to refer to something that is known."

His point is that the language creation of a noun in itself is not adequate to confer reality.

Much more caution on the cavalier use of nouns and attributes related to 'God' is pointed out by author James Byrne, in his excellent book: God: Thoughts in an Age of Uncertainty. . The essence of Byrne's point of view is that investing too much in talking or writing positively about "God" or assigning too many attributes (if even indirect ones) is tantamount to a gross form of symbolic idolatry. (As is clinging too much to every word or phrase in the Bible)


Byrne's emphasis on this point is so strong that (earlier) he goes so far as to endorse French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion's ploy of only writing 'God' with a strikethrough. Thereby to indicate no one has the capacity to describe, grasp, conceptualize or manipulate the underlying entity. In effect, as Byrne observes, "to think -G-O-D- is unthinkable is to reject the entire basis of onto-theology."

This is something Rene is wont to do, because of course he admits no ontology. In his mind simply rattling off biblical quotes is enough to confer existence. But he falls woefully short. Again, this shows why it is futile to debate the Christianoid Archetype that Rene represents.

Let us go into this a bit more. We can do this by addressing the core ontological problem of an "existent" - what it means, and how defined. What needs to be done to validate a claim for such. Once one addresses this, it is then easy to see how all of Rene's complaints against atheists (especially of implicit atheists)are really complaints against himself for being an intellectual coward.

First, following Russell’s lead (‘The Problems of Philosophy’) we need to specify the practical and operative laws that apply to existents and entities, under the general rubric of “being”. (Thus, to be most accurate here, when an atheist agrees to debate a Christian, he is only agreeing to the presupposition of “being”. It remains to be worked out or proven, what the exact nature of this being is.)

By “existent” we mean to say that which has prior grounding in the mind, albeit not yet demonstrably shown in reality.

For example, the number ‘2’.

If the number 2 is mental, it is essentially a mental existent. (Do you see literal two lurking in the outside world, apart from what the human mind assigns, e.g. two apples, two oranges, two beetles etc.?)

Such existents are always particular.

If any particular exists in one mind at one time it cannot exist in another mind at any time or the same mind at a different time. The reason is that as time passes, the neural sequence and synapses that elicited the previous “existent” at that earlier time, no longer exists. My conceptual existent of “2” at 3.30 a.m. this morning is thus not the same as my conceptualization of it at 4 p.m. It may APPEAR so, but rigorous neural network tests will show it is not. (E.g. differing brain energies will be highlighted at each time)

Thus, ‘2’ must be minimally an entity that has “being’ regardless of whether it has existence.

Now, we jump into the realm of epistemology from here, with the next proposition:

Generalizing from the above precepts, ALL knowledge must be recognition, and must be of entities that are not purely mental but whose being is a PRECONDITION- and NOT a result- of being thought of.

Applying this to the ontology of “non-contingent creator”, it must be shown it exists independently of being thought of. (E.g. there must be the case that an independently existing Creator abides outside of the existence of human brains which might get tempted to confabulate it. Note here that quoting bibles won't do since one is then simply committing the logical fallacy of 'appealing to authority')

Here’s another way to propose it: If one demands that this entity is not susceptible to independent existence, and therefore the mere announcement or writing of the words (e.g. 'GOD') incurs validity, then the supposed condition has nothing to do with reality. It is like averring we all live inside a 12-dimensonal flying spaghetti monster. I would be laughed into oblivion, especially as I incur no special benediction by invoking the G-noun.

I guess another way to put it is that words are cheap. However, amongst all the million words Rene has used so far not ONE of them gives an ontology for his existent. And he continues the chronic believer "sin" of talking or writing past me rather than addressing the core issues. But let us move on.

In effect, if the proposed “non-contingent creator” isn’t subject to independent existence, then its alleged “truth” is separated from verification. Truth then becomes what is communicated to us by proxy (or proxy vehicle, e.g. epistles by Paul to the Corinthians or other biblical citations) with the existent (abstraction “Creator”) in the mind of the communicator who deems himself qualified to make the “truth” exist. (As in the case of Rene averring "God is invisible", "immortal" etc. when he hasn't even demosntrated the existence. Thereby committing another logical fallacy "affirming the consequent")

But such a “truth” is fraudulent and cannot be a valid expression of the condition. What it means is there is little assurance the communicated secondary artifact has all the elements and particulars needed to be an affirmed REAL entity. The truth is dispensed according to our needs (in this case the need to believe humans are seen after by a Cosmic Daddy) – all we need ignore is the constellation of evidence that refute it.


How to escape from this ontological problem? Short of the pre-recognition (and acceptance) of the entity in the mind of the other – the only alternative for the communicator is to show at least ONE sufficient condition (reason) for the existence of his claim.

A sufficient condition is one which, if present, the entity must exist.

For example, a sufficient condition for the existence of a hydrogen emission nebula in space would be proximity of the nebula to a radiating star. (The necessary condition is the nebula exist in the first place). In this case, the star’s radiation causes the hydrogen atoms in the nebula to become excited – cause electrons to jump to higher energy levels- then go to lower with the emission of photons)

Other key or core logical and language violations that Rene has committed have been pointed out by Pascal Boyer already. (Since so many Christians who debate atheists make them). Boyer, in his 'Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought'. (Perseus Books, 2001) notes, (Ch. 2, `What Supernatural Concepts are like', p. 51) observes that it is essential :

"the information contained in key tags of the statement or concept must contradict information provided by the ontological category".

Boyer, to make it clear, emphasizes this (p. 52)

"Religious statements or concepts INVARIABLY include information that is counterintuitive relative to the (ontological) category activated"

Thus, Boyer's criteria for a reasonable basis for ANY supernatural definition or claim (whether `God', `soul', or whatever) must satisfy two principles:

1)It must include information that is counterintuitive relative to the (ontological) category activated.(For example, `physics' may be one ontological category that is *also* an epistemological category- then 'spirit physics' would be counterintuitive to it. However one must first elucidate what that means exactly!)

2) The concept and its statement must preserve all relevant default inferences except the ones barred by the counterintuitive element.


Up to now, Rene - being the intellectual lightweight and coward he is, has refused to comply with any of this. He instead keeps returning to bogus definitions of atheism that do not apply, and attempting to place the onus of "non-belief" on atheists, when the full burden of proof is on god believer to deliver the goods - and show their claimed existent merits being added to reality.

Of course, Rene will make his further comments and remarks - cluttering the issues further rather than enlightening us as to why we should believe his God exists. But he merely shows again why it is futile to debate the hard core believer.

An Invitation to God-template?

As religiosity heats up again approaching Christmas, a number of new "God" books - and some not so new- have come to my attention. One of these has been the book: ‘No One Sees God’ by Michael Novak, 1994 winner of the Templeton Prize.

Novak's is one of those books an atheist sometimes reaches for in the hope of seeing whether a Christian can forge a detailed apologia for his position. Also, whether an atheist can be greeted by something more than bombast, threats or venom for not kowtowing to the mainstream God-addiction.

For the first thirty or so pages, until the author veers into palpable atheist baiting (‘Not the Way to Invite a Conversation’, using the "New atheist" books of Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris as templates) it was a pretty good read. One sees a reasonable and rational mind at work, and one not afraid to admit that atheists may have something in their favor - for at least pushing lazy Christians to examine issues and aspects of their faith. (But, of course, to me - Christianity is not one monolithic faith, but a patchwork of about 70 different sects - from the largest, Roman Catholicism - to which Novak belongs, to the smallest Science of Mind enclaves)

Indeed, it reminded me of the sort of dialectic content that often permeates arguments with my longtime Christian friend, John Phillips. E.g. the author’s claim (p. 17) that he hypothesizes that:

“unbelievers, especially those who have never known religion in their personal lives, or who have had bad experiences with it, experience a revulsion against a reasoned knowledge of God”.

Of course, as my friend John noted and recalled, I have not had so nice experiences of religion either – going back to a nun teacher in first grade pressing a hot needle (she’d just heated using a match) into my right palm to remind me “of Hell”.

“Remember boy, the fires of Hell are a million times hotter than this and they burn you inside and out! Don’t ever forget it!”

Well, I didn’t, and thus began my journey to rational atheism as I note in my recent book, Atheism: A Beginner’s Handbook.

But to assert, as Novak does, that this might have elicited “a revulsion against reasoned knowledge of God” is to miss the interpretation, and by a country mile.

First, there can be no such thing as “reasoned knowledge” of anything until one has first provided the ontology. Ontology, the basis for primary existence, comes BEFORE knowledge (epistemology) and not after. Thus, all Novak’s later citations of the classics describing God and citing the likes of Aristotle and St. Augustine, do him no service. Rather, such diversionary passages merely show that Novak himself has no clue about who or what this “God” is, he can only say what It isn’t.

Thus, despite waxing long and hard (in reply to the three atheist authors, Dawkins, Harris and Dennett) in Chapter Three (‘Letter to an Atheist Friend’) he fails to make his case that his entity is anything more than a will-o-the-wisp centered in his fertile imagination, or his temporal lobes (as Michael Persinger’s work showed, see my review of his ‘The Neuropsychology of God Belief’) . He himself reinforces his own deficiencies when he admits (p. 274, Epilogue):

“The only knowledge of God we have through reason, all the ancient thinkers have taught us, is dark- and by the via negative- that is, by reasoning from what God cannot be”

True enough! But Novak is not afraid, despite this candid admission, to make all manner of positive statements about God’s nature. A few samples off-hand:


p.196:

“God must be more like human consciousness, insight, a sense of humor, good judgment…”

“God knows well the creatures He made…he has to beat us around the ears a bit”

“In the end it was important for God that his son (who is one with him) became human and dwelt on the Earth”


The Trinity: p. 197,

“to think of God as a Trinity is to think of Him as more like an intimate communion of persons than as a solitary being”.

p. 198:

“When everything is suffused with reason, that is the presence of God”

How exactly are any of these, metaphorical or not, statements via negativa- the dark way? They aren’t! Especially the egregious and misplaced reference to “God’s son” (p. 196) which assumes there is ample evidence that a possible 1st century charismatic Jewish rabbi was a genuine God-man. He wasn’t. He was a confabulation of Christians who felt compelled to copy and imitate the earlier pagan Mithraists’ god-man fables. (E.g. Mithras was born of a virgin, performed miracles, died on a cross...etc. then rose from the dead.)

The collection of Novak’s statements comprise an assortment of positive statements the author proffers about an entity he really doesn’t know because he hasn’t provided any ontology.

Now let’s get into some ontology here. First, following Bertrand Russell’s lead (‘The Problems of Philosophy’) we need to specify the practical and operative laws that apply to existents and entities, under the general rubric of “being”. (Thus, to be most accurate here, when an atheist agrees to debate a Christian, he is only agreeing to the presupposition of “being”. It remains to be worked out or proven, what the exact nature of this being is.)

By “existent” we mean to say that which has prior grounding in the mind, albeit not yet demonstrably shown in reality.

For example, the number ‘2’.

If the number 2 is mental, it is essentially a mental existent. (Do you see literal two lurking in the outside world, apart from what the human mind assigns, e.g. two apples, two oranges, two beetles etc.?)

Such existents are always particular.

If any particular exists in one mind at one time it cannot exist in another mind at any time or the same mind at a different time. The reason is that as time passes, the neural sequence and synapses that elicited the previous “existent” at that earlier time, no longer exists. My conceptual existent of “2” at 3.30 a.m. this morning is thus not the same as my conceptualization of it at 4 p.m. It may APPEAR so, but rigorous neural network tests will show it is not. (E.g. differing brain energies will be highlighted at each time)

Thus, ‘2’ must be minimally an entity that has “being’ regardless of whether it has existence.

Now, we jump into the realm of epistemology from here, with the next proposition:

Generalizing from the preceding example, ALL knowledge must be recognition, and must be of entities that are not purely mental but whose being is a PRECONDITION- and NOT a result- of being thought of.

Applying this to the ontology of “non-contingent creator”, it must be shown it exists independently of being thought of. (E.g. there must be a way to declare and isolate its independent existence from the constellation of human brains which might get tempted to confabulate it out of innate brain defect or emotional need)

Here’s another way to propose it: If one demands that this entity (G-O-D) is not susceptible to independent existence, and therefore the mere announcement or writing of the words incurs validity, then the supposed condition has nothing to do with reality. It is like averring we all live inside a 12-dimensonal flying spaghetti monster. I would be laughed into oblivion, especially as I incur no special benediction (as you do) by invoking the G-noun.

In effect, if the proposed “non-contingent creator” or its single word equivalent isn’t subject to independent existence, then its alleged “truth” is separated from verification. Truth then becomes what is communicated to us by proxy (or proxy vehicle, e.g. Pope Benedict, the Bible, Novak or any other Xtian apologist) with the existent (or a metaphor) in the mind of the communicator who deems himself qualified to make the “truth” exist.

But such a “truth” (or any associated invocation of “reason” in its service) is fraudulent and cannot be a valid expression of the condition. What it means is there is little assurance the communicated secondary artifact has all the elements and particulars needed to be an affirmed REAL entity. The truth is dispensed according to our needs (in this case the need to believe humans are seen after by a Cosmic Daddy) – all we need ignore is the constellation of evidence that refutes it.

Second: How to escape from this ontological problem?

Logicians have been aware for centuries of the pitfalls of appealing to pure causes, or to generic causality. We see this in multiple places in Novak’s book such as on page 217 where he takes Dan Dennett to task for what is claimed to be spurious invocation of causes and causality:

“Besides, Dennett interprets the cause of a cause as if both were the same, like one turtle on another”

This sort of causal approach is exactly what makes discussions sterile because it invites dead ends and ambiguity. By contrast, as Robert Baum notes in his text, Logic, 4th Edition, causal explanations are only of limited utility because of the intuitive, non-systematic nature of causal inference. Not only are we confronted with multiple types of cause but also proximate and remote causes. For example, a collision of a comet with a large meteoroid in space may be the proximate cause of the comet’s shifting orbit enough for its nucleus to collide with Earth. However, another collision – say of a large asteroid with Earth- may be engendered by the remote cause of the YORP effect.

For this reason, it is far more productive to instead reframe causes into necessary and sufficient conditions. As Baum notes (p. 469) this is advisable because the term ‘cause’ has been too closely associated in most people’s minds with a “proximate efficient” cause. Like one billiard hitting another and sending it into a side pocket. Or one small asteroid hitting another to send it into Earth- intersecting orbit.

In these terms, whatever “secondary causes” or other causes pertain to G-O-D are irrelevant and do not advance the arguments. We therefore put these causal references aside as Baum recommends, and substitute for them necessary and sufficient conditions for the claimed existent. If someone is unable to provide these, then either he doesn’t know what he is talking about, or has engendered a fantasy creation or phantasmagoria in his own brain which he now offers to us (non-believers) as reality.

Let’s now review what these n-s conditions are. A necessary condition is one, without which, the claimed entity cannot exist. A sufficient condition is one which, if present, the entity must exist.

For example, consider a hydrogen emission nebula. The necessary condition is the nebula or interstellar cloud of hydrogen exist in the first place. The sufficient condition for the existence of a hydrogen emission nebula in space would be proximity of the nebula to a radiating star. In this case, the star’s radiation causes the hydrogen atoms in the nebula to become excited – cause electrons to jump to higher energy levels- then go to lower with the emission of photons)

Leaving out all the fluff about “first causes” or “secondary causes” we therefore simply ask: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a “God” of the type Novak proposes to exist?

Note, that in having to explicate these, Novak also is compelled to show how his God varies from all the other God- concepts proposed. This also disallows the cavalier statement he makes in his Epilogue where he conflates the Judeo-Christian God with that of deists. E.g., page 274:

“If there is a God such as Jews, Christians and deists have held there to be…..”

But wait! The Deist’s God is NOT the same as that of Jews or Christians! Strictly speaking, Deism treated in its orthodox and traditional form is not Theism. Deism is, in fact, only one step removed from atheism. The only real difference is that in deism some kind of non-specific "first cause" is proposed, but after that all distinctions collapse. The atheist avers there is no one or nothing "minding the store" and so does the deist.

Deism, to give an analogy, is analogous to a child who makes a toy with a gear wheel, and the toy has the ability to move after being wound up and released. Thus, the child makes the toy (he's a clever kid) winds it up, releases it down the sidewalk, then walks away never to glance at it or its final outcome, destination. In this case, the child plays an analogous role to the ambiguous first cause of deism and the toy is analogous to the universe.

One of the most egregious arguments of Novak is when he avers (p. 267) that:

“The trouble is that atheism is a leap in the dark and not a rational alternative. No one can possibly prove a negative or know enough to be certain there is no God”

But none of the atheists I know, myself included, DO THAT! So what Novak has succeeded in doing is inventing his own straw man atheist or tackling dummy and nothing more. Let’s take his ‘shot in the dark’ tag. Not at all! What we (rational atheists) say is that in the absence of YOU proving your claim (or at least giving us the necessary and sufficient conditions for it) - we are maintaining a position of non-investment of our mental or emotional resources and energies into it. This is the conservative and natural position to adopt for a true rationalist.

In a similar vein, if a neighbor tells me he has alien ghosts inhabiting his attic, I would also withhold investment of any emotional or intellectual commitment to it. Until he could provide me with some empirical justification or evidence, I am fully entitled to ignore his claim as possessing any remote connection to reality. Likewise for Novak’s claim of a deity no matter how many descriptive metaphors he can dredge up for it. Minus those n-s conditions he is merely promoting phantasm as reality like the alien ghost believing neighbor. True, on a vaster perhaps more sublime scale, but in the end the same category of Macguffin.

As to ‘proving a negative” no atheist does that either. We simply maintain the conservative “show us, we’re from Missouri” outlook. Thus, we regard the improbability of a deity that is invisible and governs and designs the cosmos as about the same as one trillion alien ghosts from Tau Ceti inhabiting the DC Beltway.
The error of latter day Christian obscurantists like Novak is in placing the onus of proving a negative on us, when in fact the onus is on him to prove his existent is substantive and not his own mental confection. Failing any hard evidence, say like a video recording for an alien ghost or apparition, the next best thing is to give us those necessary and sufficient conditions signed, sealed and delivered. As it is, what we end up with (in Novak's book) is his own creation of deity as a mirror image of his mental self-representation.

There are so many other egregious assertions or claims that pervade the book, such as atheism allowing the meme that “everything is permitted”, or that purpose must be exposed via science, that it would require a whole other book to deal with them. So let me end this review with the case of Novak’s daughter, who we are told, p. 42: “decided atheism cannot be true because it is self-contradictory”.


He then goes on to expostulate that: “atheists want all the comforts of rationality that emanates from rational theism but without any personal indebtedness to any Creator, Governor, Judge.."


And so Novak’s daughter concludes it is more reasonable to believe there is a God, then withholding investment for any evidence demonstrating it is more than a munchkin of her mind. And let us recall hear the words of astrophysicist Carl von Weiszsacker: “It is impossible to understand rationally a God in whom one did not believe in already”.

First, Novak’s daughter is wrong to accept that we define everything as “chancy” or “absurd”. Indeed, there is within the cosmos a domain of natural law regularity within which our deterministic mechanics can work very well. It is only when one moves on to the quantum theory (quantum mechanics) that hard prediction becomes dicey. Our job, as rationalists and scientists, is not to succumb to metaphysics or overeager mystics, but to try to show how much of our cosmos CAN be understood in terms of known laws and how much cannot. Thus, on setting the limits for rational enquiry we set limits on our own penchant for mental eruptions and inventions. We use our empirical methods, whatever they are, to put curbs on our human penchant to inflate reality.

What we do know now, compliments of our most modern advances in infrared and microwave astronomy, is that the assay of the cosmos holds little room for what we recognize as “order”. The latest results from the Boomerang balloon survey and the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy project disclose that darkness pervades 93% of the cosmos, whether in the form of dark matter(23%) or dark energy (70%). We humans represent emergence of a rational brain to fathom these mysteries compliments of natural selection on one small planet, and the probable beneficial intervention of a large asteroid 65 million years ago which wiped out our prime competition.

Second, NONE of these rational modes or methods was earned via “comfort” or given to us compliments of the god-mongers or Christians. We had to earn our rational results (say those showing that dark energy behaves like a plasma that fits a spherical harmonic distribution) step by step through patience and many errors, and the final ability to reach our goals. Thus, we owe absolutely nothing to any “judges” or mystical “creators’ inhabiting the mind of Novak, or anyone else. To say so is to attempt to validate science’s service in the perpetuation of never-ending mumbo-jumbo, theological dogmas and superstitious phantasmagorias.

I am a rational atheist, proud of it, and beholding for it to no fictitious entity that inhabits the wayward neurons of someone’s brain.

The good news here is that this is one of the better “God books’ in circulation. The bad news, is that it’s not anywhere near as good as James Byrne’s “GOD”(Continuum, 2001). But then again, after reading Tipler’s fulsome ‘Physics of Christianity’ it was a relief of sorts!

Proving the deity - Or Bayesian Bollocks?

Gil Gaudia (‘God: Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics’, The American Atheist, Sept. 2007) merits kudos for lacerating the specious premise of Stephen Unwin’s pompous book ‘The Probability of God: A Simple Calculation that Proves the Ultimate Truth’ .

The core issue, as Dr. Gaudia observes, is the: “assumed values- or assumptions – created by the person using the theorem to support a preconceived viewpoint.”

In many ways it would be analogous to my bright, seven year old niece offering that a “50% probability exists” for a pipe-smoking, invisible (except to her) elf to be sitting in her basement fireplace ten hours out of twenty-four.

In a more sophisticated sense, it would be analogous to Tulane physicist Frank Tipler asserting that a “50-50” chance exists for his “Omega Point” to really be the “First Person of the Trinity”. (E.g. see his balmy tome: ‘The Physics of Christianity’ in which he purports to “prove” the Trinity, the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection of Jesus. and a host of other unadulterated, supernatural codswallop via quantum physics and general relativity)

The trouble is that all of these lack a reasonably sound ab initio epistemology that would warrant a credible statistical assumption. It is precisely the epistemology (if such exists) that would allow us to take the assumption seriously.

For example, I might make the claim that a 50% probability exists for a monster solar flare capable of frying every electric transformer in the U.S. This sounds way out, but we must recall the monster flare of March, 1989 which fairly brought down the Ottawa power grid and indeed, “fried” coils and wires subject to enormous induction currents of 10^ 6 A and more. Hence, given what we know of the magneto-hydrodynamics of flares, and how magnetic substorms are generated on Earth – there is an epistemology for the assignment of probability.

Moreoever, it is one that can be subject to tests. For example at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks now there are ways of generating numerical models of magnetospheric substorms which can duplicate conditions arising from powerful flares.

Can Unwin do the same for his “God”? Can he even differentiate clearly its nature – say from the Hindu Brahmin, or the Islamic Allah, the Jews’ Yahweh or even Tipler’s “Omega Point”? In other words, WHICH God is it that he's “proving” with Bayesian stats, and HOW does he KNOW? What are the discriminating attributes that uniquely distinguish this entity from any other? If this can’t even be specified, it would be like me claiming a “50 % probability” of a monster flare occurrence exists, without even estimating the likely x-ray class, and optical class. I would be hooted out of any solar physics’ seminar!

One would have thought that proving an entity as momentous as “God” would constitute much more than Bayesian smoke and mirrors a posteriori tricks and statistics.

It's all very well to claim an a posteriori "proof" can be rendered for “God” (via Bayesian statistics) but this won't do in serious discussion until epistemological prerequisites are met. It is interesting that whenever assorted God provers like Unwin invoke their proofs, they never provide a discriminating epistemology – which begins with a basic definition of the entity.. They merely use the G-word as if we already know what the entity is they are “proving” (The lone claimed exception to this which I have seen is physicist Frank Tipler in his book, ‘The Physics of Christianity’ – but in order to arrive at it, Tipler must not only resort to a posteriori assumptions and stats, but also mangle all the normative concepts of quantum mechanics!)

So the question persists: WHICH God is it that is being proven?

Is the entity based on the deist (“create it and leave it be”) model? The pantheist Spinozan (“all is God”) model? The personal but "infinite" Christian model? The Christian Trinity? The Hindu impersonal Brahmin model? Until this is resolved in a uniform, operational sense – skeptics and scientists are justified in taking any uses of the G-word with the proverbial grain of salt.

As I have found on numerous forums, and in dozens of venues wherein I've debated these folks (e.g. Salon, AARP forums, Amazon book reviewes etc.) when you press them for an epistemological basis to their deity the best they can do is a generic “designer God”. In other words, as the Discovery Institute and others would warrant, it is the God of “intelligent design” which will answer to the Christian “God” name.

Once you have them offering an “epistemology” – in this case one that posits a “design” presumes a “God” – you have them by the cojones.

They will insist there must be “design” because the odds of overcoming remote probabilities are otherwise too low. But how does one separate naturally low probabilities from outcomes based on the intervention of a special agent? What criteria allow such separation?For example - we know that any one supposed single fusion of (proton) nuclei in the Sun is expected to occur on average once every 14 billion years.However, no designer is required to explain how the Sun shines (from fusion reactions) rather quantum mechanical tunneling. There exists a finite probability that any given proton will surmount the Coulomb repulsive barrier and fuse with another proton. Yes, this is a rare even, but there are trillions of protons in the Sun so it emerges as not so “rare” as one may first believe.

Another question to challenge the epistemology: Why doesn't the "designer" insinuate itself into the domains of other worlds in the solar system to create ("design") life? Why isn't Mercury inhabited, or Venus? Or Jupiter? IF the designer is also omnipotent it ought to be able to design outside of purely natural (or terrestrial) norms and limits. (Thus an organism on Venus, for example, that can live off sulphuric acid, CO2 in the atmosphere and an atmospheric pressure of 90 atm.)If the designer is not omnipotent, and indeed doesn't exist in the first place - it makes more sense that life will only occur on certain planets within habitable temperature zones and containing the elements (oxygen, nitrogen, water etc.) needed for life. In such cases, it isn't "design" at work but a long, gradual process of chemical evolution that eventually leads to life forms. Thus, the only real emergent reason for a designer in the first place would be that it possesses ubiquitous power to design ANYWHERE! If it can't do that, or is limited by conditions already in place - we simply don't need it, it's redundant.

The final challenge to toss at the God-claimant is predicting what the designer or design agent can do for another planet other than Earth. Provide him with ‘x’ attributes of the unknown planet (also give also the spectral class of the star) and let him specify the nature of the “designed” life that would emerge. If he knows his designer deity as well as he claims, he ought to be able to do this and display flexibility irrespective of the parameters thrown at him.

Failing that, force him to offer tests of falsification. Make him tell you what observation – if anything – will falsify his claim. Ideally, force him to relate this to chromosomal observations for various genomes on Earth.(Say using the cytochrome-c gene in one or more species, to determine their interrelatedness, say of the human to the chimp, or the human to a lowly yeast species).

Tipler, at least, has done that – and interestingly, one finds that most of his proffered “tests” have already been falsified. For example, his claim that there can be no “heat death” of the universe. However, the current acceleration of the cosmos via dark energy shows indeed that all the bodies of the cosmos will indeed one day cool to absolute zero temperature. No humanity, no life, no consciousness. It is but a matter of time.

Unwin, Ken Ham and others get away with their nonsense and specious “proofs” largely because skeptics and Atheists fail to call them on their baloney. Demanding that they provide a real epistemological basis for their lunatic claims, as opposed to Bayesian smoke and mirrors. Alas, we often have such a volume of baloney to rebut, that it is often difficult to prioritize!