The Problems Of Theodicy Revisited ('How Can A Good God Permit Evil?')

From time to time in this blog I've examined religious claims, as well as their underpinnings. In this post I want to examine typical Christian claims from the viewpoint of theodicy – which is the argument that the nature of evil in the world leaves open the nature of a hypothetical God in terms of the cosmos as it is. Note that in some cases atheists have argued that theodicy and the encounter of evil in the world (natural or human) is so formidable that it excludes the existence of a deity. 

I don’t go that far and fully explain why in my 2013 book, Beyond Atheism- Beyond God.. For now I will only say that it's feasible to "square the circle" regarding God - treated as a hypothetical. Hence,  the attributes of  such a hypothetical God and apparent evil  are fully reconcilable - so long as one loosens the conditions for the divine attributes.

First, let’s examine the naturalist-atheist’s premise, which can basically be summed up thusly:

If pervasive evil (natural or human) exists in the world and:

is allowed to continue unabated despite a claim for an “infinite  and omnipotent God” then either:

a) God is powerless to stop it, in which case God is not omnipotent or infinite, or

b) God chooses not to stop or limit it, in which case God is a sadist or evil himself

Some Christians in order to counter one or both points have tried to interject “free will” but this doesn’t work for the following reason: if one person’s (e.g. victim’s will) is not operative, then it is only a one-sided will, so what was done to help the person of passive will or incapacity of will?

For example, several years ago a report emerged of a ninety year old invalid woman in a nursing home raped by one of its attendants. The woman was cerebrally and physically incapacitated so had NO free will. She was, in essence, preyed upon by a person whose job was to assist her. This is human evil in its most malignant form.

Now, a truly beneficent deity would not allow this to occur, but would act (according to Kai Neilsson, ‘Ethics Without God’) at least to the minimal standard of a decent human parent. Thus, if a human parent were to observe (e.g. using a remote monitor) a baby sitter about to assault his or her baby, he or she would intervene forthwith – not wait for the baby to “make up its mind” whether it wanted to be assaulted or not! In like manner, a true beneficent or just deity would intervene to prevent the elderly woman’s rape in a nursing home. Perhaps by causing the perpetrator to stumble and break a leg, or whatever. Anything but inaction!

Yet, in the world as it is, all we see is inaction when even the most vulnerable are predated.

The core problem of the apparent limitations of divine power (or attributes) was first enunciated by the Greek Materialist, Epicurus:

“God either wishes to take away evil and is unable, or He is able and unwilling, or He is neither able nor willing, or He is both willing and able.”

Mathematician John Paulos draws the key logical inferences (‘Irreligion’, p. 125)

“In the first three cases He is not very God-like, which prompts you to wonder about the prevalence and persistence of evil. Or to make the situation even more concrete: imagine a serial child killer with his thirtieth victim tied before him. Prayers for the child are offered by many. If God is either unable or unwilling to stop the killer than what good is He? It seems the usual response is we don’t understand His ways, but if this is so why introduce Him in the first place?”

Indeed. Because if God refuses to act in the case of an innocent and on her behalf, or is incapable of action – then for all practical purposes He does not exist. It is therefore a useless exercise to introduce a deity at all. One could as well toughen his mind, admit there's nothing out there, and we're all on our own in a totally purposeless cosmos devoid of remorse or empathy for us. In fact, one major Torino 10 asteroid could obliterate us one time and nobody would be the wiser.

Now, as seemingly sealed as this case of human evil, I'm not going to prematurely foreclose its import for Christian-oriented theodicy just yet. The reason is that there is a “God Theory” which can explain it. This was put forward by Bernard Haisch in his book by the same name.  For now I only note that the reason we behold inaction is because the divinity itself isn't fully knowledgeable, aware, or complete.   This is, of course, the basis of the so-called "Socinian heresy", i.e. that God is not perfect or complete but must evolve toward such a state. (First proposed by Socinus).

Along the same lines, the cosmos and world are still in a process of evolution, and that de facto incomplete process allows for what we call “evil” as well as human (as well as divine) misjudgments and mistakes. I believe it was the philosopher N.M Wildiers who first observed:

“Evil is part and parcel of a world in evolution, an incomplete world.”

Meaning that in an imperfect world governed by evolution, we must expect evil as a kind of natural concomitant. "Evil" is the downside of a fundamental polarity which permeates all finite manifestation in the extant cosmos. We must therefore not expect divine intervention because God himself is “working things out”  (Socinus' take again!) amidst a sea of polarities in the relative domain of physical reality. Haisch argues this is the only way it can be, since the "infinite" can't simply manifest in the limited cosmos as the infinite. The only choice is to become finite then manifest at the dunned down level this dictates, i.e. in its creations. Note, this is not the same as the Socinian heresy. But in this frame let’s now examine the problem of natural evil.

As an example consider the 2010 massive earthquake that struck Kumming, China, killing hundreds. Then, the same year, we noted a 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti killing over 200,000. Meanwhile, in December, 2004, a tsunami struck Indonesia and over 220,000 were killed. What gives?

For the atheist or naturalist, nothing "gives", so no rationalizations need be offered.  The brutal fact is that this is the planet we inhabit, one inherently composed of tectonic plates and hence unstable. Hence, these are simply natural events for a planet with a dynamic core,  unstable crust. There is no “evil” inherent in any of the earthquakes since humans – like it or not- populate a disruptive planet. There are, in fact, about 12-15 earthquakes per year over magnitude 7.0 all over the Earth. We don’t hear about most of them because they occur in inaccessible, far off regions like Siberia or Mongolia or in the sea. We do hear about them when they manifest in populated land centers, but this doesn’t imply more are occurring or “the end of the world is nigh” or any such nonsense.

So, why does a problem of natural “evil” enter? It enters only for the theist, and specifically one type of theist who predicates his world view on a supposed benevolent “Creator” or “designer”. Because at root, if humans inhabit a world subject to monster storms, hurricanes, tidal waves and earthquakes…it is the fault of the Creator for designing such a world in the first place when He knew he’d put humans at risk. 

Religionists go round and round in circles trying to avoid this unsavory conclusion, but there it is! If you're going to posit that a Designer (or omnipotent) deity made it all, then logic informs that if we inhabit a world with large defects (including diseases like COVID-19) so it is that entity’s fault when natural tragedies occur! After all, if  truly omnipotent then why couldn’t he or it create a planet without these defects which would have been known ahead of time (via the attribute of "omniscience") to kill his ‘children’ by the millions each year? If, as some religionists argue, it was to "teach us" something, then what exactly was it? Did it require mass death to get the lesson over?

But stand back! If the Haisch theory is correct, then this is expected because an incomplete deity is not any kind of proper “designer” (as Haisch himself concedes). Thus, the flawed "pinball machine" world (and cosmos) we inhabit is solely the product of a part-time, incompletely informed divinity- inherently limited in its power and wisdom because it must operate via finite proxy  (e.g. incomplete) beings. The brains of such beings cannot channel the infinite in entirety, but only minuscule fragments or quantums of it. In other words, using the framework in which Haisch would put it: “This is the best that a manifest divinity could do having to operate in a physical, relative domain in which Its absolute infinity couldn’t be manifest all at once. "

To summarize then, this is where we are so far led in considering the problems of theodicy:

The evils (natural and human) in the world, lead us to conclude that either the world (and cosmos by extension) is not the product of a “designer” - or any deity at all.  OR: the world and cosmos is the product of a putative, supra-physical agent that is likely incomplete and which actions are constrained by being manifest in an incomplete, evolving universe.

In the latter case, we’d more likely side with Leibniz, who opined that "natural disasters aren’t the result if any divine punishment for sin” but simply the foreseen (or better, foreseeable) consequences of a regulated and overall consistent system of natural laws.

Thus , ALL the natural disasters to which I earlier referred were either completely or partially predictable – even by current methods of science. The 2004 tsunami would've been predictable with 10 or more hours to spare had tsunami warning bouys been present in and around the Indian Ocean (though the people in the immediate vicinity of Bande Aceh may still have not had enough time to prepare). The Haiti earthquake did have a warning, but it was too short, and most people (lacking radios, TVs) didn’t hear it.

The laws that unleash tsunamis and earthquakes are themselves well known, and have to do with subduction processes and pressures, shear stresses that accumulate over time, say between tectonic plates. The two plates (North American and Caribbean) that caused the 40' uplift displacement in Haiti were known to be en route to that for over two centuries, for example.

One commentator in the Barbados press  some years ago, while referencing Leibniz, had this to say:

“One unsettling consequence of Leibniz’s view is that God’s plans and purposes aren’t as human-centered as we might have believed. It is oddly wonderful to think the whole cosmos, even natural disasters, revolves around us – but that belief may already be hard enough to sustain given what we already know about the history and size of the universe”.

Indeed, and I might add it's the epitome of human arrogance and conceit to believe such – given a cosmos 66 billion light years in diameter and teeming with trillions of galaxies each containing over a 100 billion stars each. Only a totally ignorant or self-worshiping species could entertain such an incredibly egomaniacal fantasy!

So to believe any natural disaster or cosmic event is purely for human purposes and interpretations is to commit a ghastly mental misfire so vast that it boggles the imagination. It rivals that of the egomaniac ant (in one ancient Bajan fable). According to that fable, an ant decided one today to pick up a small piece of straw in its mandibles and drive all humans from its land! Before it could move two inches, it was squashed by a human foot. Not intentionally- but merely because the ant was in the wrong place at the wrong time!

The whole history of the advance of modern science, especially astronomy, also provides a cautionary tale to anthropocentrism in showing how humanity has been repeatedly driven out of its solipsistic roosting perches: from Copernicus’ revelation of the heliocentric theory of the solar system (showing the Sun, not the Earth was the center of the solar system), to the discovery that the solar system is not at the center of the Milky Way galaxy – but two thirds to the edge. And then on to the discovery that the Milky Way itself is not the center of the cosmos – but rather that all galaxies (in clusters) are moving away from each other in the expansion – with no single geometric center.

Finally, in 1997-98, the discovery that the matter of which we are composed - and to which I referred above- isn’t even special.  It is only about 7% of the total, the other 93% is dark energy and dark matter! This elicits the question: What manner of divinity would invest so much into creating a universe 93 percent dark energy, dark matter? Oh, and with no 'order' that can be assessed, or observed? 

What Prof. Keith DeRose Gets Wrong About God Claims (Part 2)

I continue now with the commentary on Keith DeRose's interview with Gary Gutting:

De Rose:

"To know that God does (or doesn’t) exist, you have to show that there are no arguments for atheism (or for theism) that a reasonable person could find plausible. But to support that claim you would have to have better critiques of all those arguments than I’ve ever seen. In my view, it’s more likely those who claim to know whether God exists — whether theists or atheists — are just blowing smoke."

Again, DeRose regurgitates the "claim to know" nonsense which embodies the cartoon version of atheism.   What we atheists actually say is that the whole idea of God is redundant – logically unnecessary – because it doesn’t help us to model any physical systems or make verifiable, empirical predictions. The closest to what De Rose identifies as atheism here more relates to explicit atheism which maintains there can never be any evidence for a God because the natural sciences can have nothing to do with the supernatural. (I.e. "Supernatural evidence" is an oxymoron)

 

The gist of it is that the atheist maintains the probability is very high that there is no ultimate force out there, and we are on our own. (Which is precisely the point Carl Sagan made in the last segment shown of the final new COSMOS episode ('Unafraid of the Dark'), with the focus on the 'pale blue dot' of Earth.)

 

The issue then isn't one of "knowing" but instead efficacy in the real world. What benefit is there - apart from emotional security - of God belief if there is no active demonstration of the object of belief in the outside world? This is the core theme that DeRose won't touch because he knows he can't get anywhere with it.

 

Prof. Gutting then asks him:

"Without getting into details, could you mention a theistic and an atheistic argument that you think a reasonable person could find plausible?"

He responds:

"My favorite theistic example is the cosmological argument, particularly as William Rowe discusses it in his “Two Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument.” This is the argument that tries to show that we need to posit God as the reason the universe exists. Negatively, it’s clear to me that this argument does not really establish its conclusion. For it to work you have to accept a quite strong form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (roughly, the claim that everything must have a reason). This principle is just too questionable for an argument based on it to produce knowledge. And, like Rowe, I in fact don’t buy it."

Of course,  De Rose is correct that the cosmological argument does not really  "establish its conclusion".  Which would be near impossible in any case  since quantum mechanical  models (e.g. T. Padmanabhan,  ‘Universe Before Planck Time – A Quantum Gravity Model, in Physical Review D, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 756)  show the cosmos can come into existence on its own via quantum fluctuation.. Once physical models exist then one doesn't need supernatural explanations and should refrain from invoking them.  See also:

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/09/yes-universe-created-itself-from.html


DeRose is also wise not to buy into the 'sufficient reason' bollocks because numerous philosophers, e.g. Mario Bunge (cf. Causality and Modern Science, pp. 33-34, 1979) , have shown it is defunct. A much more fruitful path is to present necessary and sufficient conditions  for one's claims.  The criteria of necessary and sufficient conditions was actually invoked originally by Galileo to replace the concept of efficient cause (ibid., p. 33). In this regard, it was recognized from early on that "efficient causation" was often too limited or narrow a concept to be practical or workable.

Robert Baum, in his textbook, LOGIC, p. 469-70, correctly observes that n-s conditions are practical replacements (in logic) for causes. In other words, instead of saying or asserting "x caused y", one stipulates that a, b are necessary conditions for x to exist at all, and c, d are sufficient conditions for y to have been the sole effect of cause x.

Baum’s reasoning is clear (ibid.): because “cause” (generic) can be interpreted as proximate or remote, or even as the “goal or aim of an action” and is therefore too open-ended, ambiguous and construed in too many different ways. Thus, “cause” is too embedded in most people’s minds with only one of several meanings, leaving most causality discussions unproductive and confused. If my “cause” and your ‘cause” in a given argument diverge, then we will not get very far. Also, if we confront a disjunctive plurality of causes, we may be at moot dead ends using a naïve causal paradigm.

Anyway, DeRose Goes on:

"But positively, given the state of the philosophical discussion, which has produced good responses to the apparently knock-out objections, someone could certainly be reasonable in accepting the argument. This view has been cemented in place for me since I came to Yale, because my colleague Michael Della Rocca is a terrific, and very sensible, advocate of quite strong forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He has never convinced me to join him in his rationalist ways, but because of him I would be willfully blind to think that even someone who understood the issue extremely well could not reasonably think as he does."

But note that one would expect DeRose by this point to at least adopt some rationalist way! In effect, we'd like to see him present the necessary and sufficient conditions for God's existence but he hasn't. I believe the reason might be that, again, he has not been willing to define the God he refers to in his exchange. Without the definition it isn't possible to supply the n-s conditions which will depend on the entity's nature.

Gutting next asks him:

"How about an argument against God’s existence?"

He replies:

"I’m going to have to be conventional here and go with the usual suspect: the argument from evil. Without getting into any details, you can feel the force of the argument by choosing a suitably horrific example (the Holocaust, children dying of cancer) that leads you to say, “There’s no way a perfectly good God would have allowed that!” There is a huge, often fascinating, discussion that tries to refute such arguments. But I find this intuitively powerful case does stand up to scrutiny, at the very least to the extent that someone could reasonably accept it at the end of the day. I suspect that even God thinks there is something wrong with you if you are not at least tempted by such an argument from evil."

 Here, DeRose is quite wrong that the "argument can't stand up to scrutiny to the extent someone can reasonably accept it". In fact, examined from one definition of the deity (and bear in mind DeRose has carefully avoided defining the God to which he refers) it's abundantly evident how and why it fails. This definition is provided we allow the attribute of "design" along with one of the omni properties: omniscience.

Then we can treat first natural evil, then human evil and trace it back to the designer.  If the former is emphasized, such as the 2004 Indonesian tsunami that took out 240,000 people - or the Haiti 2010 earthquake, then it doesn't beg the question to ask whether in fact the world was not properly designed for humans ab initio. I mean, if it was then we'd not see such enormous disasters with vast loss of life. If the world wasn't properly designed then whose fault is that? It must be the designer's, the same as it's the automotive designer's fault for a GM car that won't brake properly or accelerates when one puts the keys in the wrong way.

But perhaps mass killer earthquakes, tsunamis, killer hurricanes  etc. are no one's fault since no designer exists that would or could have made a habitable planet without them. The same applies to human evil, which actually inheres in the structure of the human brain itself, e.g.

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2013/12/want-better-future-then-evil-brains.html

 In other words, if a designer God is responsible for fashioning the human brain then he must be ultimately responsible for human evil. But....it could be the brain is simply the product of evolutionary accident, in which case we'd expect the hodgepodge tossing together of ancient atavistic regions (e.g. R-complex)  with newer ones (neocortex).

This leads the rational skeptic to conclude that both forms of  evil (natural and human) mean  that either the world (and cosmos by extension) is not the product of a “designer” at all (in which case no God exists by one set of criteria) OR: the world and cosmos is the product of a putative, supra-physical agent that is likely incomplete and whose actions are constrained by being manifest in an incomplete, evolving universe. (This is the Socinian deity first advanced by Socinus, which posits a creative intelligence that can never know more than the most advanced of its created, conscious "wetware".)

In the former case, we’d more likely side with Leibniz, who opined that "natural disasters aren’t the result if any divine punishment for sin” but simply the foreseen (or better, foreseeable) consequences of a regulated and overall consistent system of natural laws.

In the latter case of the limited but supra-physical agent it was the philosopher N.M Wildiers who first observed:

“Evil is part and parcel of a world in evolution, an incomplete world.”

Meaning that in an imperfect world governed by evolution, we must expect evil as essential to an incomplete natural order.  We must therefore not expect divine intervention because the supra-physical agent version of God himself is “working things out” amidst a sea of polarities in the relative domain of physical reality. (This is also part of the "God Theory"  of Bernard Haisch).

All the above is meant to show how crucial definitions are when one discusses the possible existence of God. Even a tiny change in definition in terms of the attributes assigned can totally turn the discussion or debate in one or other direction. Yet DeRose steadfastly refuses to provide anything to work with, leading me to conclude his avoidance of defining "God" must be intentional. It allows him to be evasive and prevents Gutting from pinning him down. (Aside: some may aver here that "God cannot be defined" in any case, which in one philosophical context is true. BUT...if we are going to debate or discuss claims for God's existence that won't do. Since a logical treatment involving existence claims presumes the use or acceptance of propositions bearing defined objects, then we must provide the definitions. If we refuse to then we need to take the Buddhist way out and say: "No discussion  (or interview) is possible because the reality is beyond the use of words to limit or parse it".  This means all claims for it are as well.)

Prof. Gutting does his best to press DeRose further:

"So far, you’ve argued that both atheists and theists can have good reasons for their views, so that neither side can rightly claim that the other is just irrational. But you make an important distinction between reasonably believing something and knowing that it’s true, and you claim that neither atheists nor theists know whether God exists. Finally, what do you think of agnosticism, the view that, given the strong disagreement about theism, the most reasonable position is to remain undecided?

De Rose replies:

"In some ways, that view is right. One reading of “agnostic” is just someone who does not take herself to know. On that reading, I accept the view. After all, my suggestion is that those who are not agnostics in that sense are deluded! But “agnostic” often slides into meaning something more along the lines of someone who does not take a position on the issue, and is in that way “undecided,” as you put it. And while I certainly think someone could easily be, and many people are, reasonable in being an agnostic about God in that stronger way, there are important goals served by our taking stands on issues where we cannot be objectively certain, or even know that we are right."

Here, at least, DeRose comes closer to parsing the meaning of agnostic - but not completely. In fact, an agnostic atheist is exactly someone who withholds belief until there is evidence for a claim. A pure agnostic is one who asserts there is an impossibility of ever knowing enough to confer belief.  He subscribes to the tenet that our brains are simply not up to the capacity to ever be in such an ultimately knowing position.  Thus, the belief that an agnostic is simply someone who refuses to take a stand on an issue is wrong. De Rose is correct that there are "important goals in taking stands on issues" but this has nada to do with being an agnostic. One will "take a stand" if s/he is able to parse necessary and sufficient conditions for a claim (including a defined deity) and then see that the claim is inconsistent with the conditions set out. One would not simply "take a stand" out of an emotional or simply belief position.

At least Prof. Gutting asks him:

"Could you explain that more fully? If you don’t know you’re right, why take a stand?"

De Rose responds:

"In philosophy and other areas of controversy, like politics, we often come to adopt a view on a disputed matter. When this happens, then even if you recognize the reasonableness of contrary views, you can come to really feel that your view is right, to the point that it can feel as if you know that it’s true. And I think that taking such a strong stand on a disputed issue can be good. Those who take a strong stand may most effectively develop and defend their position. I don’t think it would aid philosophy or politics if we all quickly abandoned our positions whenever we hit significant resistance from well-informed opponents. Often, that’s just when things get interesting."

But DeRose again misses the point that the areas he references generally require the adoption of views based on logical analyses - and this almost always entails examining the necessary and sufficient conditions. If those aren't met, one rationally won't "take a stand". One doesn't take a position merely out of an emotional incentive or "feeling" or having watched "Fox and Friends".

For example, I take a position to reject unregulated market capitalism because I understand that the resources of the planet are inadequate to fuel and support the level of growth market capitalism demands. If one then runs the numbers, this becomes evident. It isn't a matter of simply "taking a stand" without any basis.

In politics, I take a position to reject money as "free speech" because it automatically puts voters in an inferior position and owners of capital  (and corporations) in control of our political process.

In philosophy, I take a position to reject Ayn Rand's Objectivism because it simply can't work. Taking 66  million seniors immediately off of Social Security and Medicare will not make the nation better, or make people better, only create an additional vast poverty class. This is apart from the fact that there simply don't exist the decent paying jobs to support such a move, nor will there ever be. (15 million citizens even now remain under-employed and the monthly jobs numbers, such as they are, barely reach population replacement level- estimated at 200,000 per month.)

Yes, one can "take a stand" but there must be a logical, rational basis to do so.

Prof. Gutting again:

"But is the existence of God just a philosophical question, like, say, the definition of knowledge or the existence of Plato’s forms?"

De Rose responds:

"The existence of God is not just any philosophical issue. It’s intimately tied up with what very many in our society feel gives meaning to their lives. As compared with other philosophical issues, many, including many professional philosophers, are especially protective of their position here. And on God’s existence, I think many are subject to often subtle, but also often powerful, pressure from their religious groups to feel and to act and even to try to be certain of their position.

This no doubt creates special dangers. But it also seems that a life of religious faith can lead us to special values we can’t find elsewhere. At any rate, this too is a philosophical issue. In light of all that, I would not want to make any blanket pronouncement, either about philosophers or people generally, that the most reasonable stance on the existence of God is to stay on the sidelines."

 DeRose does at least get it right that  discussions of philosophical issues such as God's existence are fraught with enormous emotional overtones and baggage - including a need for existential security.  No one denies here that a profound need to believe in a higher power exists, and for the majority of human brains the very idea of cosmic isolation - or a universe without higher purpose - is unthinkable. But this emotional driver alone is not sufficient to justify philosophical claims for existence.

I may feel, for example, more comfortable in the cosmos if intelligent extraterrestrials also existed within it. But I can't make a claim for their existence unless hard evidence is forthcoming - at least intercepted radio signals which bear a definite mathematical pattern such that they could only have been produced by intelligent aliens.

In the same way, though people may feel "God gives meaning to their lives" - they can't just make a claim for such without providing evidence, or at least proposing necessary and sufficient conditions for the Being they want to exist.  I am not saying here that the cosmos is not imbued with a higher consciousness or intelligence, it well might be (as I indicated in my book, 'Beyond Atheism, Beyond God'). What I am saying is that you cannot arrive at any objective truth for such an entity merely by invoking emotional appeal or needs.

It is a pity that DeRose himself didn't deliver more substance - as opposed to ambiguous rhetoric - in his interview with Prof. Gutting.

Antonin Scalia: Innocuous 'Devil' Babble- Or Is The Man An Idiot?

Antonin Scalia: Now seeing the Devil everywhere and wondering why no one else does. Maybe it's time for him to pack it in.

Recall back in 2011 when Rick Santorum had the "Devil" on the brain?  Well now it's Antonin Scalia, who as a Supreme Court Justice ought to embody the pinnacle of rationalism but appears to have gone loopy with his recent pronouncements on the existence of the Devil. In his own words, from an October 6 remark:

"In the Gospels, the Devil is doing all sorts of things. He's making pigs run off cliffs, he's possessing people and what not. And that doesn't happen much anymore. He used to be all over the New Testament...What happened to him? He got wilier!"

Bill Maher's take on this idiocy on his REAL TIME show last night was exactly correct:

"I don't care why someone acts like a fool, only that when they do we keep them away from decision making. It would be one thing if Mr. Scalia sold pizza for a living. But this is a man we go to to interpret our laws. It's like smelling a gas leak and calling an exorcist.  Antonin Scalia helped put George Bush in the White House and he believes the Devil went down to Georgia. He gets to decide when life begins and he thinks evil is a person."

Maher went on to aptly point out the problem in believing in the Devil, is that you then see the world divided into two camps, one of 'good', the other of 'evil' and will then be inclined to see the "Evil One" on the side of 'them' (the others, who don't share your views). It then is merely one step more to see compromising with your  opponents as compromising with evil. Then, Voila! You have the Tea Party.

Let's return to Scalia. He refers to the "Devil" but which one is it? Historically in ancient scriptures,  numerous named prime entities have assumed that role, e.g. Gaap (left) and Focalor, in the graphic. They were part of the Satanic hierarchy drawn up in the Middle Ages.

Or possibly, Scalia means the "chief Devil" - but even he has a name, 'Lucifer'  - and a recent depiction is shown. Note that we can be reasonably certain this is THE Boss Devil because of the serious look on his visage- very much resembling how we'd expect Dick Cheney to appear in a fire and brimstone environment.


 One problem is that no one is quite sure if he truly controls all the demonic hordes (there is disagreement on whether he has influence on Chinese or Indian entities).  After all, the Chinese and Hindus have their own castes of Devil-Demons with their own chronology and names.

Scalia wonders what happened to this Devil, but as Maher pointed out, it could be he merely became redundant after primitive humans grew out of their intellectual infancy and science replaced superstition. So we now know, for example, that the bubonic plague isn't a result of the Devil,  e.g. casting a spell on followers, but because rats infected with fleas carrying the plague bacteria, pass them on to humans - who get the disease after being bitten. Yersinias pestis then multiplies in the blood stream  - no Devil needed.

Never mind, some minds remain in the primitive infant state and appear to need "the Devil" to explain occurrences in the real world. But, like Maher, I prefer these people remain outside those positions wherein their decisions could affect millions.

In any case, any grown man who subscribes in this century to the notion that entities such as those shown here are real, and "wily" - tricking us all to disbelieve them- must be a congenital idiot. Sorry, but that's the way it is. NO serious person of any intellectual heft or insight can possibly believe in actual demons, or a Devil. And further, any decision such an infantile twit delivers, must be called into question.

Still, we can (possibly) help Scalia to comprehend why the Devil is no longer  evident in the world or discussed, especially as a reality by serious people. First clue, it isn't because he's "wily". As Lauran Paine has noted (‘The Hierarchy of Hell’, Barnes & Noble, 1972, p. 140), the erosion of Church power almost exactly paralleled the demise of the long –enduring “orders and hierarchies” of Hell. In other words, as a supernatural agent or cause, the Devil isn't needed to account for events in the real world - including terrorist attacks, wars, or what have you. The "evil" exists instead within the brain, and is endemic in an evolving world.

The brain, the cosmos and world are still in a process of evolution, and that de facto incomplete process allows for what we call evil and hence human  misjudgments and mistakes. The brain itself is saddled with the leftovers of its reptilian- primitive hominid past and this division continues to govern its dynamics.  It was the philosopher N.M Wildiers who first observed:

Whatever is yet to be completed is of necessity imperfect, defective,  unfinished. Evil is thus structurally part and parcel of a world in evolution. An evolving world and a perfect world – these are mutually contradictory ideas.

In other words, evil is inevitable in an imperfect  and incomplete world governed by evolution.  If we know and have data to support we inhabit an evolving world, as well as universe then it is irrational to expect it not to display evil.  No personalization of evil or "Devil" is required.

Will this change Scalia's mind? Doubtful, because in his Manichean view of the world it's less useful to adopt an objective and rational explanation for evil than one which divides humans into "evil ones" and "good guys."