Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus': Philosophy In The Service Of Logic & Practical Reason

Ludwig Wittgenstein

In Ludwig Wittgenstein's  masterpiece, 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'  one beholds a unique work, written as   pure philosophy. But which over time has also provided a formidable tool in the service of practical logic and reason.  This has made it possible  to confront the whole domain of irrational folly and illogical bunkum emerging on different fronts.  In this post, I introduce readers to some of his gems and show applications.

First things first. Below I list (as subsets)  some of the key principles from the Tractatus which I  discuss in turn and which we can then examine in conjunction with the others:

1) The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. 

2) For these are first presented by the propositions—first formed by the configuration of the objects. Roughly speaking: objects are colourless.

The  two principles above, in many ways, underscore the thinking of Wittgenstein, and hence need to be thoroughly grasped before one can proceed to examine his other points.   The key thing to note is that the "substance" defined in (1) is not a material entity.  In this way, Wittgenstein is approaching his arguments from the viewpoint of idealism.  As defined by Euan Squires  ('Conscious Mind and the Physical World', p. 74):

"Idealism is. the simple observation that all knowledge comes from sensations in the conscious mind. Thus, since everything I know, I know through my mind, it follows that in some way my mind is the only certain reality."

Given this definition then it follows (from (2)) that objects lack color, given color is a physical property.    What Wittgenstein is saying then is that the abstract (mental) form of a thing (its "configuration")  comes first in formulating a proposition. Its later elaboration, say in terms of elucidating physical properties, comes later.  

We consider now the next sequence of three principles:

 3) Two objects of the same logical form are— apart from their external properties—only differentiated from one another in that they are different.

 4) Either a thing has properties which no other has, and then one can distinguish it straight away from the others by a description and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things which have the totality of their properties in common, and then it is quite impossible to point to any one of them. 

5) For if a thing is not distinguished by anything, I cannot distinguish it—for otherwise it would be distinguished

We see here Wittgenstein is affirming that 2 things of the same logical form ("configuration") can only be differentiated one from another if the configuration (apart from external, i.e. physical, properties), is different.  So consider 2 circles, A and B, which share the same configuration: circle.  But how would one discern A is different from B if other external (physical)  properties are disallowed? Well, one might draw the circle A (locus of  dimensionless points satisfying: x ²   +    y ²  =   r ² )  inside the circle B (locus of dimensionless points satisfying:  x ²    +    y ²  =      r'  ² where r' > r).   Then one can see the difference on inspection without even the need for measuring.  In this case one can "straight away" refer- say to circle A- by description (i.e. A is smaller than B since it is inside B).  But if  I have several circles, A, B and C, which share all the same properties (e.g. diameter) then it becomes impossible to point out any one of them as distinct from the others. Or, more importantly, to point to the property (diameter) as distinct from the others.  

In effect, if two or even three 'things' (circles, say) cannot be distinguished by any property, then they cannot be distinguished, period.  For if such a property did exist that enabled distinction,  the object(s) would be distinguished.

6)The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact. In the atomic fact objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain.

 7)In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way.

8) The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact. The form is the possibility of the structure.

9)The structure of the fact consists of the structures of the atomic facts.  

10)The totality of existent atomic facts is the world.

11) The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist.

Here, "atomic facts" is a concept going back to Bertrand Russel, and basically meaning a fact that cannot be broken down any further.  Hence, the general term "logical atomism"to refer to such facts.  Let us note here this is harking back to an antiquated notion of atoms, such as proposed by Democritos, the Greek atomist.  He intuited that matter is composed of  atoms as hard, irreducible entities that can't be further broken down. Of course, with modern quantum theory we know this isn't true and atoms can be resolved further into electrons, neutrons, protons and even quarks etc.  Further, the wave (probabilistic  model of atoms further renders the Greek notion redundant.

In terms of logical atomism, one Stanford website on Russell notes:

"According to logical atomism, all truths are ultimately dependent upon a layer of atomic facts, which consist either of a simple particular exhibiting a quality, or multiple simple particulars standing in a relation."

Further:

"Logical atomism can be seen as endorsement of analysis, understood as a two-step process in which one attempts to identify, for a given domain of inquiry, set of beliefs or scientific theory, the minimum and most basic concepts and vocabulary in which the other concepts and vocabulary of that domain can be defined or recast, and the most general and basic principles from which the remainder of the truths of the domain can be derived or reconstructed.

Metaphysically, logical atomism is the view that the world consists in a plurality of independent and discrete entities, which by coming together form facts. According to Russell, a fact is a kind of complex, and depends for its existence on the simpler entities making it up. The simplest sort of complex, an atomic fact, was thought to consist either of a single individual exhibiting a simple quality, or of multiple individuals standing in a simple relation. "

Basically, Wittgenstein (like Bertrand Russell) held that all meaningful expressions are analyzable into "atomic elements" which refer directly to atomic elements in the real world. For example, "Saturn has rings" is an atomic fact  and also one from which more complex facts (and propositions) can be constructed, i.e. "Saturn's rings are composed of tiny bits of ice, rocks and dust".   The most important of the atomic fact principles is (11)  where we note:  "The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist".  For example, if:

p =  "Fire burns most material things." 

Is an atomic fact, then it must negate the proposition (alternative atomic 'fact'):  

q =  "Fires can burn non-material things (e.g. souls)."

Thus, the totality of related atomic facts (to p) determines that those related to q cannot exist. Hence, the concept of "Hell" is based on atomic facts which do not exist because it requires elements (facts) of the category q, or the ability to "burn nonmaterial souls"  and do so "forever". 

Following this process, one can eliminate all supernaturally based "atomic facts" (or presumed atomic facts) from consideration or any relevance to human concerns and lives.

We go on to the next set of principles of interest:

12) The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.)

 13) Atomic facts are independent of one another.

14) From the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer the existence or non-existence of another.

15) The total reality is the world. We make to ourselves pictures of facts.  The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence of atomic facts. The picture is a model of reality. 

16) The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.  The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible. We cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have to think unlogically.

Following the preceding set, we can say the existence of fire (in terms of burning material things)  is a positive fact, while "supernatural fire" (i.e. which burns non-material things) is a negative fact.  By principle (15) it is clear that any "model of reality" will, of course, encompass both the existence and non-existence of atomic facts in its logical space or discourse.  In  a rational system of thought the true atomic facts are accepted as such while the false atomic facts ("negative"facts) are not - though their existence is acknowledged.

For example, in the model of reality one accepts as a rationalist there is acknowledged a constellation of atomic facts, e.g. "Saturn has rings", "Fire burns most material things",  "Spain is a country" etc. And at the same time we (grudgingly) reckon in a lesser constellation of non-existent atomic facts, e.g. "supernatural fire burns souls", "demons stoke supernatural fires",  "angels dance on the heads of pins." etc. etc.  In effect, this rationalist model of reality accepts the first but not the second, though it acknowledges the presence of the latter.  Well, because so many people in the world are gullible enough to accept them - and we have to deal with these folks.

All models of reality then will ab initio reference all those facts they accept, and all those (negative) facts they do not.  (Evangelical Christians, for example, will include all facts pertaining to Darwinian evolution in their negative fact category. )

Now, the former constellation of  rationalist  positive facts is essentially what Wittgenstein would refer to as "the totality of true thoughts"  and this yields (for us rationalists) a picture of the world.  We also assert that "picture of the world" is faithful to reality for which the other other negative facts are not. 

When in principle (16) Wittgenstein writes "what is thinkable is possible" he means with the proviso that the thinkable is logical, meaning based on the reality of  true thoughts - not false ones.   On the other hand,  that segment of humans who think in terms of supernatural fires and demons stoking them, are thinking "unlogically" - in Wittgenstein's parlance.   (I prefer the term illogically, though Wittgenstein is clearly attaching a specific meaning to his use of his term with 'un-').

Now we regard the final two principles of interest:

17) No proposition can say anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the “whole theory of types”).

18)  It used to be said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is, we could not say of an “unlogical” world how it would look. To present in language anything which “contradicts logic” is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not exist

That no proposition can say anything about itself ought to be self evident. For example:

p=  "The circumference of a circle is greater than its radius"

Says nothing about itself.  What it says concerns the relation (R) between the circumference (C) and the radius (r) such that:  R: C > r

Principle (18) is perhaps one of the most important articulated in the Tractatus, and it bears more generally on deeper issues and questions, such as: Can science and religion have anything to say to each other, or any relationship, period?  One of the most quoted illustrations of the first sentence in (18) revolves around some variation of the question: Could God create a rock that he can't lift?  On the one hand we are informed (by the religious) that God is "omnipotent" so he can do anything, so that creating such a rock ought to be possible. But on the other hand, if it is claimed "too heavy" to lift it contradicts the laws of logic.  In this case, such a world is deemed "unlogical".  In like manner, the very rendering of such an example is preposterous or better, meaningless.

Natural science, empirical science would flat assert there can be no existent (or entity)  which creates or exists outside the laws of logic.  And here I am including the laws of quantum logic as well as classical,  e.g.

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2009/09/foray-into-quantum-logical-and.html

 A majority of religions claim, for example, that a supernatural domain exists and is populated by supernatural entities. However, as we've seen, the constellation of supernatural entities (demons, Satan, souls etc.) are based on entities which contradict the settled atomic (positive) facts that comprise an actual model of reality.   The existence of such elements or entities is therefore  as impossible  as presenting a figure in geometry which contradicts the laws of space, or to "give coordinates to a point that does not exist."

The same can be said for any proposition that claims a "miracle", e.g.

"In the miracle of Fatima the Sun was displaced and whirled around."    

The devotees of the Fatima miracle assert the Sun actually gyrated and moved back and forth before 70,000 devout observers.  But, alas, no telescopes or astrometric instruments anywhere on Earth recorded such a phenomenon. The only conclusion?  It did not occur, did not exist as a positive fact, in this case an observational "atomic" fact. Hence, had to be a mass hallucination.

From a strictly rationalist viewpoint any actual motion of the Sun that day would have to be deemed more miraculous than a mass hallucination.  Hence, it meets David Hume's test for any potential real miracle, i.e.

"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish."

This leads us to another (related) proposition in the Tractatus (p. 67):

"If God creates a world in which certain propositions are true, he thereby also creates a world in which all propositions consequent on them are true. And similarly, he could not create a world in which the proposition 'p' is true without creating all its objects"

For example, if the proposition:

p=  "The Sun exhibits no motion specific to one location."

Is true, then it means all propositions attendant on it are also true.  I.e.  all  solar behavior is uniformly visible to all observers at the same time, with observational access to the Sun.   Thus, if the Sun were to suddenly  slow in its rate of rotation, this has to be visible to all solar observers wherever they may be, assuming they have daytime access.  If this proposition be true then no world can be created by a hypothetical deity such that any ancillary aspects of the proposition aren't also true. At the same time, this means by extension that   any claimed unusual motion of the Sun - say gyrations - specified only visible from one special location (e.g. Fatima) must be false.   

Wittgenstein, as can be seen from the examples illustrated, has provided us with a logical scaffolding of immense power which can be used to advance the cause of logic and of  reason employed  in specific  arguments.  

See Also:

Is the Religious Brain Capable of Reason?

Yes, It's Important To Teach Students HOW To Think - Not WHAT To Think

Loyola University philosophy students (ca. 1964) regularly were tested in the rigors of thinking using core questions such as 'How would you choose to live (and why) if you learned humans were the product of accidental mutations via evolution?'


Sue Sharkey and Bruce Benson were correct to draw attention to the need for collegians' critical thinking in their Denver Post Sunday Perspective article, 'It's Critical To Teach Students How To Think, Not What To Think' (p. 4D).  But this elicits the question of exactly HOW that training ought to proceed.    What techniques should one employ in critical thinking?   At Loyola, as part of the required  Arts and Sciences core courses, we all took Logic (Phil. 220), and what follows are some of the takeaways from my preserved notes.

In previous posts I explored a number of basic logical fallacies, this was at the '101' level. But as we learned at Loyola, arguments  are not always blatantly fallacious - many more are subtle and the defects can be much more difficult to recognize and challenge. But the ability to do so forms a crucial support if the student (or average person, citizen) is to be able to do critical thinking.

Consider: Logic requires the isolation and separation of objects in order to relate them to propositions. In this way both generalizations and deductions can be made.

A logical sequence might be (given propositions p, q, and r):

If p, then q

If q, then r

Hence p-> r

(Hence, p implies r)

However, to do this necessitates that the objects connected to the propositions p, q, and r be isolated from each other by category.  This is why good, solid arguments are often difficult to craft. But in general, as Fr. Hecker,  S.J. often reminded us, a good argument must satisfy three conditions:

i)The premises must provide a reasonable amount of support for the conclusions

ii) The truth of the premises must be well established

iii)It must not be circular.

While a blatant fallacy may well omit or cut corners with one or more of these, there are other fallacious arguments that aren't so self-evident. Let's consider the following under the category of 'disguised nonarguments'.

1) Petitio Principii  (Begging the question):

In fact, there is no "question" to follow or beg but rather it refers to the specious circular argument under consideration.  In general, this is a variant of circular reasoning whereby the conclusion is merely a restatement of something stated in one or more premises, e.g.

The assassins of  U.S. presidents have all been lone nuts

Lee Harvey Oswald was a lone nut.

Therefore, Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated JFK.

Apart from being circular (which makes it a bad argument in itself) the initial premise also suffers from over-generalization.  The secondary fallacy at work here is "hasty generalization".  That is, assuming that because previous presidents may have been slain by loners or "lone nuts" JFK would have had to have been as well.  In addition, the assumption is made that Oswald was a "nut", which is refuted by all the evidence we know about him. This was best summed up by author Michael Parenti (The JFK Assassination  - Defending the Gangster State.):

"Lee Harvey Oswald spent most of his adult life not as a lone drifter but directly linked to the U.S. intelligence community. All of his IQ tests show that he was above average in intelligence and a quick learner. At the age of eighteen in the U.S. Marines he had secret security clearance and was working at Marine Air Control in Atsugi Air Force Base in Japan, a top secret location from which the CIA launched U2 flights and performed other kinds of covert operations in China. The next year he was assigned to El Toro Air Station in California with security clearance to work radar. “.

Another (somewhat)  less controversial example of begging the question:

God existed before the universe because He created it

Therefore God had no beginning

Therefore, God exists without a cause because He is the first cause.

Again, we see that the conclusion is simply a restatement (using different words) of the initial premise.  Further, since  a "causeless God" is a much more extraordinary claim than a causeless cosmos then much greater argumentative heft must be summoned to defend it. The example shown, however, reveals "God" is trotted out as part of the premise, and the causeless attribute is added as a separate part. Thus,  the religionist's argument is useless because the conclusion is one of the premises. Circular logic cannot prove a conclusion because, if the conclusion is doubted, the premise which leads to it will also be doubted.

2) Post hoc ergo proper hoc:

Example:

"Jim got seriously ill and had to be hospitalized. I prayed for him and he got better after five days. Therefore, my prayers made him better."

This is quite common and easily exposed. It basically means a person has connected some event in a causal fashion with an event that has gone before – though there is no proof whatever of causal nexus.

It is often observed after disasters, when there are few survivors, and they claim that they “experienced a miracle” by escaping alive. In fact no connection exists between the plane crash or whatever, and their survival. They were merely lucky – to perhaps be sitting in the right seat at the right time, nothing more.

3) Affirming the consequent:

In affirming the consequent, the offender starts out by stating or claiming  ab initio that which they still need to prove or demonstrate. The classic example from real life can be found in the Katzenbach memo which defined the modus operandi and purpose of the Warren Commission, e.g.

"It is important that all facts surrounding President Kennedy's assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad that all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be made now.

The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin, that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial. "

In this memo argument, one can see Katzenbach had Oswald pegged as the assassin of JFK even prior to the Commission's commencement. A classic case of "affirming the consequent" and a major reason we refer to the WC report as a whitewash.

Here’s the deal: the laws of deductive logic used in an argument, prevent a person from affirming that which he must prove. It doesn’t matter if what’s being affirmed happens to be Lee Oswald's being the one and only JFK assassin,  visiting aliens from an advanced civilization (or some vague “intelligent designer”)  presumed to be responsible for the intricacies of the inner ear or the human eye, or the validity of astrological horoscopes in x, y or z situations.

In each and every case the claim has to be presented as a conclusion to rigorous propositions or deductions, not stated as fact from the outset. 

4) Fallacy of Equivocation:

This disguised argument usually depends on a particular word or set of words having two or more different meanings in the context of a single argument, e.g.

Man is an inventor

No woman is a man

Therefore, no woman is an inventor.

Here, the obvious flaw inheres in the conflation in the use of "Man" for "mankind" or the  whole human species, with "man" an individual member of the species and of male gender.   This is a reminder that when confronted with argument to be sure the terms are consistent for the given premises in the context.

5) Slippery Slope:

Examples:

"If we legalize marijuana across the country, our people will collectively lose the ability to want to do anything- and they'll just tune out  - so we can be taken over by anyone!" 

"If  we pass the universal basic income  (UBI) everyone will just become a lazy good -for- nothing and the country will rot from the inside!"

Those who invoke slippery slope arguments want to convince you that legalizing marijuana, or passing the UBI (e.g. for workers displaced from jobs by AI, or automation)  will send the country on the road to economic or moral perdition. Some manner of calamity will rain down on one and all. Families will be torn asunder with members hooked on opioids.  Functioning society will crash. Wall Street will cease to have a DOW or NASDAQ, whatever.

 The base thread in all slippery slope arguments is the assumption, or perhaps more accurately the false assumption, that some disdained behavior or policy will lead inexorably to a vastly worse outlook or behavior. Although these tactics are insipid on their face, since no concrete evidence is ever presented to support them (or if it is, it’s specious), they’re invoked because people can be so easily misled by appeals to fear. All that’s required is a preconceived negative image, e.g. an MJ user zoned out and oblivious to the world around him, and the recipient of the disinformation will be ready to accept just about any claim.

History shows, time and time again, that appeals to slippery slope reasoning often do much more harm to innocent people than they do to advance a case for some agenda- whether preventing nationwide legalization of MJ, refusing to vote an atheist into public office, or providing a universal basic income for soon to be displaced workers.

6)  Ignotum per Ignotius:

Example:  "The human eye is far too complex an organ to have come about in any way other than intelligent design."

Of all the fallacies, I supsect this is perhaps the most endemic and pervasive within the U.S. cultural war landscape. This dates from as far back as 1925, when Christian “design” model creationists argued the best “cure for atheism” was the structure and design of the eye. Well, hardly! Since, after all, the eye “sees” optimally at a particular wavelength (~ 5500 Å) of light, precisely because it evolved on a planet with a star whose maximum radiation output is at that wavelength!

What is the logical fallacy of ignotum per ignotius? Basically it translates from the Latin to mean: “seeking to explain the not understood by the less well understood.” In this case, attempting to account for the alleged grandiose “design” of the human eye by appeal to totally unknown constructs (e.g. a supernatural or unknown "designer"). This, after all, would have to be the subtext if the eye’s design is being viewed as “a cure for atheism”. (E.g. the atheist is compelled to surrender evolution via natural selection, since the inherent nonrandom survival features are alleged to be unable to account for the splendid design).

The problem with this line of argument is that it invokes a less well-known or understood mechanism (“the designer”) to account for a structure or organ whose origin may not be fully apprehended at this moment. But who or what is this designer? The proponents of the various forms of creationism (including the now fashionable intelligent design) won’t say, but it doesn’t require an Einstein to infer they are interjecting a supernatural agent. That is, “God.”

The problem is that all intelligent design (ID) has done is to subsume naturalistic evolution's observations then magically assert they are produced by "intelligent design", since no random process could possibly arrive at such intricacy in a billion years. Thus, rather than accept a fairly well understood random process ID’ers opt to nix it in favor of a much less well understood “designer” about whose specifics, attributes they are totally silent.

All they can offer up is the canard that: “X, Y or Z structures display irreducible complexity, hence there must be some unseen intellect working behind the scene to create it!" This is pure nonsense as well as a circular argument- but most important commits ignotum per ignotius fallacy. (Note that very often logical fallacies are committed in sets, though one particular transgression stands out.)

To paraphrase the philosopher David Hume[1]:

"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish."

For example, consider the example of the eye again. Is the falsehood of its intelligent design more miraculous than the fact it attempts to establish: that the eye is the product of intelligent design? Arguably no. While the falsehood would leave natural selection as a primary agent, it is (as we saw) in no way is “more miraculous” or incredible than the initial ID proposal! As I noted earlier, by the time natural selection appears, a selection effect in the genome is already solidified. So no "random chance exists", .e.g
http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/08/if-youre-going-to-quote-dawkins-do-it.html

7) Arguing from authority:

Example: "Read John 3:16! If you don't believe in the Lord Jesus Christ as personal Savior you are going to Hell!"

If you’ve ever argued with orthodox Christians, you know how often they cite chapter and verse from their Bible to try to force an argument to their side.  The tendency has become so predictable it resembles a kind of dog whistle response whenever an unbeliever appears in view. The Fundies (especially) salivate-drool and aren't even aware they're doing it. You start a rational argument with a hard core believer, and within five minutes he’s trotting out the old canard:

“The fool hath said within his heart there is no God!”

If that citation doesn’t work, look for him to go back to his biblical or scriptural grab bag for some other forlorn, antiquated quote (say like John 3: 16) , all in an effort to convince you that you, Mr. or Ms. Heathen, are going against two thousand year old authority and God’s holy writ! The favorite quotes, by the way, seem to be all those dealing with “Hell” in the New Testament, or related to the end times and the “Beast” written about in Revelation. All of these, as well as the psychotic personality portrayed in the Old Testament, disclose (god-) concepts fashioned by human minds. Martin Foreman hits the nail squarely on the head when he writes[2]:

“No self-respecting human author, far less an all-knowing deity, would suggest (the Bible) is worthy to be considered a holy text”

Catholics at least are somewhat less predictable than Protestants, maybe because Catholics were forbidden to read the Bible for centuries, so didn’t develop the incredible fetishism and obsessive dependence displayed by many evangelical Protestants


8) Red Herring:

In any argument or debate with a diehard cultural warrior, the most anticipated tactic is always the red herring. This tried and true ruse represents an effort to re-direct a debate away from its central issue to a marginal or peripheral one.

Examples:

“Look at all the crime, the murders and the drugs going on! If it weren’t for atheists we’d have none of these!”

"Socialism has always failed because it seeks to steal from those who create the jobs, and produce the goods!"

In fact, none of the above are remotely related to, or effects from, the cause imputed. More atheists aren't going to increase crime (there are fewer atheists per capita in prisons than any other group), nor are socialists going to "steal" from those who create jobs.

In each case the red herring exploiter seeks to take attention off the real causes of whatever problems are under discussion and deflect them to a specious scapegoat or smokescreen cause. Thus, poverty and extreme economic inequality aren't examined as the primary sources of crime, drugs etc. - but instead atheism is blamed.  Similarly, an inefficient, capitalist economic model isn't examined  (based on the Pareto distribution) for why its sundry aspects fail in a low aggregate demand society. Instead,  Socialists are blamed for trying to "steal" the means of production - when in fact the alleged job creators are merely sitting on their money and doing nothing- leaving millions jobless - yes, who would have jobs under Socialism because tax monies would be used for capital works- alternate energy programs and not launching wars or specious spending.


9)Fallacy of Ambipholy:

Any statement or argument characterized by ambipholy contains imprecise grammar or syntax which permits one or more interpretations and hence is designed to mislead.  (Give only one of the interpretations will be accurate).   This fallacy generally occurs when a person attempts to support a conclusion using a faulty interpretation of a grammatically ambiguous statement.

Example:

Pons and Fleischmann's demonstration of cold fusion showed that we can obtain energy from nuclear fusion.

Here the mixup is between "cold fusion" and nuclear fusion, thereby leading too many readers to believe they are the same thing, but they are not. Pons and Flesichmann basically conducted their experiments at room temperatures while genuine nuclear fusion requires temperatures such as developed in special machines called tokamaks, e.g.

Brane Space: Fusion Power Within Ten Years? Basically A Pipe Dream

In addition, the cold fusion experiments never generated excess heat (thermal energy) beyond the limits of measurement errors.

A more prosaic example - from modern advertising:

"This mattress comes with a lifetime guarantee!"

With this statement in the advertisement, the consumer assumes the product is guaranteed for as long as she lives whereas a careful reading of the fine print actually reveals the guarantee refers to the life of the product, the mattress. In other words, when the mattress goes, it goes! THAT'S the lifetime!

Of course, the classic case of ambipholy - as Fr. Hecker informed us - was in Croesus, King of Lydia.  The story has it that the King asked an oracle if he could be assured a great victory in going to war with Persia.  The oracle replied: "You will destroy a great kingdom" - which Croesus interpreted to mean Persia.   So Croesus confidently went to war unaware the kingdom to be destroyed was his own.


10)The Straw Man fallacy:

This one is often used in political campaigns so we ought to be especially aware of it now with the midterms scheduled in 25 days.   The basic strategy is to set up a "straw" person who can be knocked down easier than the real one. In this case the straw is a dubious argument.  In effect, the opponent's argument is construed in the least sympathetic way possible or an earlier incident or event is elaborated on in the most deleterious fashion. Example:

"If the Democrats take over the House they will take away your tax cuts and use the money for 'Medicare for All."

In fact the Demos will do no such thing since the tax cuts passed last year are already law. What they CAN do is vote to prevent an extension of the existing tax cuts - which are projected to add more than $2 trillion to the deficit.

Another straw man to expect:

"The Senate Judiciary Democrats tried to destroy a good man during the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings and used the presumption of guilt instead of innocence"

They Senate Judiciary Dems did no such thing because the hearing was NOT a trial and Kavanaugh was not a "defendant" or the "accused".  He was a former federal judge now about to be promoted to the highest court and legal position in the land.  Hence, the hearing was a rigorous job interview nothing more. In any similar corporate capacity - with so much at stake (a nearly 30-40 year job position) do you really believe any LESS grilling would be done? If so,  you live in Wonderland.

Be aware this political season of the arguments trotted out in whatever venue, and see if you can apply critical thinking to validate them.

Mensa's Theists Still Don't Understand Atheists

Recent letters appearing in The Mensa Bulletin have garnered attention under the header: 'Atheists Come In Many Flavors'.   Indeed, and in one response I noted:

"Reading Scott Bowden’s letter  (‘Brainwaves’, September, p. 12), reminded me of  James Byrne’s arguments in his book, ‘GOD’ to do with the limits of humans' grasp of  such an entity. Byrne argued that all statements made by humans to do with God must be either incomplete or more often contradictory. Byrne thereby endorsed French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion’s ploy of  only writing  GOD. Thereby to indicate no one has the capacity to define, describe, prove, or  imagine  the underlying entity.

In effect, as Byrne observed (p.151)  “to think GOD as unthinkable is to reject the idolatry of the God of onto-theology.   Byrne’s thesis also introduced a problem for atheists. For if  this entity is de-conceptualized, then it can’t be debated, even by the most ardent, aggressive atheist. The latter ends up tilting at a windmill of the mind, like a modern Don Quixote.  I suspect the takeaway message is we need to look beyond facile word symbols and stop jousting at them if we’re to get a reasonable resolution.  The alternative is that debate will invariably prove futile since incomplete definitions and contradictions inevitably emerge, even in atheist claims and arguments."

This is actually a synthesis of arguments I also made in my book, Beyond Atheism,  Beyond God,  and in the relevant chapter I took pains to point out the "beyond" in the title  is a different thing from being “beyond knowledge” as the classic agnostic would define it. It is rather, beyond any capacity for human thought at all!  Thus, while the avowed agnostic may insist his position embraces impossibility of knowledge of God, this new category prohibits even naming the subject when expressing limitations of knowledge. It is more productive and practical, as Byrne avers, to regard God as a “regulative ideal”. Such an ideal for human use doesn’t necessarily preclude a transcendent Being, but it doesn’t require it either.

These observations became more relevant as the next blowback arrived in the October issue of the Bulletin with more theists putting in their 2 cents, including a padre. (Father John Oliver). For some reason Fr. Oliver wasn't limited to a mere 250 word letter but allocated an entire article headed: 'We Theists Come With Four Suggestions' directed at atheists and specified under what Oliver presumed to be four atheist categories.

His first broadside was directed at the "reluctant atheist" and he admonished:

"We theists encourage a reconsideration of agnosticism. Compared to atheism it is the more intellectually defensible position"

But is it really? And more to the point, does Fr. Oliver really know what agnosticism means? On parsing the context of Oliver's query it is clear to me he has no idea of agnosticism. I refer here to George Smith ('The Case Against God', p. 9):

Properly considered, agnosticism is not a third alternative to theism and atheism because it is concerned with a different aspect of religious belief. Theism and atheism  refer to the presence or absence of belief in a god; agnosticism refers to the impossibility of knowledge with regard to a god or supernatural being.

Note that this is a critical difference.  From a scientific and objective standpoint there is simply no way that any purported "supernatural" entity can be demonstrated or proven.  There are no existing scientific methodologies for such, nor any credible instruments, measuring techniques. The rejoinder that these things "can't be measured" merely reinforces the argument that they are unfit for scientific inquiry any more than the astrologer's claim of Mars' "malefic" influences on a birth. These more refined definitions are crucial, especially in honing people’s mental perspectives which in turn help to forge a coherent mental outlook. After all, if one cannot truly know anything supernatural, then how can one arrive at a supernaturally –based all powerful entity? One can't.

Because there is no way to approach a supernatural domain in any scientific or objective way, then by any reckonings it doesn't exist.  In this case, one need not even "deny" its existence because to all intents the supernatural entity becomes logically unnecessary, or redundant.  It doesn't  help us to make scientific predictions or explain natural phenomena. The point is, if any doubt is to be expressed in terms of the impossibility of knowledge then it must vastly multiplied for supernatural agents. 

As I noted in my ASTRONOMY magazine article:  ‘The God Factor’ (Astronomy Forum, March, 1990), science selectively excludes problems for which no practical method of inquiry exists. The supernatural, which is neither measurable or verifiable, falls into this category and that includes ‘God’ - if depicted as "causeless" and "supernatural". More to the point, we tend to regard such entities held by virtue of belief alone – as opposed to evidence - as evocative of superstition.  The latter encompasses such beliefs, especially when the supernatural realm is populated by invisible beings which can supposedly affect and interact with our world. To the empirical scientist this is the very epitome of superstition.

Fr. Oliver goes on to insist, quoting Thomas Edison: "We don't know one millionth of one percent of anything". Which is true, but this pertains to the realm of natural phenomena. It can't pertain to the supernatural because that is by definition unknowable, so it's preposterous to assert we don't know "one millionth" of that. We don't know any! .  Present me with what you claim is a supernatural event or entity, and I will provide a natural explanation for it.  But whatever you do you cannot appeal to the argument from ignorance.

Some religionists claim, for example, that consciousness is impossible to understand apart from a supernatural concept or formulation. But this is the classical argument from ignorance.  It commits the fallacy of  ignotum per ignotius : postulating an unknown agent or cause to account for a not well understood process, e.g. consciousness or rational thought within it.

The same goes for "miracles" used as examples of such. The Fatima "miracle" is a case in point. The supernaturalists had actually claimed the Sun to have gyrated and moved back and forth before 70,000 devout observers.  This indeed would have been the most fantastic event in history, of science too. But alas, no telescopes anywhere in the world detected such motions.   The only conclusion? Rather than all the observatories around the world being "blind" or their solar telescopes defective,   the entire crowd experienced a mass hallucination.  From a strictly rationalist viewpoint, the former has to be deemed more miraculous, so that the latter – no matter how much one’s temperament may rebel – has to be accepted as closer to the explanation!

This is what we call applying the Hume test, so according to David Hume:

"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish. "

By the Hume test one always selects the more probable natural option from two or more choices.

Fr. Oliver then makes this facile argument:

"Consider an attack on theism by an atheist to be a bit like an attack on swimming by someone who has never leapt into the pool. God is not an abstraction but an experience and therefore understandably unfamiliar to any who have not had the experience."

But this is a false analogy. For one thing, swimming is a real, wholly physical exercise not just an "experience". After all, one must know the correct moves, muscles to use to get from point A to B in a pool. Is Oliver saying God is a physical experience? Then it is a false analogy because there is no such thing as a supernatural experience for the reasons already given.  Hence, Fr. Oliver ends up begging the question of God's existence by invoking a specious example with no bearing on any rational approach to ascertain it.

Fr. Oliver demands the atheist to "pursue honest debate" - but at this stage we must demand it more of the sophist theist. An excellent way out of the morass is to consider necessary and sufficient conditions.  Robert Baum, in his textbook, LOGIC, p. 469-70, correctly observes that n-s conditions are practical replacements (in logic) for causes. In other words, instead of saying or asserting "x caused y", one stipulates that a, b are necessary conditions for x to exist at all, and c, d are sufficient conditions for y to have been the sole effect of cause x.

A necessary condition is one which, if absent, the entity cannot exist. A sufficient condition is one which, if present, the entity must exist. For example, a sufficient condition for the existence of a hydrogen emission nebula in space would be proximity of the nebula to a radiating star. The necessary condition is the nebula exists in the first place.

 Baum’s reasoning is clear (ibid.): because “cause” (generic) can be interpreted as proximate or remote, or even as the “goal or aim of an action” and is therefore too open-ended, ambiguous and construed in too many different ways. Thus, “cause” is too embedded in most people’s minds with only one of several meanings, leaving most causality discussions unproductive and confused. If my “cause” and your ‘cause” in a given argument diverge, then we will not get very far. Also, if we confront a disjunctive plurality of causes, we may be at moot dead ends using a naïve causal paradigm.

Thus, if you are going to make an argument on how or why the universe came to be, you can’t just say “God did it” or “Because God is the uncaused cause” – you must deliver the necessary and sufficient conditions for God to exist first. We can THEN examine these conditions in terms of how the universe actually looks, behaves and determine if the conditions are consistent.

Fr. Oliver's "swimming" example, then, is merely a red herring which doesn't really get to the core of either the pro-theist argument, or even advancing an honest one. He is correct in saying one can search via "experiential depths". This is, indeed, something I have been doing the past 40 odd years, which formed the basis of my last book, Beyond Atheism, Beyond God. But my conclusion - though I agreed modern physics offered a basis for a transcendent Being - is that one simply could not also identify it as being supernatural. It had to be a wholly physical-energy entity more in line with David Bohm's "Holomovement".

In Fr. Oliver's next paragraph, directed at the "activist atheist"  he insists:

"Surely you know more of classical theism than to accuse it of rejecting logic. Logos is of vital relevance to the theist, chiefly for its embodiment as a Person ("In the beginning was the logos and logos was with God") but also for its usefulness as a dialectic tool."

Several points to make here: First, if classical theism does indeed embrace logic, it ought to have done with specious false analogies like the swimming -experience one offered by Oliver earlier. Second, if theism doesn't reject logic it ought to have no problem applying Robert Baum's necessary and sufficient conditions to use to support existence of a deity. Third, while Fr. Oliver identifies "logos" with God it is more accepted by philosophers and biblical exegesis as referencing the dawning of consciousness in the brain.

When did this arise?   In his controversial 1976 book, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Julian Jaynes (a Princeton psychologist) argued that the brain activity of ancient people - those living roughly 3,500 years ago, prior to early evidence of consciousness  - would have resembled that of modern schizophrenics.  Jaynes maintained that, like schizophrenics, they'd have initiated conversations with unseen deities as well as inanimate objects and even been the beneficiaries of conversations from them! Only later, with the emergence of language, logic and quantitative empirical testing would actual human consciousness emerge. One can argue at this stage "logos" finally appeared.

In perhaps his most forthright appeal, Fr. Oliver directs attention at "militant atheists" imploring them thusly:

"When you attack theism, especially publicly, please deal with its non-caricatured expressions. Snake handlers and preachy politicians make easy targets but the hospitals, food banks and charity centers traceable to the conviction that God hides in the hungry, the poor, the suffering....are not easily refutable."

He is correct here that, too often,  the explicit atheists (which he calls "militant") go for the extremes, but is honest enough to acknowledge theists do likewise, invoking bloodthirsty totalitarian megalomaniacs like Stalin and Mao - who just happened to adopt atheism.

Alas, where he is dishonest is in conflating all branches of theism with Christianity. Hence, as much as he'd like us to invest incontrovertible power to his invocation of charitable works, these simply do not apply to all theisms. Below, for reference is a diagram that we can use to fix ideas on the breadth and scope of theism - which Fr. Oliver avoids:

So what he is referencing with his "hospitals, food banks" etc. is really a tiny domain with the small box on the left labeled  "monotheism".  It doesn't necessarily apply at all to the other boxes which feature other variants of  theism (e.g Hindu, Jain, Shinto, Buddhist etc.) that vastly outnumber the Christians  My point is that one cannot legitimately use the charity invocation if it doesn't apply to all parts of what you are defending which is THEISM, not Christianity alone.

Let's briefly cover some of the distinctions:

Polytheism refers to a belief in multiple deities each of which is worshipped or propitiated in turn. There is no formal injunction in any of these to be charitable.

Pantheism holds that nature and deity are bound up as one indistinguishable entity, most often as a single oneness or in terms of the regularities of natural laws. Thus, when one worships nature one is cognizant that an all encompassing power resides within it. While this form may lead to more compassion for other humans (as part of nature) it does not necessarily mandate any charitable works on their behalf.   A more subtle form is "natural law pantheism" which received attention after Einstein referred to it as "Spinoza's God". When pressed to explain himself, Einstein insisted he meant no personal God but rather "Spinoza's God, the order and harmony of all that exists."

Deism: Strictly speaking, deism treated in its orthodox and traditional manner is only one step removed from implicit atheism. In the Deist view an innominate, impersonal Intelligence created the cosmos - but then detached from it - so there's no further involvement.

The Deist God is analogous to an intelligent child who makes a toy with a gear wheel, and the toy has the ability to move after being wound up and released. Thus, the child makes the toy, winds it up, releases it down the sidewalk, then walks away never to glance at it or its final outcome, destination.

We know nearly all the Founders, the actual authors of the Constitution were hard core Deists, not  Christians.

 Fr. Oliver gets a gentleman's 'C' for his Bulletin effort, which at least doesn't go over the top in its portrayal of atheism like a letter writer (Dr. Barry Lamont) in the same issue. At least Oliver tries to keep his reasoning on an even keel though as I showed there are  number of places where it is full of holes.  Lamont, meanwhile, argued in his letter (p. 16):

"Atheists believe, with no possibility of proof, that God does not exist, nor can this basic premise of atheism be refuted by logic."

But, of course, this is not a "basic premise" at all, it is Lamont's mental permutation of what he believes is a basic premise of atheism. This is the cartoon version of atheism.   What we atheists actually say is that the whole idea of God is redundant – logically unnecessary – because it doesn’t help us to model any physical systems or make verifiable, empirical predictions that pertain to the natural world.

In addition, Lamont poses the "premise" as if atheists initiate a rejection or preemptive denial. In fact, it is the theist who usually proposes whatever deity claim (given atheists can't know in advance what his definition of "God" is)  to which the atheist simply withholds intellectual investment. Since the atheist is only the recipient of the claim (not the originator) it behooves the god claimant to provide the evidence for it. This is the same as if I claimed that an invisible Gnome lurks around all Trump rallies causing the crowds to go batshit nuts.  This may play well in the anti-Trump enclaves but doesn't pass muster with the rationalist.

Not surprisingly, Lamont - like Fr. Oliver- also errs in his take on agnosticism, calling theism and atheism "two diametrically opposed views". Hence, one is entitled to doubt each.  But this is oversimplified, failing to grasp the root of how there are actually different agnosticisms, as pointed out by George Smith (op. cit.) . Thus, agnosticism predicated on the "impossibility of knowledge" can be either theistic or atheistic in manifestation. The agnostic theist believes in the existence of a god but maintains the nature of god is unknowable. The agnostic atheist maintains any supernatural realm is inherently unknowable by the human mind. And further - not only is the nature of any supernatural realm, (e.g. "Hell") unknowable, but the existence of any supernatural being is unknowable as well.

To summarize:

1) The pure agnostic disdains any belief in a deity based on an absolute impossiblity of knowledge.

2) The agnostic theist BELIEVES in the existence of God, but argues it's useless to attempt to elaborate any divine nature (e.g. all-powerful, all loving, all knowing etc.) because the knowledge basis isn't there to permit such assumptions.

3) The agnostic atheist asserts all transcendents are unknowable and hence their existence is as well, so belief is impossible since it requires a leap of faith not warranted by reason alone.

Never mind, it is almost a certainty that in future debates between theists and atheists, the putative "agnostics" who fancy themselves above the fray will still get it wrong.

See also:

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/11/re-visiting-atheism-agnosticism.html